Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Mehdi Qasemi

About

Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Unknown

Case

Date of Killing: March 19, 2026
Location of Killing: Qom, Qom Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Execution » Hanging
Charges: War on God

About this Case

The Criminal Court of Qom sentenced Mr. Mehdi Qasemi and two other defendants to death in a process described as "extremely unfair."

Information regarding the execution of Mr. Mehdi Qasemi, son of Asghar, was gathered from the official website of the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mizan News Agency (March 19, 2026), Tasnim News Agency (March 19, 2026), Iran Human Rights Organization (March 19, 2026), and the Committee for the Follow-up of Detainees (March 19, 2026).

Available sources do not provide information on Mr. Qasemi’s date of birth, age, place of birth, marital status, education, or employment background.

Mr. Qasemi is accused of killing two law enforcement officials during the January 8, 2026 protests in Qom.

December 2025 Protest Backgrounder 

(This background has been prepared based on the initial information at the start of the protests and will be updated at the earliest opportunity.)

On December 28, 2025, merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar went on strike to protest the country’s deteriorating economic conditions. Protests were sparked by the rapid depreciation of the Iranian rial to the U.S. dollar which reached a record low of 1.4 million rial to dollar by late December. High inflation, reaching 42% by December, further deepened Iranians’ economic frustrations. By December 30, protests had spread to half of Iran’s provinces, including Alborz, Khuzestan, Fars, Hamedan, Kermanshah, Khorasan Razavi, West Azerbaijan, Hormozgan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Markazi, Isfahan, Zanjan, and Yazd. In addition to labor strikes, Iranians also held street gatherings and marches, and convened rallies at universities and outside government offices.  

During the first week, protest slogans largely focused on economic grievances and government corruption, but by the second week, evolved into anti-regime chants targeting the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Republic itself. Chants of “Death to Khamenei” were recorded in several cities including Tehran, Arak, Urmia, Qom, and Zahedan, as well as “death to the dictator”, “we don’t want an Islamic Republic”, and calls for a return of the Pahlavi dynasty: “Pahlavi will return”, and “long live the Shah”.  While economic hardships initially triggered the protests, protest demands increasingly evinced calls for an end to the theocratic government altogether.

On January 8, the 12th day of protests, Iranian authorities instated a nationwide internet blackout. By this time, protests had spread to at least 22, a majority, of Iran’s provinces, half of which are minority regions, including Kurdistan and Khuzestan which experienced some of the largest protests outside of Tehran. According to the Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA), protests had taken place in at least 585 locations across 186 cities in all of Iran’s 31 provinces by the 15th day. Image and footage of scores of bodies in a makeshift morgue in Kahrizak Forensic Medical Center in Tehran surfaced online amid the blackout around January 10. Testimonies obtained by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center (ABC) described a chaotic environment at Kahrizak, with vehicles unloading piles of corpses, and people forced to identify their loved ones among the body bags strewn on the ground.  

ABC documented the first protester death on January 1st. ABC has received testimonies from several provinces, including Mashad, Tehran, Yazd, Kurdistan describing protesters shot in the heart, throat, or head, suggesting the security forces were shooting-to-kill. Eyewitnesses also described security forces' use of machine guns at protest sites, underscoring the indiscriminate and arbitrary nature of the shootings. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of protesters killed due to the ongoing blackout as of this writing on January 15, 2025, but preliminary estimates indicate a high death toll, at minimum in the several hundred, but potentially in the thousands. 

Initial government statements varied at the onset of the protests, with President Masoud Pezeshkian instructing the Minister of the Interior to “engage in dialogue with the protesters’ representatives to address their legitimate demands” on December 30, 2025, with Ayatollah Khamenei stating during a Friday sermon on January 3, 2026 that, “officials must talk with protesters”, but added “rioters must be put in their place”. As protests became more widespread and focused their demands for an end to clerical rule, the Iranian government’s statements became more unified and hostile towards protesters. On January 5, Iran’s Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i said that the government would show no “leniency” towards protesters and called for expedited judicial proceedings. President Pezeshkian claimed protesters, or “rioters” were foreign agents, and that “These individuals were trained both inside and outside the country. Foreign terrorists were brought in to set fire to mosques, bazaars, and public spaces. They have killed people with guns, burned them, and beheaded others. Truly, such atrocities are not the work of our people.” On the same day on January 11, Iran’s Cabinet of Ministers released an official statement reiterating Pezeshkian’s statements, writing: “The Zionist regime and the criminal U.S ... have repeatedly emphasized their efforts to incite chaos. They have exploited the current situation by deploying mercenaries and terrorists across the country to attack and martyr a large number of our dear citizens, as well as our devoted police, Basij, and security forces”. On January 13, Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated, “We declare the names of the main killers of the people of Iran: 1 - Trump, 2 - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”. During an interview with Fox News on January 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described reports that thousands of protesters had been killed by security forces as an "exaggeration" and “misinformation campaign”, and that the number of deaths were “only hundreds”. 

Abroad, U.S. President Donald Trump warned on January 1, “If Iran violently kills peaceful protesters…the United States will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go”. He took again to Truth Social, writing: “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING - TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! Save the names of the killers and abusers. They will pay a big price” on January 13. Later that same day, he wrote, “HELP IS ON ITS WAY”. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s former Shah, also issued several statements echoing President Trump’s statements that foreign assistance was coming, and called for more strikes and demonstrations on January 10 and 11: “Our goal is no longer merely to come to the streets; the goal is to prepare for seizing the centers of cities and holding them”. 

On 1 February 2026, the Office of the President of Iran published a list containing the details of 2,986 individuals who were killed during the protests. On 3 February 2026, the number was increased to 3,038. (IRNA, 8 February 2026).

In an official statement, the Government of Iran emphasized that the list was compiled “by aggregating the names prepared by the Legal Medicine Organization of the country and cross-referencing them with the database of the National Organization for Civil Registration. The discrepancy of 131 individuals compared to the previously announced figures is due to a number of unidentified bodies and inconsistencies in the registration of national identification numbers of some of the deceased within the Civil Registration system, which will be corrected and reflected in a supplementary list as soon as the necessary amendments are made.”

At the time this list was published, the Boroumand Center’s ongoing and continuously updated list included names that did not appear in the government’s list. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) had also reported that it had documented more than 6,000 deaths.

Arrest and Detention

Mr. Mehdi Qasemi and two other defendants were "quickly" arrested through security and intelligence measures following the killing of two law enforcement officers during the January 2026 protests. They were placed under temporary detention orders and interrogated. (Tasnim News Agency, March 19, 2026).

According to the Committee for the Follow-up of Detainees, Mr. Qasemi was transferred to the Nasr Detention Center, affiliated with the IRGC's Intelligence Organization, after his arrest (Committee for the Follow-up of Detainees, March 19, 2026).

No information is available on the exact date of Mr. Qasemi’s arrest, the length of his detention, his access to family members, or the conditions under which he was interrogated.

Trial

The Criminal Court of Qom Province prosecuted Mr. Mehdi Qasemi, the third defendant in this case, together with his two co-defendants. (Iran Human Rights Organization, March 19, 2026).

According to a Tasnim News Agency report, the judicial proceedings against Mr. Qasemi were conducted "quickly and with precision," and the legal process was carried out in the presence of both privately retained and court-appointed defense attorneys. However, no further details about the course of the proceedings were provided (Tasnim News Agency, March 19, 2026).

Charges

According to the available information, the court sentenced Mr. Mehdi Qasemi for "moharebeh through the use of cold weapons at public gatherings," "participation in the killing of a law enforcement officer," "acting on behalf of foreign governments," and "inciting others to wage war and commit killings" (Tasnim News Agency, March 19, 2026; Mizan News Agency, March 19, 2026).

According to official reports, on the evening of January 8, 2026, protest gatherings formed in areas including Nobovat Square and its surrounding neighborhoods, and Law enforcement forces were deployed to confront the protesters. The government claims that during the clashes and attacks involving stones, Molotov cocktails, and cold weapons, two Law Enforcement Command officers were killed. Mr. Qasemi and the two other defendants separately attacked officers with cold weapons in two locations: Nekuyi Intersection and Nobovat Square in Qom. These attacks resulted in the officers' deaths. (Mizan News Agency; Tasnim News Agency, March 19, 2026).

The validity of the criminal charges brought against this defendant cannot be ascertained in the absence of the basic guarantees of a fair trial.  International human rights organizations have drawn attention to reports indicating that the Islamic Republic authorities have brought trumped-up charges, including drug trafficking, sexual, and other criminal offences, against their opponents (including political, civil society activists, as well as unionists and ethnic and religious minorities). Each year Iranian authorities sentence to death hundreds of alleged common criminals, following judicial processes that fail to meet international standards. The exact number of people convicted and executed based on trumped-up charges is unknown. 

Evidence of guilt 

Based on the available information, the primary evidence against Mr. Mehdi Qasemi and the other defendants in this case consisted of their “confessions” during interrogation, investigation, and court proceedings, as well as the “crime scene reenactment. (Tasnim News Agency and Mizan News Agency, March 19, 2026).

In the crime scene reenactment footage released by Mizan News Agency, Mr. Qasemi shows how he delivered the blows and says he stayed in the same spot and struck them from there. (Mizan News Agency, March 19, 2026).

International human rights organizations have repeatedly condemned the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for its systematic use of severe torture and solitary confinement to obtain confessions from detainees and have questioned the authenticity of confessions obtained under duress. 

Defense 

No information is available concerning Mr. Mehdi Qasemi's defenses. Existing sources do not detail his access to a personally chosen attorney, his opportunity to present a defense, summon witnesses, or raise objections during the judicial process.

A Summary of the Legal Defects in Mr. Mehdi Qasemi’s Case

The exact date of Mr. Mehdi Qasemi’s arrest is unknown. However, given that the protests occurred on January 8, 2026, and two law enforcement officers were killed in Qom on that date, he was likely arrested in late January or early March of that year. Considering his execution took place on March 19, 2026, the entire process of the preliminary investigation, trial, and sentencing took approximately two months.In a case involving three defendants, two deaths, and allegations of moharebeh and operational activities on behalf of foreign governments, extensive investigations are required and will necessarily take a relatively long time. In other words, the investigative process in this case inherently requires significant time due to the nature of police and forensic examinations. Furthermore, adhering to procedural safeguards, such as the legally mandated timeframe between receiving a summons and appearing in court, as well as the statutory deadlines for appealing decisions made by the prosecutor's office and the court, would typically prevent a case from progressing from investigation to execution within two mounths. Yet, it is evident that the proceedings in this case progressed with extraordinary speed. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to conclude that the defendant’s rights were respected or that the proceedings were conducted in compliance with applicable legal requirements.

Mr. Qasemi was sentenced to qesas for intentional murder. However, additional accusations were brought against him, including charges of moharebeh and acting on behalf of foreign governments. There is no information available regarding the outcome of any related Revolutionary Court proceedings. However, none of the reports published by domestic media outlets, particularly Mizan News Agency, indicate that he acted in support of the governments of Israel or the United States. In other words, neither the released video footage nor the court proceedings contains evidence of a connection between Mr. Qasemi and foreign governments. Regarding the charge of moharebeh, the question of which actions by the defendant resulted in widespread fear and insecurity has not been addressed.

According to reports, the two officers killed died from multiple blows inflicted by a large number of individuals. Reports have cited 29 injuries on one of the deceased officers' bodies. Determining which blow or blows were fatal would not have been simple and would have required a careful forensic examination by the Forensic Medicine Organization. There are serious doubts about whether the necessary examinations were conducted, particularly given the preliminary investigation's rapid pace.

Furthermore, according to official news agencies, Mr. Qasemi and two other individuals committed the killings at two separate locations. In other words, the officers were not killed in the same place or at the same time. However, the crime scene reenactment addresses only a single killing. Therefore, it remains unclear whether Mr. Qasemi participated in both killings or whether his actions in one instance resulted in death and in another merely caused injury. In other words, the role of each defendant in the two killings has not been clearly established.

Based on information published by domestic news agencies, the primary basis for the convictions of Mr. Mehdi Qasemi and the two other defendants appears to have been their confessions. While these reports repeatedly refer to confessions and crime scene reenactments, the nature of the case suggests that additional forms of evidence, such as surveillance camera footage and forensic examination results, should have been included in the case file. In other words, it seems the judicial authorities focused on lending credibility to the defendants’ confessions rather than adequately investigating how they were obtained.

Judgment

The Criminal Court of Qom Province sentenced Mr. Mehdi Qasemi and the two other defendants in this case to qesas (retribution in kind), and the Supreme Court upheld the sentence. (Tasnim News Agency, March 19, 2026).

After receiving approval, Mr. Qasemi and the other two defendants were publicly hanged on Thursday morning, March 19, 2026, in front of a group of local residents of Qom. (Tasnim News Agency, March 19, 2026).

Available sources do not provide information on notifying Mr. Qasemi's family, the burial location, or funeral arrangements.

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