Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Peyman Menbari

About

Age: 25
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Islam (Sunni)
Civil Status: Married

Case

Date of Killing: October 8, 2022
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Qatarchian (Vakil) street, Sanandaj, Kordestan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Arbitrary shooting » Assault weapon/ Fire arm » targeting vital organs

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Whenever his mother and sisters begged him not to participate in the protests, Mr. Menbari responded, "If I don't go and neither does anyone else, then who will?"

Information regarding the life and arbitrary execution of Peyman Menbari, son of Ayub Menbari and Sahebeh Veisi, was obtained through an interview with a relative (February 8, 2023) and an informed source (May 27, 2023). News of Mr. Menbari’s killing was also reported by Human Rights Watch (December 21, 2022). Additional information was gathered from the websites of Human Rights Watch (December 21, 2022), BBC Persian (October 10, 2023), Radio Farda (November 25, 2023), IranWire (October 9, 2022), Radio Zamaneh (March 9, 2024), Kurdpa (November 28, 2022; February 7, June 10, and July 1, 2023), as well as the social media page of Iran International TV on X (October 9, 2023).

Peyman Menbari was born on June 31, 1997, in Niyar, a village in the Zhavehrud district of Sanandaj. He was born into a large, Sunni Kurdish family. His father supported their family of ten by working as a laborer. Peyman graduated from high school with high marks in the field of experimental sciences. According to relatives, he was interested in pursuing a degree in pharmacy but left school in 2019 after his father died from illness to help provide for his family. (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023; Radio Farda, November 25, 2023).

Mr. Menbari specialized in building stainless steel railings for homes. After an apprenticeship of about three years, he became highly skilled and eventually established himself as a master craftsman. According to a relative, Peyman was deeply concerned about poor people and often said, "Even though I live a relatively calm life and can make ends meet, I can’t live in comfort when I see my neighbors struggling financially." He often felt distressed about this, and once his financial situation improved, he began helping impoverished families. (Radio Zamaneh, March 9, 2024).

Peyman Menbari was socially conscious and deeply concerned about the state of society. According to a relative, he was upset by the suffering of the Iranian people and "always said that we have responsibilities on our shoulders. Now that the people are suffering, we cannot stay silent. I could live in comfort and choose to ignore it, but turning a blind eye would be shameful and dishonorable.” Another close relative said that his dream was the “freedom of Iran” and that he wished to “die a martyr’s death for his homeland and the freedom of his people.” Peyman once told a friend, "Blessed is the one who becomes a martyr for his homeland." (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023; BBC Persian, October 10, 2023).

According to relatives, Mr. Menbari actively participated in the 2022 protests in Sanandaj, which were organized on a neighborhood basis. They said his "passion for freedom" filled him with "remarkable enthusiasm" during that time. "From the day Mahsa Jina Amini died, he could not rest. He refused to attend any celebrations and spent every day of the protests in the streets. Whenever his mother and sisters pleaded with him not to go, he replied, “If I don't go, and if no one else does either, then who will?” (Radio Farda, November 25, 2023).

In his last message to a friend, Peyman wrote, "Let us be martyred for freedom, but never live in captivity." (IranWire, October 9, 2022). According to a source close to the family, "Peyman's mother had told him not to go to the protests because something might happen to him." (BBC Persian, October 10, 2023). In his final Instagram story, Peyman wrote, "This will be the best Saturday in history. We will protest, we will strike, and—just as they say—we will destroy; we will riot. If anyone stands in our way, we will fight; we will be wounded; we will be martyred. We will turn the streets of the city into their hell, and we will continue until my people, my family, and my city are completely free.” (Screenshot of Peyman Menbari’s Instagram story, cited by BBC Persian on October 10, 2023.)

Peyman Menbari loved soccer and wrestled when he was younger. He also regularly went to the gym. He had a beautiful voice and often sang stirring Kurdish anthems at gatherings. (BBC Persian, October 10, 2023). He was young and had recently become engaged to a woman he had loved for six years. According to relatives, he had the same simple hopes and dreams as his peers. "Peyman had elaborate plans for autumn 2022: He was going to take his ailing mother to Tehran for arthritis treatment, take the family on a trip to northern Iran, see off his recently engaged sister, and create unforgettable memories with the woman he had finally proposed to after six years of dating." Relatives described him as a hardworking and studious person. Despite his young age, he was known for helping families in need (Radio Farda, November 25, 2023; ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023). One niece described him as "a person with a very big heart, calm, and with a personality different from the rest of the family," adding that he was "humanitarian, freedom-loving, family-oriented, and, above all, a defender of women's rights" (Radio Zamaneh, March 9, 2024). 

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of Ms. Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year old Kurdish woman, on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The protests, which started in front of the hospital and continued in Saqqez County (Kurdistan Province) where Mahsa was buried, were triggered by popular exasperation over the morality patrols, misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s killing and the resulting impunity for the violence used against detainees, as well as the mandatory veil in general. This protest, initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils and youth in general who chanted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia. The bloodiest crackdown took place on September 30th in Zahedan, Baluchestan Province, where a protest began at the end of the Friday sermon. The death toll is reported to be above 90 for that day. Many injured protesters, fearing arrest, did not go to hospitals where security forces have reportedly arrested injured protesters before and after they were treated.

According to reports from a human rights organization, at least 450 protesters were killed by fire from security forces during the protests, while thousands were wounded or arrested. In the twelve months after protests commenced, at least seven individuals were tried and executed in connection with the protests, without minimal standards of due process. Several others are faced with charges which could potentially result in capital punishment.

According to reliable published reports, a number of the families of killed protesters have been pressured by security bodies to record their slain loved ones as state forces, or to blame protesters for their deaths. In regions such as Kurdistan, security bodies have summoned some families to compel them to declare dissident Kurdish political parties responsible. Moreover, state media has reported that approximately 70 members of the security forces were killed in the protests.

Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.” 

Background of the 2022 Protests in Sanandaj

Following the state murder of Jina Mahsa Amini on September 15, 2022, protests commenced at Jina’s funeral in her hometown of Saqqez and spread afterward to other cities in Kurdistan. Sanandaj was the first city where protesters turned out in solidarity with the people of Saqqez, and during the months-long duration of the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, various streets and neighborhood in Sanandaj witnessed ongoing anti-government protests. Sanandaj was the city with the highest number of Kurdish citizens who lost their lives in the uprising – 22 of 123 total throughout Iran. State forces first killed protesters in this city on October 8, 2022. Repression of popular protests in Sanandaj was so intense that Amnesty International warned in an October 10, 2022 statement of “widespread dimensions of repression,” with state forces using weapons of war and firing at houses. 

 Mr. Peyman Menbari’s arbitrary execution 

On October 8, 2022, Mr. Peyman Menbari was shot and killed by security forces while protesting in the Ghatarchian neighborhood of Sanandaj.

That afternoon, he left his home with a friend to join the protests. They met about 70 to 80 other demonstrators in Ghatarchian who were clashing with security forces. Wearing a mask and a traditional Kurdish scarf covering his face, Mr. Menbari was at the forefront of the protest. (ABC interview with an informed individual, May 27, 2023).

Security forces had positioned themselves at the top of the street while protesters sought escape routes in the surrounding alleys. As the clashes intensified, the security forces advanced toward the protesters, who resisted by throwing stones. The demonstrators were pursued several times and eventually forced to take shelter in nearby alleys. As night fell, security forces opened fire from about 150 meters away. Mr. Menbari stood in front of the crowd. While many fled in fear of the gunfire, he and a few others continued to throw stones in an attempt to push the forces back. At one point, an injured security officer shouted, "Bring me the hunting rifle! I'll take down one or two of them!" Around 6 p.m., the remaining protesters decided to head home due to the darkness and the dwindling crowd. Peyman threw his last stone as they left. Just as he turned to leave, he suddenly yelled out and collapsed. Only then did those around him realize he had been shot. (ABC interview with an eyewitness, February 8, 2023; Human Rights Watch, December 21, 2022; BBC Persian, October 10, 2023).

Other protesters carried Mr. Menbari to a parking lot and tried to stop the bleeding. Although a nurse on the scene said he had died instantly, one of his companions and three other demonstrators volunteered to take him to the hospital. They first tried to reach Kosar Hospital in Sanandaj, but due to blocked streets, they went to Towhid Hospital instead. Upon arrival, the nurses immediately advised them to leave quickly to avoid trouble. Hours later, a phone call to the hospital confirmed Mr. Menbari’s death. (ABC interview with a relative, May 27, 2023). 

When his family arrived at the hospital, they found his body on a stretcher. Hospital staff urged them to take the body before security forces arrived, fearing that otherwise, it would be buried without them present. However, before the family could do so, security forces and special units arrived, seized the body, and transferred it to the morgue. (ABC interviews with an informed individual and a relative, May 27 and February 8, 2023). 

When his family saw Peyman's body at the hospital, they noticed that the bullet wound on his chest was clearly visible. Before burial, however, the bullet had been removed. (ABC interview with an informed individual, May 27, 2023). The death certificate, issued on May 31, 2022, recorded the cause of death as "trauma from sharp or hard objects." (Copy of document — ABC archives).

An eyewitness told Human Rights Watch that the protesters knew the shooter by name and identified him as a local Basij member who had helped the IRGC identify demonstrators. Other witnesses confirmed this individual's presence and said that protesters shouted at a security officer, "We know you! Why are you shooting at people?" However, they could not confirm whether he fired the fatal shot. (ABC interview with an informed individual, May 27, 2023).

On Sunday, October 9, Mr. Menbari’s body was buried in Section 12 of Behesht Mohammadi Cemetery in Sanandaj amid a heavy military and security presence. Only his grandmother and sisters were permitted to attend, and they were prohibited from approaching the grave or wailing loudly. (Kurdpa, November 28, 2022; ABC interview, February 8, 2023).

Mr. Menbari was 25 years old at the time of his death. 

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms.

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible:

a) Warning shots.

b) Shots aimed at the lower body.

c) Shots aimed at the upper body.

(Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

**Note 1:** If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Given this situation, the families of those killed in the recent protests should file a complaint of murder with the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office against the law enforcement officials involved. Although the prosecutor's office is responsible for conducting its own investigation, it is important to file the complaint and request an autopsy and forensic analysis before the body is buried. In addition, if there are witnesses to the scene, their written statements should be obtained as soon as possible. Their identifying information should also be recorded so that it can be presented later in court. The prosecutor's office should be asked to review any available CCTV footage of the scene. A major problem in these cases is the unwillingness of prosecutors to conduct a complete investigation. Without a complete investigation, it is difficult for the victim's family to identify a specific official as the perpetrator or to prove that the shooting was intentional. 

Officials’ Reaction 

Security forces prevented Mr. Menbari’s family from burying him in their village. They pressured the family to sign an agreement ensuring that the funeral would not turn into a protest. Officers from the Criminal Investigation Department told the family, "We will not hand over the body to you. If we do, you’ll turn it into another Jina Amini case. Your village is a hotbed. If he’s buried there, it will spark protests and lead to clashes.” They also insisted that Peyman’s body be buried that same night. (ABC interview, February 8, 2023; Radio Farda, November 25, 2023).

Officers from the Criminal Investigation Department told the family: "We will not hand over the body to you. If we do, you’ll turn it into another Jina Amini case. Your village is a hotbed. If he’s buried there, it will spark protests and lead to clashes.”

On the night of October 8, 2022, security forces summoned several family members to the Criminal Investigation Department. They compelled the family members to sign a security pledge in a committee convened for the release of Peyman’s body. At the Intelligence Department, the family was told that they could see Peyman’s body one last time and learn the burial location only if the burial was carried out quietly, without anyone else present, and in the presence of security agents. During the burial, officials prevented the family from approaching the grave and from openly expressing their grief. (ABC interview, February 8, 2023; Radio Farda, November 25, 2023).

Even after the burial, security forces prevented the third-, seventh-, and fortieth-day mourning ceremonies from being held. Some family members were forced to sign pledges promising not to hold any memorials in the village during the first three days. These restrictions continued for the seventh-day memorial. According to a source close to the family, security officials threatened to arrest all family members if they visited Peyman Menbari’s grave before the fortieth-day memorial. The Sanandaj Intelligence Department also warned the family that they were not permitted to hold a birthday gathering for Peyman at home. (ABC interview, February 8, 2023; Kurdpa, July 1, 2023; BBC Persian, October 10, 2023).

From the moment Peyman was killed, security officials offered his family money and resources in exchange for changing the official account of his death to favor the government. Immediately following the quiet nighttime burial, Ministry of Intelligence agents called the family and summoned them for questioning. They offered the family a substantial sum of money and a monthly stipend for Peyman’s mother if they declared that Peyman had been a government supporter killed by protesters. The family rejected the offer. (BBC Persian, October 10, 2023). Furthermore, government officials—particularly the governor of Sanandaj—repeatedly attempted to visit Peyman’s mother at her home. (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023). The pressure to falsify the cause of Peyman’s death continued in the following years. On several occasions, officials offered the family financial incentives in exchange for declaring that Peyman had been killed by opposition parties, such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan or Komala. Each time, the family refused. (Radio Farda, November 25, 2023).

On November 27, 2022, the Sanandaj Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office issued a summons to the Menbari family. Judicial officers also repeatedly called the family, pressuring them to appear at Branch 4 of the Sanandaj Prosecutor’s Office to file a complaint. (Kurdpa, November 28, 2022).

On the evening of June 9, 2023, IRGC Intelligence forces arrested Peyman’s sisters, Hana and Baran Menbari (aged 12), along with 40 other mothers and family members of victims from Sanandaj, Divandarreh, and Dehgolan. The arrests occurred while the group was visiting the graves of their loved ones in the Aychi Cemetery in Saqqez and Bukan. (Kurdpa, June 10, 2023).

Regarding the restrictions on the fortieth-day ceremony, a source close to the Menbari family said: "Before the fortieth day after Peyman’s death, they told the family they were not allowed to go to his grave. They threatened to arrest the entire family. The threats and harassment are still ongoing." Despite these threats, the family remained defiant. Images were published of Peyman’s mother and sisters mourning. In one of the images, Peyman’s mother says, "Peyman was my kind son. The Islamic Republic took him from me.” (BBC Persian, October 10, 2023). 

Familys’ Reaction

Despite intense security pressure, Ms. Sahebeh Veisi, the mother of Mr. Peyman Menbari, addressed the mourners at her son’s funeral on October 9, 2022: "Do not let my son’s blood be in vain. For God’s sake, seek justice for him." (BBC Persian, October 9, 2022).

At the graveside, Mr. Menbari’s brother also pledged, "I swear I will take your revenge." (Video downloaded from social media on December 26, 2022).

After being summoned by Branch 4 of the Sanandaj Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office to file a complaint, Ms. Veisi refused, saying: "I have no complaint against anyone—the Islamic Republic itself is the killer, and God will deliver justice." (Kurdpa, February 7, 2023; ABC interview, February 8, 2023).

The Menbari family rejected repeated offers of financial assistance and government benefits in exchange for officially recognizing him as a "martyr." Ms. Veisi refused the governor of Sanandaj's attempts to meet with her, declaring: "The Islamic Republic murdered my son, and I will not allow anyone from the government to enter my home." According to a relative, when officials insisted, "He was your provider—let us arrange a pension for you," she replied, "Even if you gave me the whole world, I would never allow you to claim my son. He died for freedom, and that is our pride. He brought honor to himself and us. I will never betray his memory.” (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023).

On the first anniversary of his death, the Menbari family covered the spot where he was killed with flowers and sang in his memory. (Iran International Television's X account, October 9, 2023).

Impacts on Family

According to the available information, the extrajudicial killing of Mr. Peyman Menbari had a profound impact on his family. Relatives described it as an "irreparable emotional blow." (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023).

His younger sister, who was very close to him, attempted suicide twice after his death. The first time, she nearly died and had to be admitted to the intensive care unit. Afterwards, she could only sleep with the help of sedatives. (ABC interview with an informed source, May 27, 2023). Mr. Menbari’s mother, who has heart problems, experienced a worsening of her condition after learning of her son’s death. Since then, she has had nightly episodes of high blood pressure. (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023). Relatives of Mr. Menbari said: “His memory is with us every second. How could we forget Peyman? Everyone who sees me says, 'Peyman broke your back—you’ve been broken.'” (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023; BBC Persian, October 10, 2023).

One family member, who was also a close friend and had worked with Mr. Menbari for over 12 years, found it impossible to continue working in the same field after his death and changed jobs. This person, who shared a deep bond with Mr. Menbari, fell into severe depression and constantly relives memories of him. "I open my phone—it's Peyman. Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram—everywhere, it’s Peyman. When I return home, the walls and the doors—everything is Peyman." (ABC interview with a relative, February 8, 2023).

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