Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi

About

Age: 20
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: June 20, 2009
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Enqelab Street, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Arbitrary shooting » Assault weapon/ Fire arm » targeting vital organs
Charges: Unknown charge
Age at time of alleged offense: 20

About this Case

It took five days for his family to find him and to pay for his return.  The last street he had walked past, Enqelab street, bears a message of “Revolution.”

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi, son of Fatemeh and Majid, was obtained from interviews conducted with his parents by the Jaras news website (July 12 and September 19, 2010) and by Youth for Human Rights, quoting Jaras (September 17, 2011). Additional information was gathered from Iran Khabar Agency (June 29, 2009); Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) (August 17, 2009); Fars News Agency (June 13, 2010); Radio Farda (June 21, 2013); and the official forensic certificate archived by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center (ABC).

Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi was born in 1988 and was the eldest child in a family of four living in District 15 of Tehran. (Iran Khabar Agency, June 29, 2009; Jaras, September 19, 2010).

Hamid was an athletic, educated young man who was calm and quiet. He was deeply devoted to his family and, unlike many others his age, was not interested in spending time with friends. He preferred to spend his free time at home. He once told his parents: "If God gives me the chance, I have beautiful plans for us—I want the rest of our lives to be full of joy." (Iran Khabar Agency, June 29, 2009; Jaras, September 19, 2010).

According to his family, Hamid had no specific political affiliation, yet he participated enthusiastically in the 2009 presidential election. (Jaras, July 12, 2010).

2009 Election - Background 

Election returns from Iran’s June 12th, 2009, presidential election declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected with 62.63 percent of the vote.  Following the announcement, citizens disputing these official results demonstrated in the streets.  Text messaging services were disrupted starting at 11:00 p.m. on the night before the election and remained unavailable for nearly three weeks, until July 1st. On Election Day, the deputy chief of Iranian police announced a ban on any gathering of presidential candidates’ supporters throughout the country.  The same evening, security forces made a “show of strength,” increasing their presence in Tehran’s public squares to “reinforce security at polling stations.”  Officials at election headquarters began reporting results soon after midnight, despite a statement from the Minister of the Interior that the first returns would not be announced until after the morning prayer (around 4:00 a.m.). 

Many supporters of other presidential candidates came out into the streets on June 13th, once the results were made public, to protest what they believed to be a fraudulent election.  Candidates Mir Hossein Musavi, Mehdi Karubi, and Mohsen Reza’i, Ahmadinejad’s competitors in the race, contested the election, alleging many instances of fraud.  They filed complaints with the Council of Guardians, the constitutional body charged with vetting candidates before elections take place and approving the results afterwards, requesting an annulment and calling for a new election.  Before the Council of Guardians could review their claims, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election.  In the meantime, many people active in Karubi’s and Musavi’s campaigns were arrested. 

On June 15th, unprecedented demonstrations filled the streets of central Tehran, in which an estimated three million protestors participated, according to statements attributed to the mayor of Tehran.  As the demonstrations were ending, paramilitary forces attacked the marchers, injuring and killing several people.  To prevent such news from being broadcast, the Iranian government expelled foreign journalists from the country and banned news agencies from reporting on the events.  Over the next three days, protesters took part in peaceful demonstrations in Tehran.  The repression entered a new phase on June 19th after Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday sermon, in which he announced his support for Ahmadinejad and warned protestors that they were responsible for any disorder and its consequences. Amnesty International stated that the speech gave “legitimacy to police brutality.”  The next day and thereafter, police and plainclothes paramilitary groups attacked the protesters.  Public gatherings of any kind were declared illegal, and police, motorcycle-riding special units wearing black uniforms and helmets, and plainclothes agents brutally enforced this restriction. 

Individuals in civilian clothing, commonly referred to as plainclothes forces, are used in the Islamic Republic to disrupt political and trade union activities, student events and gatherings, electoral initiatives, and protests.  Armed with sticks and clubs, and sometimes with chains, knives, batons, or firearms, they emerge when the state decides to suppress dissent.  These plainclothes forces move about freely, violently beating protesters and arresting them, while the police passively look on or actively cooperate with them.  

There is little information on the command structure and organization of such groups, whose members wear ordinary clothing rather than official uniforms and may be affiliated with the ministry of information, influential political groups, or the armed forces. Following the post-election demonstrations in June 2009, pictures of some plainclothes agents were posted on internet websites.  Internet users helped to identify some of them and provided evidence that these individuals were affiliated with the Basij paramilitary groups, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and state intelligence forces. On September 16, 2009, a deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Province of Tehran confirmed the active and decisive role of Basij forces in the repression of the demonstrations, saying, “Basijis, through their presence in recent events, have blinded the eyes of the conspirators, and they should be appreciated… The enemies of Islam wanted to make the air dusty and to exploit the recent events, but thank God, through the enlightenment of the Honorable Leader we were victorious against this conspiracy.” He also emphasized, “The zealous youth of [the] Basij, believers in the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, are the second and third generations of the Revolution.  They have been successful in this stage and victorious on this battlefield.” 

When personal property was damaged during the protests, government authorities and state-run radio and television programs accused the demonstrators of vandalism and justified the repression.  At the same time, however, footage posted online showed security forces destroying and damaging property on side streets and in uncongested areas away from the protests.  Moreover, in a public gathering in Tehran on October 20th, the chief of Iranian police conceded that police had destroyed and damaged property and accepted responsibility for it. 

The precise number of citizens injured, killed, or disappeared in the post-election violence is not known.  According to various reports, there were hundreds of victims in demonstrations throughout the country.  More than seventy names have been reported.  It is said that officials have threatened victims’ family members, demanding their silence and that they refrain from giving interviews.  Reports also allege that returning a victim’s body to a family has been made conditional upon their agreement to change the cause of death listed on the coroner’s certificate to that of a heart attack or some other natural cause — thus foregoing the right to file a complaint — as well as the family's agreement not to hold memorial services for the loved one.  

According to government statements, more than 4,000 people were arrested throughout Iran in the weeks following June 12th. Many have been held at the Kahrizak Detention Center, where prisoners’ rights and minimum hygiene standards were typically ignored.  Numerous reports of violence, including the torture and rape of detainees, have been published.  State reports and testimonies confirm that a number of detainees at Kahrizak died in custody due to beatings, difficult and unbearable prison conditions, and torture. 

Mr. Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi’s arbitrary execution 

According to available information, Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi was shot and killed by plainclothes security officials near Enghelab Street in Tehran on June 20, 2009. (Human Rights Activists in Iran, August 17, 2009). 

On that same day, political groups opposing the results of the presidential election requested a permit from the Tehran governor's office to hold a rally between Enghelab and Azadi Squares. However, following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s threatening remarks during his Friday sermon the previous day—in which he warned against further protests—most of Tehran’s central streets and squares were heavily monitored by police, military personnel, and plainclothes agents. 

According to his family, Hamid left home that evening to visit his ailing grandmother but never returned. They reported him missing to law enforcement and visited Evin Prison and other detention centers, assuming he might have been arrested during the protests. Yet, they were not provided any information about his whereabouts. (Jaras, July 12, 2010). 

Eventually, Hamid’s parents identified his body among photos of unidentified corpses at the Kahrizak Forensic Medicine Center. According to his mother, his face was covered in blood, his front teeth were broken, one side of his face was bruised, and there were visible gunshot wounds to his chest (Jaras, July 12, 2010). 

His body was examined and autopsied on June 21, 2009, one day after his death, at the Tehran Forensic Medicine Center in the presence of a weapons expert. The body was submitted naked and covered in blood and registered as an "unidentified male." The referring agency was listed as "B. Hazrat-e Rasul," which appears to be linked to a military institution. The forensic report noted multiple abrasions and contusions on various parts of his face, including the forehead, nasal bridge, both sides of the nose, upper and lower lips, chin, and left cheek. It also noted fractures of the two central upper front teeth. Additionally, the report recorded an oval-shaped bullet entry wound measuring 8 by 9 millimeters with surrounding burn marks on the sternum and a round exit wound measuring 8 millimeters on the right side of the back. The cause of death was declared to be a gunshot wound to the chest. The distance and angle of the shot were left to be determined by weapons experts. (Forensic Medical Certificate, ABC Archives). 

According to a ballistics report by the Police Criminal Identification Center, the nature of the wounds indicated the use of a military weapon, such as a Kalashnikov rifle, fired from a distance of less than 15 meters. (Jaras, September 19, 2010; September 17, 2011). 

Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi was buried on June 25, 2009, at Behesht Zahra Cemetery in Tehran. (Human Rights Activists in Iran, August 17, 2009). 

He was 20 years old at the time of his death. 

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms.

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible:

a) Warning shots.

b) Shots aimed at the lower body.

c) Shots aimed at the upper body.

(Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

**Note 1:** If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Given this situation, the families of those killed in the recent protests should file a complaint of murder with the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office against the law enforcement officials involved. Although the prosecutor's office is responsible for conducting its own investigation, it is important to file the complaint and request an autopsy and forensic analysis before the body is buried. In addition, if there are witnesses to the scene, their written statements should be obtained as soon as possible. Their identifying information should also be recorded so that it can be presented later in court. The prosecutor's office should be asked to review any available CCTV footage of the scene. A major problem in these cases is the unwillingness of prosecutors to conduct a complete investigation. Without a complete investigation, it is difficult for the victim's family to identify a specific official as the perpetrator or to prove that the shooting was intentional. 

Officials’ Reaction

Security police officials demanded 12 million tomans from Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi’s family as compensation for the bullet that killed him. Ultimately, on June 25, 2009, his body was returned to the family in exchange for a payment of five million tomans. (Human Rights Activists in Iran, August 17, 2009; Iran Khabar Agency, June 29, 2009).

Three days after Hamid’s death, Ministry of Interior representatives visited the family’s home. Individuals from the Red Crescent, the police, and other security agencies also made contact with the family. (Jaras, July 12, 2010).

On June 13, 2010, the Fars News Agency published a report describing Hamid as a "martyred Basij member." The report falsely quoted his mother as blaming opposition presidential candidates, including Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, for her son’s death and calling for their prosecution. This version of events was later echoed by other state-affiliated outlets, including the Kayhan newspaper. (Jaras, July 12, 2010; Fars News Agency, June 13, 2010; Jaras, September 19, 2010).

On December 30, 2009, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) invited Hamid’s family to the state-sponsored "9 Dey" rally, which was held in response to the post-election protests. During the rally, the IRGC recognized Hamid as a "martyr". (Jaras, September 17, 2011).

In the years following Hamid’s death, the IRGC repeatedly visited the family, questioning them about the precise location where their son had been killed. (Jaras, September 17, 2011).

According to his mother, some government officials attempted to attribute her son's death to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (referred to by the state as the "Monafeqin," or "hypocrites"). (Jaras, September 17, 2011).

In 2009, the Basij Organization held a ceremony titled "In Commemoration of the Martyred Basij Members After the Election" at Mahdieh Mosque in Tehran and invited Hamid’s family to attend. In the lead-up to the 2013 presidential election, a program on Radio Farhang (the Islamic Republic's cultural station) referred to Hamid Hosseinbeig Araqi, along with several others, as a "martyred Basij member." (Radio Farda, June 21, 2013). 

Familys’ Reaction

In the days following Hamid’s death, his family filed a lawsuit with the Criminal Division of the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office. Two years later, they stated that neither the precise location of the shooting nor any witnesses had been identified. They also questioned why Hamid’s front teeth were broken and why he was transferred to the forensic medical center as an “unidentified body,” despite the fact that he was carrying his identification documents and motorcycle the night of the incident. (Jaras, July 12, 2010; Youth for Human Rights, quoting Jaras, September 17, 2011).

In response to the Fars News Agency’s portrayal of Hamid as a “martyred Basij member” and its claim that Hamid’s mother called for the prosecution of the “leaders of the sedition” (a reference to opposition candidates who contested the election results), Hamid’s mother denied ever giving such an interview. She stated that her son was never a member of the Basij and that she had never named anyone for prosecution. Despite her efforts to correct the false narrative, the agency refused to retract or amend its reporting. (Jaras, September 19, 2010; July 12, 2010).

When members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) visited the family and claimed that "Monafeqin" (a derogatory state term for the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization) was responsible for Hamid's death, his mother responded, "If the Monafeqin are truly behind such violence, why don’t they appear at government-organized rallies and harm people there? Why is it that they only show up when our children are out protesting?" She added, "This remains a mystery to me, and I am not convinced by these explanations" (Youth for Human Rights, quoting Jaras, September 17, 2011).

Impacts on Family

Hamid's death had a profound and lasting impact on his family. Even two years later, his mother recalled breaking into tears at the dinner table when overwhelmed by memories of her son. She said the grief of losing him had never left her. His father became deeply emotional and tearful whenever he saw scenes of people being shot in films or footage. (Youth for Human Rights, quoting Jaras, September 17, 2011.)

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