Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Majid Kazemi Sheikh Shabani

About

Age: 31
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: May 18, 2023
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Esfahan County, Central Prison (Dastgerd), Esfahan, Esfahan Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Execution » Hanging
Charges: War on God; Acting against national security by organizing illegal gatherings, protests
Age at time of alleged offense: 30

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

  • The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion. 

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

  • The right not to be tried or punished again for an offence for which one has already been 

convicted or acquitted. 

ICCPR, Article 14.7.

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

"I was at work until 8:30 p.m. What group was I supposedly affiliated with?" I’m a small business owner. I have no criminal record and am not affiliated with any group, party, or organization. They can ask around the neighborhood. My workshop is there, and there are cameras.”

Information regarding the execution of Majid Kazemi Sheikh Shabani, son of Mohammad Reza, along with two other individuals, was gathered from the websites of the Mizan News Agency (May 19, 2023) and HRANA – the news agency of the Human Rights Activists in Iran (May 19, 2023). Additional information was gathered from the verdict issued by Branch 9 of the Supreme Court (May 1, 2023); the websites of the Mizan News Agency (May 17, 2023); IRNA – the Islamic Republic News Agency (January 9 and 17, 2023); HRANA (January 9 and 15, May 9, 14, and 22, 2023); Dadban – the Legal Consultation and Education Center for Civil Society Activists (May 9, 2023); Shargh Network interview with Somayeh Kazemi (May 15, 2023); IranWire (January 16 and May 19, 2023); ISNA (May 21, 2023); courtroom footage; broadcast of the coerced confessions of the three defendants (May 10, 2023); and a Radio Zamaneh interview with Mr. Kazemi’s cousin, Mohammad Hashemi (May 13, 2023); and audio messages sent by Mr. Kazemi to his family (January 13, 2023).

According to available information, Majid Kazemi was born in 1992 and lived in Isfahan. He owned a copperware workshop in the city where he employed eight people. Those close to him described him as a cheerful, energetic, friendly, and kindhearted person. He enjoyed football and wrestling. Speaking about him, Mr. Kazemi’s cousin, Mohammad Hashemi, said: "He was one of those people who always had a smile on their face—someone whose presence would instantly lift your spirits" (Radio Zamaneh interview)

Mr. Kazemi’s case, commonly referred to as the “Khaneh-ye Isfahan” case, was a group case involving six defendants. Ten individuals were initially arrested in connection with the case, and ultimately, indictments were issued against six of them. Mr. Kazemi and the others were accused of murder, moharebeh ("enmity against God"), and corruption on earth. Mr. Kazemi and the other defendants participated in the November 16, 2022, protests in Negahbani Square in the Khaneh-ye Isfahan neighborhood. These protests were part of the nationwide demonstrations that erupted in the fall of 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the Morality Police, who had arrested her for alleged "improper hijab."

This case became one of the most high-profile judicial cases linked to the 2022 nationwide protests and drew widespread criticism from both domestic and international observers. 

2022 (Mahsa Amini) Protest background

Nationwide protests were sparked by the death in custody of 22-year old Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini on September 16, 2022. Amini had been arrested by the morality police in Tehran for improper veiling on September 13 and sent brain dead to the hospital. The news of her death triggered protests, which started with a widespread expression of outrage on social media and the gathering of a large crowd in front of the hospital,continued in the city of Saqqez (Kordestan Province), where Mahsa was buried. Popular exasperation over the morality patrols and the veil in general, aggravated by misleading statements of the authorities regarding the cause of Mahsa’s death and the impunity generally granted to state agents for the violence used against detainees led to months of nationwide protests. Initially led by young girls and women who burned their veils, and youth in general, protesters adopted the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” chanted during Amini’s burial. The protest rapidly took on a clear anti-regime tone, with protesters calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. 

The scope and duration of the protest was unprecedented. State efforts to withdraw the morality police from the streets and preventative arrests of journalists and political and civil society activists did not stop the protests. By the end of December 2022, protests had taken place in about 164 cities and towns, including localities that had never witnessed protests. Close to 150 universities, high schools, businesses, and groups including oil workers, merchants of the Tehran bazaar (among others), teachers, lawyers (at least 49 of whom had been arrested as of February 1st, 2023), artists, athletes, and even doctors joined these protests in various forms. Despite the violent crackdown and mass arrests, intense protests continued for weeks, at least through November 2022, with reports of sporadic activity continuing through the beginning of 2023.

The State’s crackdown was swift and accompanied by intermittent landline and cellular internet network shutdowns, as well as threats against and arrests of victims’ family members, factors which posed a serious challenge to monitoring protests and documenting casualties. The security forces used illegal, excessive, and lethal force with handguns, shotguns, and military assault rifles against protesters. They often targeted protesters’ heads and chests, shot them at close range, and in the back. Security forces have targeted faces with pellets, causing hundreds of protesters to lose their eyesight, and according to some reports women’s genitalia. The bloodiest crackdown took place on September 30th in Zahedan, Baluchestan Province, where a protest began at the end of the Friday sermon. The death toll is reported to be above 90 for that day. Security forces shot protesters outside and worshipers inside the Mosala prayer hall. Many injured protesters, fearing arrest, did not go to hospitals where security forces have reportedly arrested injured protesters before and after they were treated.

 By February 1, 2023, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported the number of recorded protests to be 1,262. The death toll, including protesters and passersby, stood at 527, of whom 71 were children. The number of arrests (including of wounded protesters) was estimated at a minimum at 22,000 , of whom 766 had already been tried and convicted. More than 100 protesters were at risk of capital punishment, and four had been executed in December 2022 and January 2023 without minimum standards of due process. Authorities also claimed 70 casualties among state forces, though there are consistent reports from families of killed protesters indicating authorities have pressured them or offered them rewards to falsely register their loved ones as such. Protesters, human rights groups, and the media have reported cases of beatings, torture (including to coerce confessions), and sexual assaults. Detainees have no access to lawyers during interrogations and their confessions are used in courts as evidence.

Public support and international solidarity with protesters have also been unprecedented (the use of the hashtag #MahsaAmini in Farsi and English broke world records) and on November 24, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a fact finding mission to “Thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children.”

Arrest and detention

On November 22, 2022, Majid Kazemi was arrested by security forces at his brother’s horseback riding club in Isfahan. He was then transferred to the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He spent 43 days in solitary confinement. (HRANA, May 2023).

The circumstances surrounding Mr. Kazemi’s arrest are unclear. According to the Supreme Court verdict, he had been hiding in his brother’s horse stable when he was arrested. However, a video released by state media shows him handcuffed in bed before the arrest and being taken from a room inside a house.

Another video, broadcast by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), depicted the arrest of the other defendants in the case; however, Mr. Kazemi does not appear in that footage. Despite having no criminal record, the authorities labeled him a known "thug" in Isfahan. State media further claimed that firearms and homemade explosives were discovered at the hideout where the defendants were allegedly captured (IRIB video).

According to Mr. Kazemi’s cousin, security agents launched a terrifying night raid on the horseback riding club owned by Majid’s brother, Hossein Kazemi. In addition to Majid, Hossein—who was not present at the protest on the day of the demonstrations—was arrested and later released on bail after spending 50 days in custody.

Mr. Kazemi and the other defendants were interrogated by agents of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization in Isfahan, which was responsible for investigating the case.

Mr. Kazemi’s family had no information about his whereabouts or condition for 43 days. On January 13, 2023, he called his mother from Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan and told her that he had been forced to confess under torture, threats, and sexual abuse. He said he did not accept any of the charges against him and that his only truthful statements were those made in court. He said he had been subjected to electric shock and was threatened with the execution of his brothers.

After this phone call, in which he recounted his arrest and interrogation, Mr. Kazemi was transferred from the general ward of Dastgerd Prison to solitary confinement, and then to a ward known as the “Afghan Ward,” where he was denied the right to make phone calls.. (HRANA, January 15, 2023).

The last time Mr. Kazemi’s family saw him was during a prison visit on May 18, 2023.

Trial 

Branch 1 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Isfahan, presided over by Judge Morteza Barati and two associate judges, held four hearings on December 28, 29, and 31, 2022, at the Isfahan Provincial Courthouse to review the cases of Mr. Kazemi and the other defendants. (Note: Although four sessions were held, only three dates were reported in the official media.) Mr. Kazemi was represented by a court-appointed lawyer during the trial. According to his family, he was unable to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing due to his prolonged incommunicado detention after arrest. He did not even know the name of his court-appointed attorney. (HRANA, January 15, 2023). 

Charges 

Branch 9 of the Supreme Court upheld the following charges against Mr. Kazemi:

1) Moharebeh ("enmity against God") through the use of a Kalashnikov firearm in public places, causing insecurity in two incidents: a) Participation in the riots on October 2, 2022, in the Shapur-e Jadid industrial district of Isfahan; and b) The terrorist incident on November 16, 2022, at Negahbani Square in the Khaneh-ye Isfahan neighborhood.

2) Assembly and collusion leading to crimes against domestic security.

3) Membership in illegal groups and associations intending to disrupt national security. (Supreme Court ruling – Branch 9).

According to official sources and documents of the Islamic Republic, Mr. Kazemi and the other defendants allegedly carried out an armed attack during the Isfahan protests. This attack resulted in the deaths of two members of the Basij paramilitary force and one police commander: "In the wake of the riots and unrest in October and November of this year by agents of foreign enemies, on November 16, 2022, during an illegal protest at Negahbani Square in Khaneh-ye Isfahan, the rioters opened fire with firearms, martyring three devoted members of the Basij and Law Enforcement (FARAJA) Forces" (Supreme Court ruling — Branch 9).

The validity of the criminal charges brought against this defendant cannot be ascertained in the absence of the basic guarantees of a fair trial.  International human rights organizations have drawn attention to reports indicating that the Islamic Republic authorities have brought trumped-up charges, including drug trafficking, sexual, and other criminal offences, against their opponents (including political, civil society activists, as well as unionists and ethnic and religious minorities). Each year Iranian authorities sentence to death hundreds of alleged common criminals, following judicial processes that fail to meet international standards. The exact number of people convicted and executed based on trumped-up charges is unknown.

Evidence of guilt 

The evidence provided against Mr. Kazemi included the following, as stated in official documents: The complaint of the Office of the Prosecutor of Isfahan; The complaint from the head of the provincial prosecutor's office, and the report from the intelligence organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Isfahan province, which included photographs, videos, text messages, and claims that several protesters had used military weapons, including handguns and Kalashnikov rifles. The report also alleged that the defendants fired these weapons at security officers, special forces, and Basij members. The circumstances of the arrests were also documented. Authorities stated that the defendants had intended to flee. They alleged that Mr. Kazemi had planned to escape to Turkey. The report included statements and confessions made by the defendants at various stages of the preliminary investigation, before the investigating judge, and during the crime scene reenactment. It also included eyewitness accounts and testimonies from individuals familiar with the events. The Forensic Medicine Organization's report outlined the cause of death of the victims and examined the bodies. Also included were the weapons and ballistics expert report, as well as digital evidence related to events before and after the incident. Two firearms were discovered: a Kalashnikov rifle and a handgun. There was also a video of Mr. Kazemi in a café after the alleged terrorist act, in which he reportedly filmed himself confessing to the crime.

International human rights organizations have repeatedly condemned the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for its systematic use of severe torture and solitary confinement to obtain confessions from detainees and have questioned the authenticity of confessions obtained under duress.

Defense 

An eyewitness, in an interview with the Committee for Monitoring the Situation of Detainees regarding that night, challenged the court’s narrative of the events at Negahbani Square in Khaneh Esfahan: "That night, I was with a group of friends in the Khaneh-ye Isfahan area, joining the protesters and chanting slogans. A group of plainclothes Basij motorcyclists emerged from a side street and approached the protesters, seemingly intending to encircle them. We shouted to warn the others, and many of us ran toward the sidewalks and nearby alleys. From my hiding spot, I saw the motorcyclists open fire on the crowd. They didn't realize that other security forces were directly across from them on the other side of the street. I didn’t see anyone get hit, but I immediately told my friend, 'They’re shooting at their own people—they clearly have no coordination.'” Later that night, when I got home and heard that some security forces had been killed… (IranWire). This eyewitness’s account regarding gunfire by motorcyclists was confirmed by the Fars News Agency and Tasnim News Agency in their reports dated November 16, 2022.

In an audio file published by HRANA in May 2023, Mr. Kazemi claimed that his confessions were obtained through torture and that he was innocent of any crime or affiliation with a political group. He said he only confessed due to severe physical and psychological pressure. “I was at work until 8:30 p.m. What group was I supposedly affiliated with? I’m a small business owner. I have no criminal record and am not affiliated with any group, party, or organization. Let them go ask the neighborhood. My workshop is right there, and there are cameras. I was at work until 8:30. What group? What video? On the day I was arrested, I weighed 93 kilos. By the time they took me to court, I was down to 50. Who should I tell? Where do I go to file a complaint? What should I tell them about what they did to me?" (Audio file – HRANA, May 2023).

Mr. Kazemi further emphasized that he had been tortured to force a confession: "When they took off my jacket, they flogged me. They took me to a garden where there were no cameras. They said, 'Take off your pants. Take off his pants. Stick the baton in his ass.” I begged them, 'For God's sake, don't do this to me.' They said, “Film it. Put it out." I said, "For the sake of God, don't." "I’ll confess to anything you want. They killed me. They killed me" (audio file, HRANA, May 2023).

According to the Dadban Center for Legal Advice and Education for Activists, "Based on the evidence and documentation received by Dadban, none of the legal procedures and regulations were followed during the judicial process of the 'Khane-ye Isfahan' case." None of the defendants had access to legal counsel of their own choosing prior to the final court session. The court only accepted the appointed defense attorneys at the final session (Dadban, May 9, 2023).

During his court defense, Mr. Kazemi admitted to having purchased a firearm several years ago. He said he used it for hunting and celebratory gunfire at funerals and weddings in his village. He stated:

“I admit that I fired shots, but never at anyone. No one was killed with my gun. Is there only one Kalashnikov in all of Iran? Yes, I admit it; I fired into the air with a Kalashnikov. That’s all I'm admitting to." (Supreme Court ruling – Branch 9).

In another statement regarding his alleged use of a Kalashnikov rifle, Mr. Kazemi said:

"I fired one magazine into the air. I did not shoot at any officer. If I had emptied a magazine at the officers instead of three people, fifty would have been killed” (ISNA, Isfahan, January 9, 2023).

Mr. Kazemi’s attorney stated in court: “He purchased the weapon for personal reasons, not to commit the crime he is now accused of. Since there was no unified intent behind purchasing the weapon or firing the gun, I argue that the items recovered from his phones or the Kalashnikov found do not necessarily mean he used them to kill anyone” (Defendants’ trial footage).

In an interview, Mr. Kazemi’s sister denied that her brother had been present at the scene of the incident on the night in question. She said: "We demand that the authorities present evidence showing that our brother was present at the scene when the killings took place. The only things in this case file are hearsay—one person says they heard from someone else that Majid was there, and another says someone told them Majid was involved. We want them to prove that these individuals were killed with Majid’s gun. We’re not here to riot or do anything wrong. We’re not against the system or anything else. We just don’t want our brother’s blood to be shed unjustly” (Shargh Network)

The defense attorneys of the first through fourth defendants objected to the court’s ruling and requested an appeal. On January 29, 2023, the case was referred to Branch 9 of the Supreme Court. 

A Summary of the Defects of Mr. Majid Kazemi Sheikh Shabani’s Legal Proceedings

On November 16, 2022, demonstrators gathered at Negahbani Square in the Khaneh-ye Isfahan neighborhood, joining the nationwide protests that had been sparked by Mahsa Amini's death in police custody. During the protest, Colonel Esma'il Cheraghi of the police force and two Basij members, Mohsen Hamidi and Mohammad Karimi, were fatally shot.

Ten individuals were arrested in connection with the case. The Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led the investigation. According to the IRGC's report, the accused had been in contact with individuals outside of Iran and had received orders to organize and carry out anti-security operations.

1.     The incident occurred on November 16, 2022, and the court issued the verdict on January 7, 2023. In other words, all proceedings related to this case were completed within 53 days. This included preliminary investigations, court proceedings, interrogations of dozens of defendants, testimonies from numerous witnesses and informants, local investigations, CCTV reviews, digital investigations (i.e., phone and communication examinations), autopsies, ballistic analyses, indictment issuance, court trials, and verdicts. This is a case in which three individuals were killed with three different firearms. The incident did not occur as part of a simple street altercation but rather during a gathering attended by hundreds of protesters and numerous Basij, police, and security forces, with at least ten defendants involved. The charges brought against the defendants, such as moharebeh and corruption on earth, are among the most serious and complex charges. Addressing such a major case and issuing a verdict certainly could not have been carried out in less than two months. In other words, the extreme haste of the proceedings contradicts judicial norms and indicates a serious violation of legal standards and guarantees of a fair trial.

2.     According to existing judicial documents from the "Khaneh-ye Isfahan" case, the main basis for the defendants’ convictions was their confessions during the preliminary investigation phase, both incriminating themselves and one another. However, some defendants claimed that their confessions were extracted under torture by security agents. Furthermore, a confession is only considered valid and admissible as evidence if it is clear and explicit and made before the judge who will issue the verdict. The statements made by the defendants during interrogation differ significantly from those made in subsequent stages, indicating that they were under pressure during the investigation.

For instance, the verdict quotes Saleh Mirhashmi as saying he was in frequent contact with the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. However, only three Telegram channel names are mentioned, and there is no indication that an investigation was conducted to determine if these channels existed or who was behind them. In other words, no investigation was carried out into who Mr. Mirhashmi was in contact with.

During his interrogation by the IRGC, Mr. Mirhashmi said that he saw Majid Kazemi shoot at officers with a Kalashnikov rifle. However, according to the verdict, Mr. Mirhashmi later denied these statements and claimed that Mr. Kazemi had only fired a few warning shots with a handgun. During the trial, he stated: "I swear on the Quran, I did not see Majid Kazemi shoot." Mr. Mirhashmi also said that Sa'id Ya'qubi fired a handgun. In contrast, Mr. Kazemi stated during his interrogation that he went to the scene of the incident and fired five warning shots with a Kalashnikov rifle. Elsewhere, he said that he had two full magazines and fired one completely and the other partially, contradicting his previous statement. During the trial, Mr. Kazemi again stated that he had only fired warning shots and had not aimed at anyone. Regarding Sa'id Ya'qubi, Mr. Kazemi said that he had fired all of his bullets. During his interrogation, Mr. Ya'qubi said that he had not brought a weapon to the scene and that Majid Kazemi and four others with covered faces carried out the shooting. He also said that Mehdi Kazemi fired at the officers with another weapon. According to the verdict, Sa'id Ya'qubi confessed to firing at officers with a weapon at the end of his interrogation. However, during a later interrogation, he changed his statement and said that he did not have a weapon. During the trial, Mr. Ya'qubi said he saw Majid Kazemi and another person firing shots but said he and Saleh Mirhashmi did not have weapons. Soheil Jahangiri stated that Saleh was holding a Molotov cocktail but did not have a weapon, though none of the other defendants mentioned anything about Molotov cocktails. Mr. Jahangiri also stated that everyone had covered their faces and that he had heard that four people had handguns. 

According to the verdict, several police officers testified, but none of them explicitly said who fired the shots. One officer said that a Kalashnikov and a 9mm handgun were found on the street. However, it seems highly unlikely that the shooters would have left their weapons behind and fled, especially since none of the defendants claimed that others had abandoned their weapons at the scene and escaped.

Clearly, the defendants’ statements do not align with one another. Each defendant’s statements also contradict their prior statements. According to Article 182 of the Islamic Penal Code, witness testimonies must be consistent; otherwise, they are legally invalid. Furthermore, Article 185 of the same code states that contradictions in witness testimony render it unreliable.

3.      According to Article 190 of the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure, the presence of a defense attorney is mandatory in cases where the punishment is the death penalty. If the defendant does not appoint a lawyer, the investigating judge must assign a court-appointed attorney. In this case, however, the defendants were only able to access a lawyer during the final court session. In other words, they were deprived of legal counsel throughout the preliminary investigation and a significant portion of the trial.

4.  According to the available case documents, one of the firearms was never found, and the other two weapons were not thoroughly examined by a forensic expert. It was stated in one instance that ballistic analysis showed the victims had been killed by bullets fired from a Kalashnikov rifle. Given this information, it is unclear why two individuals who allegedly fired handguns were charged with the killings. No comprehensive investigation was conducted to locate the unrecovered weapon. Furthermore, the recovered weapons were not fingerprinted. The ballistic analysis was incomplete, and the case documents do not specify which bullet killed which victim. Determining this would have been crucial and could have significantly contributed to establishing the truth.

According to statements made by some of the defendants and witnesses, a large number of bullets were fired. Determining the number of bullets fired could have easily been achieved by examining the crime scene and locating the shell casings. However, no such investigation appears to have been conducted.

5.  Given that the incident took place in a crowded area surrounded by numerous shops, restaurants, and cafés, it is difficult to believe that no video footage of it exists. The case file contains no video evidence and makes no mention of efforts to review nearby CCTV cameras. 

Judgment 

On January 7, 2023, Branch 1 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Isfahan convicted Majid Kazemi Sheikh Shabani of moharebeh ("enmity against God") and sentenced him to public execution. He was also sentenced to five years of discretionary imprisonment for membership in illegal groups and associations intending to disrupt national security and an additional five years for assembly and collusion leading to crimes against internal security.

On May 1, 2023, Branch 9 of the Supreme Court upheld the verdict pursuant to Paragraph (a) of Article 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, explaining: "The defendants’ attorneys did not present valid or well-founded objections capable of undermining or overturning the verdict regarding the issued death sentence." Furthermore, no procedural irregularities are evident in the issued conviction. Therefore, based on Paragraph (a) of Article 469 of the 2013 Code of Criminal Procedure, amended in 2015, the appeal is rejected, and the verdict is upheld with the removal of the phrase 'to be carried out in public.'"

Mr. Kazemi was executed by hanging at dawn on Friday, May 19, 2023, in Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan along with Saleh Mirhashmi Batlaqi and Sa'id Ya'qubi Kordsofla.

Security forces of the Islamic Republic secretly buried Mr. Kazemi’s body at Habibabad Cemetery in Isfahan, near the Zeynabiyeh district, under strict security measures.

The following day, May 20, 2023, Mr. Kazemi’s sister and two brothers were violently arrested by security forces and taken to an undisclosed location. The two brothers sustained severe injuries during the attack. His sister was released on bail the next day.

According to Mohammad Hashemi, Mr. Kazemi’s cousin, the harassment and pressure on the family continued for forty days after the execution. These actions included the arrest of Mohsen Kazemi, Majid’s brother, on the day of the execution; a raid on the Kazemi family home three days after the execution; the physical assault of Majid Kazemi’s parents; the violent arrest of his siblings; the burning of Majid Kazemi’s grave on June 7, 2023; and the government’s refusal to allow a headstone to be placed on his grave.

Mr. Kazemi’s sister stated that the death sentence included a note that, should the pardon commission and the families of the victims—two Basij members and one special unit officer—agree, one level of sentence reduction could be applied. However, she added, "Unfortunately, the pardon commission told us not to return and not to hope for clemency" because "the public prosecutor of Isfahan also insisted on carrying out the sentence."

At the trial, only the brother of one of the deceased requested qisas (retribution), while the other next of kin granted their consent. (Branch 9 Supreme Court ruling).

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