Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Ya'qub Barvayeh

About

Age: 27
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Single

Case

Date of Killing: July 1, 2009
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: targeting vital organs
Charges: Unknown charge

About this Case

He was a hard-working young man with a passion for poetry and literature and was a talented writer.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Ya'qub Barvayeh, son of Abdolzohra, was obtained from an ABC interview with an informed individual (December 23, 2009, via Facebook), Amir Kabir Newsletter (July 13, 2009), HRANA - Human Rights Activists News Agency (July 21, 2009), and the Parcham website (October 3, 2009). Additional details were taken from the websites of Fars News Agency (July 21, 2009 and July 12, 2010), Radio France Internationale (June 21, 2009), Iran News Agency (July 6, 2009), Ham-Mihan (July 7, 2009), Norooz (July 13, 2009), Committee of Human Rights Reporters (July 24, 2009), Rooz Online (August 4, 2010), For Justice - Association in Support of the Families of the Dead and Detainees (December 9, 2010), Tasnim News Agency (June 26, 2014), and IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency (December 30, 2021), as well as from images and videos of Mr. Barvayeh and the inscription on his gravestone.

According to available information, Mr. Barvayeh was a 27-year-old native of Ahvaz. He completed his primary education in the village of Barvayeh, his high school education in Ahvaz, and later earned a bachelor's degree in drama and dramatic literature in Arak. He pursued a master's degree in dramatic literature at the Faculty of Art and Architecture in Tehran.

He was a determined and hardworking student who had prepared extensively for the entrance exam. He was engaged to a woman named Neda and had told friends that he planned to build a house for her in Tehran when she finished her studies. His friends described him as passionate about poetry and literature and as a gifted writer. He regularly wrote articles and reports on the theater for various newspapers. Those who knew him personally described him as "a warm-hearted and kind Southerner, incapable of malice." (Ham-Mihan, July 7, 2009)

Photographs show Mr. Barvayeh wearing a green wristband, a symbol of support in 2009 for presidential candidate Mir Hossein Musavi. One of his friends described him as a staunch supporter of Musavi and said that he participated in protests both before and after the election. The same person also noted that Mr. Barvayeh had previously worked with the campaign team of presidential candidate Dr. Mo'in during the 2005 election. (Iran News Agency) 

2009 Election - Background 

Election returns from Iran’s June 12th, 2009, presidential election declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected with 62.63 percent of the vote.  Following the announcement, citizens disputing these official results demonstrated in the streets.  Text messaging services were disrupted starting at 11:00 p.m. on the night before the election and remained unavailable for nearly three weeks, until July 1st. On Election Day, the deputy chief of Iranian police announced a ban on any gathering of presidential candidates’ supporters throughout the country.  The same evening, security forces made a “show of strength,” increasing their presence in Tehran’s public squares to “reinforce security at polling stations.”  Officials at election headquarters began reporting results soon after midnight, despite a statement from the Minister of the Interior that the first returns would not be announced until after the morning prayer (around 4:00 a.m.). 

Many supporters of other presidential candidates came out into the streets on June 13th, once the results were made public, to protest what they believed to be a fraudulent election.  Candidates Mir Hossein Musavi, Mehdi Karubi, and Mohsen Reza’i, Ahmadinejad’s competitors in the race, contested the election, alleging many instances of fraud.  They filed complaints with the Council of Guardians, the constitutional body charged with vetting candidates before elections take place and approving the results afterwards, requesting an annulment and calling for a new election.  Before the Council of Guardians could review their claims, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election.  In the meantime, many people active in Karubi’s and Musavi’s campaigns were arrested. 

On June 15th, unprecedented demonstrations filled the streets of central Tehran, in which an estimated three million protestors participated, according to statements attributed to the mayor of Tehran.  As the demonstrations were ending, paramilitary forces attacked the marchers, injuring and killing several people.  To prevent such news from being broadcast, the Iranian government expelled foreign journalists from the country and banned news agencies from reporting on the events.  Over the next three days, protesters took part in peaceful demonstrations in Tehran.  The repression entered a new phase on June 19th after Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday sermon, in which he announced his support for Ahmadinejad and warned protestors that they were responsible for any disorder and its consequences. Amnesty International stated that the speech gave “legitimacy to police brutality.”  The next day and thereafter, police and plainclothes paramilitary groups attacked the protesters.  Public gatherings of any kind were declared illegal, and police, motorcycle-riding special units wearing black uniforms and helmets, and plainclothes agents brutally enforced this restriction. 

Individuals in civilian clothing, commonly referred to as plainclothes forces, are used in the Islamic Republic to disrupt political and trade union activities, student events and gatherings, electoral initiatives, and protests.  Armed with sticks and clubs, and sometimes with chains, knives, batons, or firearms, they emerge when the state decides to suppress dissent.  These plainclothes forces move about freely, violently beating protesters and arresting them, while the police passively look on or actively cooperate with them.  

There is little information on the command structure and organization of such groups, whose members wear ordinary clothing rather than official uniforms and may be affiliated with the ministry of information, influential political groups, or the armed forces. Following the post-election demonstrations in June 2009, pictures of some plainclothes agents were posted on internet websites.  Internet users helped to identify some of them and provided evidence that these individuals were affiliated with the Basij paramilitary groups, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and state intelligence forces. On September 16, 2009, a deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Province of Tehran confirmed the active and decisive role of Basij forces in the repression of the demonstrations, saying, “Basijis, through their presence in recent events, have blinded the eyes of the conspirators, and they should be appreciated… The enemies of Islam wanted to make the air dusty and to exploit the recent events, but thank God, through the enlightenment of the Honorable Leader we were victorious against this conspiracy.” He also emphasized, “The zealous youth of [the] Basij, believers in the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, are the second and third generations of the Revolution.  They have been successful in this stage and victorious on this battlefield.” 

When personal property was damaged during the protests, government authorities and state-run radio and television programs accused the demonstrators of vandalism and justified the repression.  At the same time, however, footage posted online showed security forces destroying and damaging property on side streets and in uncongested areas away from the protests.  Moreover, in a public gathering in Tehran on October 20th, the chief of Iranian police conceded that police had destroyed and damaged property and accepted responsibility for it. 

The precise number of citizens injured, killed, or disappeared in the post-election violence is not known.  According to various reports, there were hundreds of victims in demonstrations throughout the country.  More than seventy names have been reported.  It is said that officials have threatened victims’ family members, demanding their silence and that they refrain from giving interviews.  Reports also allege that returning a victim’s body to a family has been made conditional upon their agreement to change the cause of death listed on the coroner’s certificate to that of a heart attack or some other natural cause — thus foregoing the right to file a complaint — as well as the family's agreement not to hold memorial services for the loved one.  

According to government statements, more than 4,000 people were arrested throughout Iran in the weeks following June 12th. Many have been held at the Kahrizak Detention Center, where prisoners’ rights and minimum hygiene standards were typically ignored.  Numerous reports of violence, including the torture and rape of detainees, have been published.  State reports and testimonies confirm that a number of detainees at Kahrizak died in custody due to beatings, difficult and unbearable prison conditions, and torture. 

Mr. Ya’qub Barvayeh’s arbitrary execution 

According to available information, on June 20, 2009, Ya'qub Barvayeh was shot in the arm and head by Basij militia forces firing from the roof of the Lolagar Mosque in Tehran. He was rushed by bystanders to Loqman Hakim Hospital, where he remained in a coma for ten days. He died from his injuries on Wednesday, July 1, 2009.

That day, as the government's crackdown on nationwide protests intensified, demonstrations across Tehran were met with violence by Basij and plainclothes agents. In one such instance, Basij forces stationed on the roof of the Basij Resistance Base adjacent to the Lolagar Mosque - located at the intersection of Navab and Azerbaijan Streets - opened fire on demonstrators. Several people were reportedly injured or killed. While no official statistics have been released, footage of Basij members firing from the roof was broadcast by Al Jazeera and other outlets on June 25. Other videos filmed by civilians clearly show two people being shot.

In response to the attack, the Basij base at the mosque was set on fire by angry demonstrators. The following day, state television reported that "rioters" had set fire to the mosque during evening prayers, killing several worshippers. However, footage showed the incident occurred in daylight, and the claim of casualties was later denied. (Radio France Internationale, June 21, 2009)

Mr. Barvayeh had joined the protest that day with some of his friends. He was separated from his companions when security and Basij forces launched their attack, using tear gas.

There is footage of Ya'qub Barvayeh lying injured on the ground, bleeding from wounds to his shoulder and head, as people rush to move him to another location amid chants of "Allahu Akbar". (ABC Archive)

On Friday, July 3, 2009, his body was buried in the village of Barvayeh, near Ahvaz, in the presence of local residents, Arab tribesmen, and a heavy security presence.

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms. 

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible: a) Warning shots; b) Shots aimed at the lower body; c) Shots aimed at the upper body. (Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

Note 1:If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Officials’ Reaction 

The security forces did not release Mr. Barvayeh's body to his family in Tehran. Instead, they transported it themselves to the family's village. According to his father: "They didn't give Ya'qub to us in Tehran. They brought him to our village themselves, made us sign a pledge not to cause any trouble, and demanded that we hold the funeral quietly. Then we buried him in their presence." (Rooz Online, August 4, 2010)

In response to the family's official complaint, which sought to identify the person who killed Ya'qub, the authorities claimed that the bullet had not been fired from a military weapon or from firearms issued to the Basij forces. On this basis, they argued that it was not possible to identify the perpetrator and offered blood money instead. (Rooz Online, August 4, 2010)

The Fars News Agency, quoting Mr. Barvayeh's father, described him as "a member of the Basij who was martyred in the service of the Islamic Republic" and claimed that his presence in the streets had nothing to do with the post-election protests. According to an informed source, following Mr. Barvayeh's death, officials issued him a membership card identifying him as an "active member of the Basij". Government authorities reportedly used threats and inducements to persuade the families of those killed to declare their children as Basij members. These conflicting reports, apparently disseminated by the government and affiliated websites, appear to be designed to prevent access to accurate information. (ABC interview with an informed person; Fars News Agency, July 21, 2009)

Five years after Mr. Barvayeh's death, on the anniversary of his assassination, a state-run news agency again attributed his death to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. It claimed that "Martyr Barvayeh was killed by the Monafeqin [hypocrites] in the post-presidential election riots while returning from a university exam on Saturday, June 13, 2009 [June 20, 2009], and was hospitalized in Loqman Hospital for several days." The Islamic Republic News Agency also echoed this narrative, reporting that the head of the Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council of Khuzestan, along with other provincial officials, had visited the Barvayeh family as "the family of a martyr of the 2009 sedition." (Tasnim News Agency, June 26, 2014; IRNA, December 30, 2021)

Familys’ Reaction

In the first days after his son's burial, Mr. Barvayeh's father filed a lawsuit demanding the identification of the perpetrator. No one was ever named or held accountable. In response to the authorities' offer of financial compensation, he said: "I told them we don't want blood money. I'm not in financial need - but even if I were, I wouldn't take it. All I want is the person who killed my son." (Rooz Online, August 4, 2010)

In response to conflicting claims in state media that Mr. Barvayeh was a Basij member and not a protester, an informed source explained that such statements by his father were the result of severe government pressure on the family and the father's fear. 

In an interview a year after Ya'qub's death, his father denied statements previously attributed to him by Fars News Agency, Kayhan newspaper, and other pro-government outlets. He said: "Ya'qub was not a member of the Basij. He had nothing to do with politics." Acknowledging the pressure on himself and his family, he added: "How long can I remain silent for the sake of my other children? We have always acted within the law and have nothing to do with anti-government groups. But if you keep repeating that Ya'qub was a Basij member... fine, then go ahead and identify and prosecute the killer of this so-called Basiji. And if you say he was a rioter or whatever, then identify the person who killed him. Either way, someone killed my child." He also gave details of the conditions under which these interviews were conducted and the pressure his family was under, and denied much of what had been published in the media in his name. At his request, the audio file of this interview has not yet been released. (Rooz Online, August 4, 2010)

Impacts on Family

According to the available information, a year after Ya'qub's death, his mother was still in great distress. According to his father: "Since Ya'qub left us, she has no hope of living." (Rooz Online, August 4, 2010)

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