Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Sarina Sa'edi

About

Age: 16
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Sunni)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: October 27, 2022
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Sanandaj, Kordestan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Blunt Force Weapon
Age at time of alleged offense: 16

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

  • The right of a person not to be subjected to the capital punishment for an offence committed before the age of eighteen. The right not to be deprived of life while pregnant. 

ICCPR, Article 6.5; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37.a.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Sarina was a 16-year-old girl who dreamed of becoming a doctor or a university professor.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Ms. Sarina Sa’edi, daughter of Hashem and Farideh, was obtained through an ABC interview with an informed person (January 21, 2023). Additional information was gathered from BBC Persian (October 17, 2023), Kurdpa (July 4, 2023), and Tasnim News Agency (October 28 and 29, 2022).

Sarina Sa’edi was born on October 11, 2007, in Sanandaj. After her parents divorced when she was three years and eight months old, she and her younger brother were raised by their father and grandmother. She was a hardworking student who loved studying and often said, "I want to be useful to myself, my family, and society." She was a well-liked ninth-grade student who was admired by her teachers for her diligence, discipline, and character. She envisioned a bright future for herself and dreamed of becoming a university professor or a doctor. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023; BBC Persian, October 17, 2023).

Despite her young age, Ms. Sa’edi was socially and politically aware. She openly protested the killing of Mahsa Amini. According to an informed person, she actively and responsibly took part in the Sanandaj protests after Ms. Amini’s death. When her family expressed concern about her involvement, she replied, "Mahsa Amini, Hadis Najafi, and Sarina Esma'ilzadeh were girls like me who were killed! Why shouldn’t I go? They also had parents." (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

During her time in school, Sarina participated in acts of protest. She encouraged her classmates to remove portraits of the leaders of the Islamic Republic from classroom walls and tear their pictures out of books. After identifying her and several of her friends, the school administration warned them that any repeat of such acts would be reported to the intelligence authorities. According to her close friends, Sarina was actively involved in street demonstrations and was considered a leader. Together, they regularly took part in protests and painted slogans on walls. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023; BBC Persian, October 17, 2023).

On October 27, 2022, Sarina participated in the protests commemorating the 40th day after Mahsa Amini’s death. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The news of her death triggered protests, which started with a widespread expression of outrage on social media and the gathering of a large crowd in front of the hospital,continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried. Popular exasperation over the morality patrols and the veil in general, aggravated by misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the impunity generally granted to state agents for the violence used against detainees led to months of nationwide protests. Initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils, and youth in general, protesters adopted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” chanted during Amini’s burial. The protest rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. 

The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia.

Since the start of the nationwide protests, and particularly after reports in late September 2022 that a police commander in Rask had raped a 15-year-old Baloch girl, Sistan and Baluchestan Province became the scene of deadly demonstrations. Unlike in other provinces, security forces in Balochistan relied exclusively on live ammunition.

On September 30, 2022 (Zahedan’s Bloody Friday), worshippers at Makki Mosque demanded a transparent investigation into the sexual assault and accountability from officials. A small group of them marched toward Police Station No. 16 while chanting protest slogans, where they were met with direct gunfire from security forces and plainclothes agents. Armed forces even fired into the mosque itself. At least 97 people were killed in Zahedan that day. In the aftermath, cities across Balochistan, including Khash, Saravan, and Rask, witnessed further protest gatherings.

On November 4, 2022 (Khash’s Bloody Friday), security forces again responded with extreme violence. After Friday prayers, they opened fire with live ammunition on protesters and even bystanders. At least 18 people, including two children, were killed and many others were wounded.

The Zahedan protests continued every Friday for months. Under pressure, the Armed Forces Judiciary eventually indicted 11 members of the security forces on charges of “fatal and injurious shootings” and 15 others on charges of “abuse of authority and unlawful use of firearms.” The closed-door proceedings ended, after two years, with only a handful of low-ranking officers sentenced to ten years in prison. Families of the victims were offered blood money. None of the commanders or senior officials responsible for the massacre were prosecuted.

 By February 1, 2023, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported the number of recorded protests to be 1,262. The death toll, including protesters and passersby, stood at 527, of whom 71 were children. The number of arrests (including of wounded protesters) was estimated at a minimum at 22,000 , of whom 766 had already been tried and convicted. More than 100 protesters were at risk of capital punishment, and four had been executed in December 2022 and January 2023 without minimum standards of due process. Authorities also claimed 70 casualties among state forces, though there are consistent reports from families of killed protesters indicating authorities have pressured them or offered them rewards to falsely register their loved ones as such. Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.”

2022 Protests - Sanandaj

Following the death of Jina Mahsa Amini on September 15, 2022, protests commenced at Jina’s funeral in her hometown of Saqqez and spread afterward to other cities in Kordestan. Sanandaj was the first city where protesters turned out in solidarity with the people of Saqqez, and during the months-long duration of the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, various streets and neighborhoods in Sanandaj witnessed ongoing anti-government protests. Sanandaj was the city with the highest number of Kurdish citizens who lost their lives in the uprising – 22 of 123 total throughout Iran. State forces first killed protesters in this city on October 8, 2022. Repression of popular protests in Sanandaj was so intense that Amnesty International warned in an October 10, 2022 statement of “widespread dimensions of repression,” with state forces using weapons of war and firing at houses.  

Ms. Sarina Sa’edi’s arbitrary execution

According to available information, Sarina Sa’edi was attacked by security forces on October 27, 2022, for writing anti-government slogans on the streets of Sanandaj. She suffered severe head injuries from baton blows and died later that day after returning home and falling asleep (ABC interview, January 21, 2023). 

An informed person told the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center that Sarina and several friends had gone out after school that day to write protest slogans on city walls. They were soon ambushed by three groups of masked security agents on motorcycles, who attacked them with batons. Sarina, who was stronger than her friends, tried to protect them, but she was struck twice in the back of the head. When local residents rushed to the scene, the attackers fled the scene. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023)

Security officials on motorcycles attacked Sarina while she was writing protest slogans, beating her with batons on the head.

According to neighbors, Sarina seemed to be in poor physical shape when she got back home. Her clothes were covered in dust, and she fainted twice due to dizziness: once outside the door and again in the yard. Her family wanted to take her to the hospital, but she insisted she was okay and refused medical treatment. Despite her condition, she joined the street protests again that same night. Witnesses saw her carrying tires and using stones to block the road before she fainted again. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

According to her friends who were with her that night, Sarina insisted on staying out while they wanted to go home. They said she climbed over the wall of the local Basij base and set fire to its flag. (BBC Persian, October 17, 2023)

When Sarina got home, her father told her that neighbors had seen her at the protests and were worried she might have fallen or been hurt. Sarina reassured him, saying she had only felt dizzy because she hadn't eaten. She refused to let her family take her to the doctor. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023)

According to an informed person, Sarina went to sleep in her father’s room that night. The next day, October 28, 2022, was a Friday (a school holiday), so her family did not wake her. As was customary on weekends, they let her rest until the afternoon. Around 3:00 p.m., when her family tried to wake her, they found her body cold and unresponsive, though she still had a heartbeat. Her father called emergency services, but the operator reportedly said that due to unrest and a heavy workload, it was not possible to send an ambulance. As a result, Sarina’s aunt drove her to Towhid Hospital in Sanandaj. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

The medical staff confirmed that Sarina had died several hours earlier. Her family believed that blows to her head with a baton caused internal bleeding, which led to her death. Right after her passing, four Law Enforcement Command (NAJA) vehicles and two plainclothes police cars arrived at the hospital. The officers questioned Sarina’s father about her condition, then took him to Police Station No. 113 on Palestine Street (formerly Gendarmerie Street) to complete administrative procedures. Afterward, the officers asked him to return to the hospital with them. At the hospital, security agents and state media representatives were present, pressuring Mr. Sa’edi by threatening to detain his son and withhold his daughter’s body to enforce the narrative they dictated on camera. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023; BBC Persian, October 17, 2023).

In footage later released by state-run news agencies like Tasnim and Mehr, a female reporter asks Mr. Sa’edi in Kurdish about the cause of his daughter’s death. In the video, he states that his daughter "committed suicide" due to her parents' divorce and family issues. After the forced interview, Sarina’s body was taken to Behesht-e Mohammadi Cemetery in Sanandaj by security agents at midnight. Initially, the family was told that only the parents and one other person of their choice would be allowed to enter the cemetery. However, after the family resisted and a written pledge was obtained from Mr. Sa’edi’s brother-in-law, who works at the cemetery, about twenty family members were permitted to attend. A person involved in the burial said that Sarina’s head and body had visible bruises and trauma marks, as well as signs of an autopsy. There were two indentations on her head, one at the top and one at the back. Sarina Sa’edi’s body was buried under strict surveillance in Section 12 of the cemetery, in the presence of many security officials and a limited number of relatives. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

According to the death certificate issued by the Sanandaj (District 1) Civil Registration Office, the cause of death was listed as "unknown." (Death Certificate, October 31, 2022).

The fortieth-day memorial for Sarina was well attended by the people of Sanandaj. Participants chanted anti-government slogans during the service. (BBC Persian, October 17, 2023)

Officials’ Reaction

Security officials, the on-duty judge, and the governor of Kurdistan Province forced Sarina Sa’edi’s father to publicly declare that his daughter had committed suicide in front of state media cameras. They threatened that if he refused to cooperate, he would be prevented from leaving the hospital; his 14-year-old son would be arrested and detained on national security charges; and Sarina’s body would not be handed over to the family. The governor also posted on social media, claiming that Sarina’s death was caused by a drug overdose. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

Security officials prevented the family from holding a proper funeral and took Sarina’s body from the hospital for a nighttime burial. Initially, agents kept her relatives from entering the cemetery. However, after the family signed a written pledge, only about 20 people were allowed to attend. The burial was conducted under strict security surveillance. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

Security officials confiscated Sarina’s mobile phone and never returned it to her family. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023) The agents also threatened the family, forbidding them from speaking to the media about the circumstances of her death. (Kurdpa, October 28, 2022)

Mehdi Ramezani, then Deputy Governor of Political, Security, and Social Affairs in Kurdistan Province, denied that police had killed Sarina Sa’edi. He claimed that her death was not related to the riots. (Tasnim News Agency, October 28, 2022)

The state-affiliated outlet also published coerced statements from Sa’edi, quoting him as saying, "According to preliminary investigations, my daughter's death was caused by the accidental or intentional use of drugs or psychotropic substances." (Tasnim News Agency, October 29, 2022).

The Sanandaj Deputy Prosecutor's Office summoned Mr. Sa'edi and his sister by phone to appear before the Sanandaj Judiciary. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

On June 9, 2023, security forces arrested Mr. Hashem Sa’edi at the entrance to Saqqez after he attended a memorial service for victims of the "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests. He was transferred to Bukan Prison and released on June 20, 2023, after posting bail. On July 3, 2023, Branch 101 of the Second Criminal Court of Bukan sentenced him to six and a half months in prison and 40 lashes for “disturbing public order.” (Kurdpa, July 4, 2023).

Familys’ Reaction

Sarina Sa’edi’s family refused to follow the restrictions imposed by security agents on her burial ceremony. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023)

After his coerced interview aired on state television (IRIB), Sarina’s father took to Instagram to urge people "not to be misled by the interview," declaring, "I will not sell my daughter's blood." (BBC Persian, October 17, 2023).

According to an informed source, Mr. Sa’edi also reacted to the statement by the then governor of Sanandaj, who asserted that Sarina’s death was caused by a "drug overdose." He responded, "Why do you tarnish people's reputation?" referencing Sarina’s death certificate, which listed the cause of death as "unknown," and questioned the authorities' claims. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023)

Mr. Sa’edi continued to pursue justice and accountability for his daughter’s death. He visited other victims’ graves and spoke with families also seeking justice. (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

At her daughter’s graveside, Sarina’s mother mourned her loss and said: "My sweet girl, my dear and noble daughter, you made your mother proud. I am proud of you." (BBC Persian, October 17, 2023).

Impacts on Family

According to an informed person, Sarina’s death had a devastating and irreparable impact on her family. Her father was unable to work and stayed home for some time. Sarina’s grandparents were emotionally traumatized by the loss of their granddaughter, and her brother, who had always been by her side, felt isolated and alone (ABC interview, January 21, 2023).

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