Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Memorial
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Hamid Arzanlu

About

Age: 50
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Unknown

Case

Date of Killing: January 8, 2026
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Arbitrary shooting » Assault weapon/ Fire arm » targeting vital organs

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

 

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

 

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

 

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

 

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

 

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

 

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

 

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

 

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

 

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

 

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

 

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

 

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

 

General Courts, 1982-1994

 

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

 

General Courts, 1994-2002

 

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

 

General Courts, 2002-2015

 

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

 

General Courts, 2015 to Today

 

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

 

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

 

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

 

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

 

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

 

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

 

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

 

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

 

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

 

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

 

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

 

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

 

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 

 

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

 

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

 

Military Courts

 

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

 

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

 

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

 

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

 

The judges

 

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

 

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  

 

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

 

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

 

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

 

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

 

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

 

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

  • The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  • The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. 

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2. 

  • The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 

UDHR, Article 12, ICCPR, Article 17.1. 

  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.

  • The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.

  • The right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 21.

  • The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.

 

  • The right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection of the law. 

UDHR, Article 7; ICCPR, Article 26.

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction.

ICCPR, Article 14.5.

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

 

Capital punishment

  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

Correct/ Complete This Entry

Hamid Arzanlu, a prominent entrepreneur in Iran’s furniture industry, was shot and killed by government forces in Tehranpars.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Hamid Arzanlu, son of Mahmud and Belgheis, was gathered from the Iran International website (January 21 and 26, 2026), the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights (January 17, 2026), and the Sang Pasargad Instagram page (February 15, 2026). He is also listed as entry number 408 among those killed during the January 2026 protests, according to the official website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, published on February 1, 2026.

Mr. Arzanlu was born on July 8, 1975; he was married, the father of two children, and lived in the Khak Sefid neighborhood of Tehran. Along with his brother Vahid Arzanlu, he was an owner and manager of the family-run business "Aysa Moble Kian," operated by the six Arzanlu brothers. Starting as a small atelier about twenty years ago, the business gradually grew into a recognized brand in Iran’s furniture industry.

 At its height, the company employed at least 1,000 people, including around 200 staff members. It expanded its presence by opening nearly 30 branches and representatives across various cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Qom, Mashhad, and Yazd, creating a wide network in the country’s furniture industry. Its main showroom was situated on Delavaran Boulevard in Tehran. Hamid and Vahid Arzanlu, both from working-class backgrounds, were recognized by industry insiders as self-made and reputable entrepreneurs (Iran International, January 26, 2026).

At this company, Hamid Arzanlu handled sales at the main showrooms in Tehran and managed at least six large Aysa Mobl showrooms within the city. Mr. Arzanlu was married and had two young children (Iran International, January 26, 2026).

Reports indicate that he and his brother, Vahid Arzanlu, were actively involved in organizing the Delavaran furniture market strikes that started on January 6, 2026. Family sources state that the two brothers joined protesters in the streets from the early hours of January 8, 2026 (Iran International, January 26, 2026). 

December 2025 Protest Backgrounder 

(This background has been prepared based on the initial information at the start of the protests and will be updated at the earliest opportunity.)

On December 28, 2025, merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar went on strike to protest the country’s deteriorating economic conditions. Protests were sparked by the rapid depreciation of the Iranian rial to the U.S. dollar which reached a record low of 1.4 million rial to dollar by late December. High inflation, reaching 42% by December, further deepened Iranians’ economic frustrations. By December 30, protests had spread to half of Iran’s provinces, including Alborz, Khuzestan, Fars, Hamedan, Kermanshah, Khorasan Razavi, West Azerbaijan, Hormozgan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Markazi, Isfahan, Zanjan, and Yazd. In addition to labor strikes, Iranians also held street gatherings and marches, and convened rallies at universities and outside government offices. 

During the first week, protest slogans largely focused on economic grievances and government corruption, but by the second week, evolved into anti-regime chants targeting the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Republic itself. Chants of “Death to Khamenei” were recorded in several cities including Tehran, Arak, Urmia, Qom, and Zahedan, as well as “death to the dictator”, “we don’t want an Islamic Republic”, and calls for a return of the Pahlavi dynasty: “Pahlavi will return”, and “long live the Shah”.  While economic hardships initially triggered the protests, protest demands increasingly evinced calls for an end to the theocratic government altogether.

On January 8, the 12th day of protests, Iranian authorities instated a nationwide internet blackout. By this time, protests had spread to at least 22, a majority, of Iran’s provinces, half of which are minority regions, including Kurdistan and Khuzestan which experienced some of the largest protests outside of Tehran. According to the Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA), protests had taken place in at least 585 locations across 186 cities in all of Iran’s 31 provinces by the 15th day. Image and footage of scores of bodies in a makeshift morgue in Kahrizak Forensic Medical Center in Tehran surfaced online amid the blackout around January 10. Testimonies obtained by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center (ABC) described a chaotic environment at Kahrizak, with vehicles unloading piles of corpses, and people forced to identify their loved ones among the body bags strewn on the ground. 

ABC documented the first protester death on January 1st. ABC has received testimonies from several provinces, including Mashad, Tehran, Yazd, Kurdistan describing protesters shot in the heart, throat, or head, suggesting the security forces were shooting-to-kill. Eyewitnesses also described security forces' use of machine guns at protest sites, underscoring the indiscriminate and arbitrary nature of the shootings. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of protesters killed due to the ongoing blackout as of this writing on January 15, 2025, but preliminary estimates indicate a high death toll, at minimum in the several hundred, but potentially in the thousands. 

Initial government statements varied at the onset of the protests, with President Masoud Pezeshkian instructing the Minister of the Interior to “engage in dialogue with the protesters’ representatives to address their legitimate demands” on December 30, 2025, with Ayatollah Khamenei stating during a Friday sermon on January 3, 2026 that, “officials must talk with protesters”, but added “rioters must be put in their place”. As protests became more widespread and focused their demands for an end to clerical rule, the Iranian government’s statements became more unified and hostile towards protesters. On January 5, Iran’s Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i said that the government would show no “leniency” towards protesters and called for expedited judicial proceedings. President Pezeshkian claimed protesters, or “rioters” were foreign agents, and that “These individuals were trained both inside and outside the country. Foreign terrorists were brought in to set fire to mosques, bazaars, and public spaces. They have killed people with guns, burned them, and beheaded others. Truly, such atrocities are not the work of our people.” On the same day on January 11, Iran’s Cabinet of Ministers released an official statement reiterating Pezeshkian’s statements, writing: “The Zionist regime and the criminal U.S ... have repeatedly emphasized their efforts to incite chaos. They have exploited the current situation by deploying mercenaries and terrorists across the country to attack and martyr a large number of our dear citizens, as well as our devoted police, Basij, and security forces”. On January 13, Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated, “We declare the names of the main killers of the people of Iran: 1 - Trump, 2 - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”. During an interview with Fox News on January 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described reports that thousands of protesters had been killed by security forces as an "exaggeration" and “misinformation campaign”, and that the number of deaths were “only hundreds”. 

Abroad, U.S. President Donald Trump warned on January 1, “If Iran violently kills peaceful protesters…the United States will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go”. He took again to Truth Social, writing: “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING - TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! Save the names of the killers and abusers. They will pay a big price” on January 13. Later that same day, he wrote, “HELP IS ON ITS WAY”. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s former Shah, also issued several statements echoing President Trump’s statements that foreign assistance was coming, and called for more strikes and demonstrations on January 10 and 11: “Our goal is no longer merely to come to the streets; the goal is to prepare for seizing the centers of cities and holding them”. 

On 1 February 2026, the Office of the President of Iran published a list containing the details of 2,986 individuals who were killed during the protests. On 3 February 2026, the number was increased to 3,038. (IRNA, 8 February 2026).

In an official statement, the Government of Iran emphasized that the list was compiled “by aggregating the names prepared by the Legal Medicine Organization of the country and cross-referencing them with the database of the National Organization for Civil Registration. The discrepancy of 131 individuals compared to the previously announced figures is due to a number of unidentified bodies and inconsistencies in the registration of national identification numbers of some of the deceased within the Civil Registration system, which will be corrected and reflected in a supplementary list as soon as the necessary amendments are made.”

At the time this list was published, the Boroumand Center’s ongoing and continuously updated list included names that did not appear in the government’s list. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) had also reported that it had documented more than 6,000 deaths.

Mr. Hamid Arzanlu’s arbitrary execution 

According to available information, Hamid Arzanlu was shot in the head by security forces during protests on Thursday, January 8, 2026. He subsequently died from his injuries in the hospital. (Iran International, January 26, 2026; Hengaw, January 17, 2026).

"His brother was also shot while he was trying to help him."

During widespread protests in Tehranpars, security forces fired on demonstrators. Hamid Arzanlu sustained a critical head injury from a bullet during the shooting and died after being taken to the hospital (Iran International, January 26, 2026; Hengaw, January 17, 2026).

After he was shot, his brother Vahid Arzanlu rushed to help him but was also shot and died from his injuries (Iran International, January 26, 2026).

The two brothers were buried by their family at Behesht Zahra Cemetery in Tehran, Section 48, Row 85. (Iran International, January 21, 2026). 

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms. 

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible: a) Warning shots; b) Shots aimed at the lower body; c) Shots aimed at the upper body. (Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

Note 1:If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary". 

Officials’ Reaction

Security authorities demanded over one billion tomans for the release of Mr. Hamid Arzanlu and his brother's bodies. They pressured the family to claim that Mr. Arzanlu's death was due to a brain stroke (Iran International, January 26, 2026; Hengaw, January 17, 2026). Additionally, they made the return of the bodies conditional on the family’s participation in the government-organized February 11 rally at Enghelab Square in Tehran (Hengaw, January 17, 2026).

Familys’ Reaction

Following the death of their two sons, the Arzanlu family held a public funeral. During the event, Kiumars Arzanlu, one of the brothers, urged attendees to show respect for their memory by applauding if they believed his brothers had been on the right path (Iran International, January 26, 2026).

Impacts on Family

There is no information about how Mr. Arzanlu’s death affected his family.

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