Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Artin Rahmani piyani

About

Age: 17
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: November 16, 2022
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Izeh, Khuzestan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Arbitrary shooting » Assault weapon/ Fire arm » targeting vital organs
Age at time of alleged offense: Under 18

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

  • The right of a person not to be subjected to the capital punishment for an offence committed before the age of eighteen. The right not to be deprived of life while pregnant. 

ICCPR, Article 6.5; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37.a.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Artin left school at age fifteen to work in an auto mechanic shop. He worked with his uncle in Izeh and dreamed of moving to Ahvaz with him to open their own shop. His greatest ambition was to open his own garage in Tehran one day and become a master mechanic of foreign cars.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Mr. Artin Rahmani Piani, son of Hengameh Chubin and Aghasi Rahmani Piani, was gathered from an ABC interview with a close relative (December 29, 2023). Additional details were obtained from reports published on the websites of Iran International (May 1, 2025; May 22, 2024); ILNA (November 16, 2022); IRNA (November 17, 2022; November 18, 2022; January 16, 2023); Tabnak (November 18, 2022); BBC Persian (November 18, 2022); Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (November 19, 2022); Radio Zamaneh (February 10, 2023); Kayhan London (November 21, 2022); and Hengameh Chubin's Instagram page (April 8, 2023; April 26, 2023).

Artin Rahmani Piani was born on July 23, 2005, in the village of Pian, near Izeh. He was the oldest of three children in his family.

At age fourteen, he dropped out of school to work in an auto mechanic shop. He worked at a mechanic’s shop in Izeh and had plans to move to Ahvaz with his uncle to open their own mechanic shop. His dream was to eventually open a garage in Tehran and become a master mechanic who specialized in foreign cars. In a notebook addressed to his mother, Artin wrote, "I am sorry, Mother. I want to set out on a path where you may no longer see my youth." (Kayhan London, November 21, 2022; ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023; Iran International, May 1, 2025).

Following the outbreak of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, Artin joined the demonstrations alongside his friends and relatives. In solidarity with the three-day nationwide strike held in remembrance of those killed during the November 2019 protests, Artin refrained from going to work from November 5–7, 2022. He was upset that the owner of the mechanic shop refused to close in support of the strike. He also shared the strike call on his Instagram story (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023).

Artin actively participated in the November 2022 Izeh protests, walking 18 kilometers from his village of Pian to the city with friends and relatives. On November 15, he wore a yellow jacket to a protest, making him stand out in the crowd. According to a close relative who accompanied him, Artin was fearless and often stood at the forefront of the protests. His uncle was deeply worried about his nephew's life because of this boldness (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023).

In his final Instagram story, Artin wrote, "This land never gave me anything, but I'll give it my life" (Kayhan London, November 21, 2022).

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The news of her death triggered protests, which started with a widespread expression of outrage on social media and the gathering of a large crowd in front of the hospital,continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried. Popular exasperation over the morality patrols and the veil in general, aggravated by misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the impunity generally granted to state agents for the violence used against detainees led to months of nationwide protests. Initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils, and youth in general, protesters adopted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” chanted during Amini’s burial. The protest rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. 

The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia.

Since the start of the nationwide protests, and particularly after reports in late September 2022 that a police commander in Rask had raped a 15-year-old Baloch girl, Sistan and Baluchestan Province became the scene of deadly demonstrations. Unlike in other provinces, security forces in Balochistan relied exclusively on live ammunition.

On September 30, 2022 (Zahedan’s Bloody Friday), worshippers at Makki Mosque demanded a transparent investigation into the sexual assault and accountability from officials. A small group of them marched toward Police Station No. 16 while chanting protest slogans, where they were met with direct gunfire from security forces and plainclothes agents. Armed forces even fired into the mosque itself. At least 97 people were killed in Zahedan that day. In the aftermath, cities across Balochistan, including Khash, Saravan, and Rask, witnessed further protest gatherings.

On November 4, 2022 (Khash’s Bloody Friday), security forces again responded with extreme violence. After Friday prayers, they opened fire with live ammunition on protesters and even bystanders. At least 18 people, including two children, were killed and many others were wounded.

The Zahedan protests continued every Friday for months. Under pressure, the Armed Forces Judiciary eventually indicted 11 members of the security forces on charges of “fatal and injurious shootings” and 15 others on charges of “abuse of authority and unlawful use of firearms.” The closed-door proceedings ended, after two years, with only a handful of low-ranking officers sentenced to ten years in prison. Families of the victims were offered blood money. None of the commanders or senior officials responsible for the massacre were prosecuted.

 By February 1, 2023, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported the number of recorded protests to be 1,262. The death toll, including protesters and passersby, stood at 527, of whom 71 were children. The number of arrests (including of wounded protesters) was estimated at a minimum at 22,000 , of whom 766 had already been tried and convicted. More than 100 protesters were at risk of capital punishment, and four had been executed in December 2022 and January 2023 without minimum standards of due process. Authorities also claimed 70 casualties among state forces, though there are consistent reports from families of killed protesters indicating authorities have pressured them or offered them rewards to falsely register their loved ones as such. Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.”

Background of the Izeh Protests

In November 2022, coinciding with the anniversary of the November 2019 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, public calls on social media led to a three-day strike and widespread demonstrations in Izeh. On the night of November 16, security forces’ intervention turned the protests violent, and seven citizens, including two children, were killed. The mother of Kian Pirfalak, one of the victims—who was in the car at the time of the shooting and witnessed the attack on her son and husband—stated at the funeral that security forces had opened fire on their vehicle. However, government officials denied responsibility, blamed the killings on “armed thugs,” and referred to the deceased as “martyrs”.

Following the incident, a group of young people in Izeh, in reaction to the killing of fellow citizens, issued calls on social media for “revenge.” Authorities labeled several of these protesters as “terrorists” and responsible for the deaths, then launched an armed raid on their hideout. Two of the young men were killed in the raid, and one, Mojahed Kurkur, was arrested while injured. Despite the formal consent of Kian Pirfalak’s family and their declaration that they would not press charges against Kurkur, he was ultimately executed on charges of “Murder and Waging war against God.”

Mr. Artin Rahmani Piani’s arbitrary execution

According to available information, Artin Rahmani Piani was fatally shot on November 16, 2022, while participating in a protest on South Hafez Street in Izeh. He died after being transferred to the hospital.

The nationwide "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests coincided with the anniversary of the November 2019 demonstrations, and people in Izeh joined the movement as well. On Wednesday, November 16, the city witnessed large numbers of protesters. Based on field reports and ABC interviews with two eyewitnesses, security forces opened fire on the demonstrators, killing at least seven people and injuring ten others.

That day, Artin told his mother that he intended to join the protests. Unlike the previous day, he wore black clothes and disappeared into the crowd. Around 8 p.m., he informed his uncle, who was also there, that he was among the protesters. They briefly saw each other before the situation escalated and the armed forces began shooting, forcing them apart.

Around 10 p.m., Artin’s uncle received a call from a friend saying that Artin had been shot on South Hafez Street and taken to the hospital. After calling Artin’s cell phone, his mother learned from the person who answered that her son had been killed and that his body was at the hospital. When the family arrived, they saw Artin’s body alongside those of several other victims. According to the family, Artin had been shot three times: once in the head and twice in the chest (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023).

On Thursday morning, November 17, Artin’s body was transferred to the Forensic Medicine Organization in Ahvaz. The family was told that they would have to travel there to identify him again. His father traveled to Ahvaz, but the authorities refused to release his son’s body (ABC interview with an informed source, December 29, 2023).

After a state-run funeral at the “Izeh Martyrs’ Hill” and a refusal to bury Artin in the “martyrs’ section,” his family took his body and returned him to his home village of Pian, located 18 kilometers from Izeh. When the coffin arrived in Pian, mourners tore off the state flag that had been draped over it during the official ceremony and set it on fire. Artin was buried according to Bakhtiari tradition, without Islamic burial rites and amid protest slogans. Security agents attempted to perpetuate the state's narrative by playing Quranic recitations and leading funeral prayers, but the crowd prevented them, chanting: "Bakhtiaris have no tradition of Islamic prayer." (Kayhan London, November 21, 2022).

"This land has never given me anything, but I'll give it my life."

— Artin Rahmani’s last Instagram story

Artin’s fortieth-day memorial was also held amid security threats and pressure. Nevertheless, attendees expressed solidarity with the Rahmani family by chanting slogans such as "Death to the dictator" and "Woman, life, freedom" (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023; Radio Zamaneh, February 10, 2023).

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms.

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible:

a) Warning shots.

b) Shots aimed at the lower body.

c) Shots aimed at the upper body.

(Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

**Note 1:** If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Given this situation, the families of those killed in the recent protests should file a complaint of murder with the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office against the law enforcement officials involved. Although the prosecutor's office is responsible for conducting its own investigation, it is important to file the complaint and request an autopsy and forensic analysis before the body is buried. In addition, if there are witnesses to the scene, their written statements should be obtained as soon as possible. Their identifying information should also be recorded so that it can be presented later in court. The prosecutor's office should be asked to review any available CCTV footage of the scene. A major problem in these cases is the unwillingness of prosecutors to conduct a complete investigation. Without a complete investigation, it is difficult for the victim's family to identify a specific official as the perpetrator or to prove that the shooting was intentional.

Officials’ Reaction

Shortly after Artin Rahmani was killed on the evening of November 16, 2022, the official Islamic Republic news agency ILNA described the incident as a “terrorist act” and identified two armed motorcyclists who allegedly opened fire on the crowd with military-grade weapons. Subsequently, some state outlets, including IRNA, published a statement attributed to ISIS claiming responsibility. The following day, however, it became clear that the statement was fake and that ISIS had no role in the incident. Nevertheless, the authorities continued to portray the attack as a "terrorist act" and link it to foreign entities. (ILNA, November 16, 2022; Tabnak; BBC Persian, November 18, 2022; Radio Zamaneh, February 10, 2023).

On November 17, 2022, when Artin’s family went to the Forensic Medicine Organization in Ahvaz to receive his body, officials refused and announced that a public funeral would be held at Izeh Martyrs’ Hill. Judicial authorities pressured the Rahmani family to describe Artin’s death as the result of a "terrorist attack" on television and to agree to bury him in the martyrs' section. According to a person close to the family, the authorities warned that, if the family refused, Artin’s body would be buried without them present. The family was also required to sign a written pledge that the funeral would be conducted quietly and without issue. (IRNA, November 17, 2022; ABC interview with an informed person, December 29, 2023).

On November 18, 2022, a state funeral was held for seven citizens killed in the November 16 protests. The funeral was labeled the "Martyrs of the Izeh Terrorist Operation" and was attended by national and provincial officials. At the time, Abdolreza Seifi was the political-social deputy governor of Khuzestan. He repeated the “terrorist” narrative, claiming that a terrorist group had taken advantage of the unrest to fire on people. He dismissed allegations that security forces were responsible as the work of hostile media outlets and insisted that police do not use military weapons. Speaking on a state television program, the provincial security and policing deputy likewise called the attack "terrorist" and stated: "On Wednesday evening, November 16, 2022, at approximately 5:30 p.m., motorcycle riders opened fire on innocent people and security officials. Initially, five were reported killed and ten wounded, including two Basij militia members” (IRNA, November 18, 2022; IRIB, November 19, 2022; Radio Zamaneh, February 10, 2023).

In the days following Artin’s death, various government and judicial officials repeatedly announced arrests and identifications of the perpetrators. However, no individual was ever publicly named as responsible for the killing. During a visit to Khuzestan, Mohammad Mokhber, the first vice president, demanded “swift and decisive punishment of the perpetrators.” Mohsen Reza'i, the vice president of economic affairs at the time, claimed that three main perpetrators had been arrested at the Maku border and returned to Khuzestan. He also alleged that terrorists had destroyed local CCTV cameras the night before the incident. Sadeq Khalilian, the provincial governor at the time, announced the arrest of 11 people allegedly linked to the event. He claimed that the ringleaders were abroad, exploiting unrest among the youth. On January 16, 2023, Yarmohammad Resalati, the Izeh public prosecutor, stated that 70 suspects had been identified and cases had been opened against them. He noted that 61 of these individuals had previously been detained in Izeh. (IRNA, November 18, 2022; IRNA, January 16, 2023).

State institutions repeatedly tried to convince the Rahmani family to accept the official story that Artin was killed in a "terrorist operation." The Martyrs Foundation offered to recognize Artin as a "martyr" and suggested naming a school after him, but the family rejected these proposals. Security authorities continued to pressure the family. After the burial, the Criminal Investigation Office and the Izeh Intelligence Office repeatedly contacted Fo’ad Chubin, Artin’s uncle. Ultimately, they arrested him on April 11, 2023. After 12 days in custody, he called his family and said he had been severely tortured, resulting in a broken nose and teeth, and forced to make coerced confessions. He was forced to give his fingerprints for interrogation documents, and following interrogation, he was transferred from the intelligence detention center in Ahvaz to Sheiban Prison in very poor physical and mental condition. (ABC interview with an informed source, December 29, 2023; Hengameh Chubin’s Instagram, April 8 and 26, 2023).

On June 1, 2023, the head of the security and intelligence police in Izeh issued a summons to Hengameh Chubin, Artin’s mother, regarding social media posts she had published about her son’s killing. The following year, in May 2024, intelligence ministry agents summoned and threatened the family after they publicly reacted to the helicopter crash that killed President Ebrahim Ra'isi. The agents warned that if the family continued their media activity and posted stories, other family members would be targeted. According to the family, the agents said: "If you celebrate the president’s death, we will show no mercy to your children. We will kill them all." (Iran International, May 22, 2024; copy of the summons in the ABC archive).

The Forensic Medicine Organization withheld Artin Rahmani’s official documents, including the death certificate and autopsy report, from the family for at least three years after his death (Radio Zamaneh, February 10, 2023). (Radio Zamaneh, February 10, 2023).

Familys’ Reaction

The Rahmani family resisted pressure from the prosecutor’s office to appear on television and claim that Artin was killed in a “terrorist attack.” Despite threats from security forces to withhold or bury his body without the family’s knowledge, the family publicly asserted that Artin had been killed by the Islamic Republic’s security forces. They made it clear that even if his body were never returned, they would not accept the official claim. (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023).

Despite threats and her brother’s arrest after her son’s killing, Hengameh Chubin refused to be silenced. On her Instagram page, she rejected the monetary offers from the Martyrs Foundation, writing: "Did the government officials imagine that they could buy us off with money after taking my son’s life with unjust gunfire?" She then quoted a line from Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh: "Who told you to bind Rostam? The high heavens will not bind me.” After her brother was arrested, she wrote, "We have nothing to lose, and we will never rest in our struggle for freedom. We will not step back. If you think arrests and torture will make us silent, you are mistaken. You will only inflame our anger. We are more determined than ever to shout for our right to liberty.” In another post, she reflected on the personal toll of her loss. She said that with her son’s death, she herself had "experienced death"; the blow shook her to the core, but it did not break her. She described the trauma as a catalyst that reshaped her worldview and helped her grow stronger in her fight against injustice. (Hengameh Chubin’s Instagram posts, April 8 and 26, 2023).

According to a close relative, Fo’ad Chubin—Artin’s uncle—became involved in the search for justice following the Izeh killings. He publicized the situation of the dead and wounded, connected with the families of victims, and organized memorials and initiatives, such as planting trees in their memory (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023).

On Labor Day, Hengameh reflected on her deceased son Artin, writing, "Whenever I see his clothes—the oil-stained garments that smell of dignity—I ache that he never reached his dreams" (Iran International).

Impacts on Family

Fo’ad Chubin was ultimately forced to leave Iran due to sustained security pressure, including an ongoing legal case against him (ABC interview with a close relative, December 29, 2023). 

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