Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Mohammad Hossein Feizi

About

Age: 26
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: June 20, 2009
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Safa Alley, Azadi Square, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Arbitrary shooting » Assault weapon/ Fire arm » targeting vital organs

About this Case

When Mr. Feiz’s wife told the family he hadn’t come home, they searched everywhere they could think of but found no sign of him. Eventually, they got a call from Mohammad Hossein’s phone. During the call, they were informed that Mr. Feiz had been shot.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Mohammad Hossein Feiz, son of Gholamreza, was obtained from Radio Farda (May 18, 2014) and HRANA (July 21, 2009). Mr. Feiz’s name appears on numerous lists of individuals killed during the 2009 post-election protests. Additional information was gathered from the Iran newspaper (June 28, 2009); the Jaras — Green Path of Hope website (September 21, 2011); the Dana News Network (December 30, 2014); Sorkheh website (2013); Shams, the Oppressed Green Martyrs website (date unknown); and Pezhvak-e Iran (date unknown).

Little is known about Mr. Feiz's personal life, including his exact date of birth. According to his mother, however, he was born on the last day of the lunar calendar month of Rajab. Because his birthday fell between the anniversaries of the Prophet Muhammad’s mission (Mab’ath) and the birth of Imam Hussein, the third Shia Imam, he was named Mohammad Hossein (Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017).

Mr. Feiz was born into a traditional religious family in Sorkheh and grew up in Mashhad. He obtained a high school diploma in accounting and completed his military service with the Student Basij Organization. According to his mother, he married after finishing his military service and had a two-year-old child. He later moved from Mashhad to Tehran, where he worked with his brother at a tech company (Dana News Network, December 30, 2014; Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017; Sorkheh website, 2013).

In an interview with the state-run Tasnim News Agency, Mr. Feiz’s mother said that he “participated in mourning ceremonies for the Prophet’s household (Ahl al-Bayt) since childhood.” She added that Mohammad Hossein joined the Student Basij in middle school. He was a professional martial artist and served as a physical education instructor at the Shahid Qa’em Basij base in Mashhad” (Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017).

Mr. Feiz’s father was described as "a staunch supporter of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and former President Mahmud Ahmadinejad." For this reason, official sources did not label him a protester (Radio Farda, May 18, 2014; Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017). However, multiple other media outlets reported that Mohammad Hossein Feiz participated in the protests, citing "friends and relatives" or "another family member." These sources noted that "he was constantly worried and upset during the tense days following the 2009 presidential election." They also stated that "there is much left unsaid about Mohammad Hossein, but for certain reasons, they have been forced to remain silent" (Radio Farda, May 18, 2014; Pezhvak-e Iran, quoting the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, undated).

2009 Election - Background

Election returns from Iran’s June 12th, 2009, presidential election declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected with 62.63 percent of the vote.  Following the announcement, citizens disputing these official results demonstrated in the streets.  Text messaging services were disrupted starting at 11:00 p.m. on the night before the election and remained unavailable for nearly three weeks, until July 1st. On Election Day, the deputy chief of Iranian police announced a ban on any gathering of presidential candidates’ supporters throughout the country.  The same evening, security forces made a “show of strength,” increasing their presence in Tehran’s public squares to “reinforce security at polling stations.”  Officials at election headquarters began reporting results soon after midnight, despite a statement from the Minister of the Interior that the first returns would not be announced until after the morning prayer (around 4:00 a.m.).

Many supporters of other presidential candidates came out into the streets on June 13th, once the results were made public, to protest what they believed to be a fraudulent election.  Candidates Mir Hossein Musavi, Mehdi Karubi, and Mohsen Reza’i, Ahmadinejad’s competitors in the race, contested the election, alleging many instances of fraud.  They filed complaints with the Council of Guardians, the constitutional body charged with vetting candidates before elections take place and approving the results afterwards, requesting an annulment and calling for a new election.  Before the Council of Guardians could review their claims, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election.  In the meantime, many people active in Karubi’s and Musavi’s campaigns were arrested.

On June 15th, unprecedented demonstrations filled the streets of central Tehran, in which an estimated three million protestors participated, according to statements attributed to the mayor of Tehran.  As the demonstrations were ending, paramilitary forces attacked the marchers, injuring and killing several people.  To prevent such news from being broadcast, the Iranian government expelled foreign journalists from the country and banned news agencies from reporting on the events.  Over the next three days, protesters took part in peaceful demonstrations in Tehran.  The repression entered a new phase on June 19th after Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday sermon, in which he announced his support for Ahmadinejad and warned protestors that they were responsible for any disorder and its consequences. Amnesty International stated that the speech gave “legitimacy to police brutality.”  The next day and thereafter, police and plainclothes paramilitary groups attacked the protesters.  Public gatherings of any kind were declared illegal, and police, motorcycle-riding special units wearing black uniforms and helmets, and plainclothes agents brutally enforced this restriction.

Individuals in civilian clothing, commonly referred to as plainclothes forces, are used in the Islamic Republic to disrupt political and trade union activities, student events and gatherings, electoral initiatives, and protests.  Armed with sticks and clubs, and sometimes with chains, knives, batons, or firearms, they emerge when the state decides to suppress dissent.  These plainclothes forces move about freely, violently beating protesters and arresting them, while the police passively look on or actively cooperate with them. 

There is little information on the command structure and organization of such groups, whose members wear ordinary clothing rather than official uniforms and may be affiliated with the ministry of information, influential political groups, or the armed forces. Following the post-election demonstrations in June 2009, pictures of some plainclothes agents were posted on internet websites.  Internet users helped to identify some of them and provided evidence that these individuals were affiliated with the Basij paramilitary groups, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and state intelligence forces. On September 16, 2009, a deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Province of Tehran confirmed the active and decisive role of Basij forces in the repression of the demonstrations, saying, “Basijis, through their presence in recent events, have blinded the eyes of the conspirators, and they should be appreciated… The enemies of Islam wanted to make the air dusty and to exploit the recent events, but thank God, through the enlightenment of the Honorable Leader we were victorious against this conspiracy.” He also emphasized, “The zealous youth of [the] Basij, believers in the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, are the second and third generations of the Revolution.  They have been successful in this stage and victorious on this battlefield.”

When personal property was damaged during the protests, government authorities and state-run radio and television programs accused the demonstrators of vandalism and justified the repression.  At the same time, however, footage posted online showed security forces destroying and damaging property on side streets and in uncongested areas away from the protests.  Moreover, in a public gathering in Tehran on October 20th, the chief of Iranian police conceded that police had destroyed and damaged property and accepted responsibility for it.

The precise number of citizens injured, killed, or disappeared in the post-election violence is not known.  According to various reports, there were hundreds of victims in demonstrations throughout the country.  More than seventy names have been reported.  It is said that officials have threatened victims’ family members, demanding their silence and that they refrain from giving interviews.  Reports also allege that returning a victim’s body to a family has been made conditional upon their agreement to change the cause of death listed on the coroner’s certificate to that of a heart attack or some other natural cause — thus foregoing the right to file a complaint — as well as the family's agreement not to hold memorial services for the loved one. 

According to government statements, more than 4,000 people were arrested throughout Iran in the weeks following June 12th. Many have been held at the Kahrizak Detention Center, where prisoners’ rights and minimum hygiene standards were typically ignored.  Numerous reports of violence, including the torture and rape of detainees, have been published.  State reports and testimonies confirm that a number of detainees at Kahrizak died in custody due to beatings, difficult and unbearable prison conditions, and torture.

Mr. Mohammad Hossein Feiz’s arbitrary execution

According to available information, Mohammad Hossein Feiz was shot and killed by security forces on June 20, 2009, while protesting the results of the presidential election on Azadi Street in Tehran.

There are two conflicting stories about how he died. His mother said he planned to visit a local Basij Resistance Base on Saturday, June 20, to inquire about the situation before returning to his job. She said he was shot and killed in front of the base (Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017). However, according to Pezhvak-e Iran, citing the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, other media sources reported that Mr. Feiz was at a protest on Azadi Street near a Basij base in Tehran’s Meqdad district when he was fatally shot in the back of the head. Despite the different accounts, both confirm that a 26-year-old man was killed by a military bullet.

When Mr. Feiz didn't return home, his wife notified the family. They searched everywhere they could think of but found no sign of him until they finally received a call from Mohammad Hossein’s mobile phone, informing them that Mr. Feiz had been shot (Radio Farda, May 18, 2014).

The Feiz family confirmed his identity at the Kahrizak Forensic Medicine Organization on June 22, 2009 (Radio Farda, May 18, 2014).

He was buried in Section 257, Row 31, Grave 25 of Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery in Tehran. Memorial ceremonies were held for him in multiple cities, including Mashhad, Shirvan, Tehran, and Semnan (Radio Farda, May 18, 2014; HRANA, July 21, 2009; Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017).

He was 26 years old at the time of his death. (HRANA, July 21, 2009).

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms.

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible:

a) Warning shots.

b) Shots aimed at the lower body.

c) Shots aimed at the upper body.

(Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

**Note 1:** If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Given this situation, the families of those killed in the recent protests should file a complaint of murder with the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office against the law enforcement officials involved. Although the prosecutor's office is responsible for conducting its own investigation, it is important to file the complaint and request an autopsy and forensic analysis before the body is buried. In addition, if there are witnesses to the scene, their written statements should be obtained as soon as possible. Their identifying information should also be recorded so that it can be presented later in court. The prosecutor's office should be asked to review any available CCTV footage of the scene. A major problem in these cases is the unwillingness of prosecutors to conduct a complete investigation. Without a complete investigation, it is difficult for the victim's family to identify a specific official as the perpetrator or to prove that the shooting was intentional.

Officials’ Reaction

Masumeh Ebtekar and Mohammad Ali Najafi, both members of the Tehran City Council at the time and close associates of Mir Hossein Musavi, one of the opposition presidential candidates in the 2009 election, visited the home of Mr. Mohammad Hossein Feiz along with several representatives from the Tehran branch of the Iranian Red Crescent. According to Mr. Feiz’s sister, during this visit, they asked, “Why did you file a complaint against Mr. Musavi?” and insisted that the family withdraw their complaint. "But my father said, 'That is impossible,'" she recalled (Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017). At the same time, according to his sister, authorities initially did not recognize her brother as a martyr. "However, after further examinations following the autopsy, they said he would also be considered a martyr." The Martyrs Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid) later offered the family the option of transferring his remains to the martyrs' section of the cemetery (Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017).

The Court for Government Employees accepted the Feiz family’s complaint against opposition presidential candidates Mir Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi, holding them responsible for their son's death. Several sessions were held, but no verdict was ever issued. The family was merely informed that "the time for their trial has not yet come" (Sorkheh website, 2013; Dana News Network, December 30, 2014).

On October 12, 2009, Brigadier General Abdollah Araqi, commander of the Basij forces in Tehran, confirmed that Basij members opened fire on protesters near the Ashura Battalion 117 base during protests. This confirmation took place during a ceremony marking the appointment of new Basij Organization leaders for Tehran Province's teachers and students (ISNA, October 12, 2009).

Familys’ Reaction

The family of Mr. Mohammad Hossein Feiz filed a complaint with the Court for Government Employees against Mir Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi, holding them responsible for their son’s death. Two years later, frustrated by the lack of results, Mr. Feiz’s father said: "We are not concerned about the outcome. It was our duty to take legal action. We filed the complaint, and the authorities followed up on it. Several sessions were held and some measures were taken, but no specific person was ever identified” (Iran Newspaper, June 28, 2009; Sorkheh Website, 2013; Green Path of Hope, September 2011).

In interviews with various media outlets, Mr. Feiz’s parents and sister described him as "a Basij member devoted to the Supreme Leader," and blamed those who spoke of "election fraud" for his death (Tasnim News Agency, December 2017; Dana News Network, December 30, 2014). However, only a few websites, such as Jaras, quoted "friends and acquaintances" who said that Mohammad Hossein Feiz "was not a Basij member and, like many other young people, was among the protesters" (Green Path of Hope, September 21, 2011; Tasnim News Agency, December 2017; Dana News Network, December 30, 2014).

According to Mr. Feiz’s sister, the family declined the Martyrs Foundation’s offer to move his remains to the official "Martyrs Section" of the cemetery. They explained that "there was no need for additional expenses, and having the word 'martyr' engraved on his gravestone was enough." As a result, the title “martyr” was inscribed on his grave (Tasnim News Agency, December 30, 2017).

The Feiz family claimed that several reformist figures and supporters of Mir Hossein Musavi—the opposition presidential candidate in 2009—such as Ms. Masumeh Ebtekar, Mr. Ahmad Masjed Jame’i, and Mr. Mohammad Ali Najafi, all members of the Tehran City Council at the time, visited their home to persuade them to withdraw their complaint against Musavi. They reportedly urged the family to blame the Islamic Republic for their son’s death. However, Mr. Feiz’s father said he was willing to sacrifice all his children for the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic (Tasnim News Agency, December 2017; Dana News Network, December 30, 2014).

According to Mr. Feiz’s mother, several years after her son’s death, the family wrote a letter accusing Mohammad Ali Najafi—a political figure associated with Mir Hossein Musavi—of being “among those behind the betrayal of 2009” when he was nominated as Minister of Education before the Iranian Parliament. They believe this letter contributed to Najafi’s failure to receive a vote of confidence (Tasnim News Agency, December 2017).

Mr. Feiz’s sister also objected to her brother’s name appearing on websites that list those killed in the Green Movement protests. She said her family rejected “such a label” and considered it as a “misuse of his name.” She added that people sometimes tie green ribbons to her brother’s grave. However, she emphasized that her family is "loyal to the Supreme Leader" and believes that "the harm caused by that sedition [the 2009 protests] was even greater than the eight-year war because this time, people were turned against one another" (Tasnim News Agency, December 2017).

Impacts on Family

According to Mohammad Hossein’s mother, her two-year-old son was deeply attached to his father. She recalled that, for forty days after his father’s passing, the child would stand by the door waiting for him to return home. Even years later, in the fifth grade, he still vividly remembered those days (Tasnim News Agency, December 2017

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