Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Razaqi

About

Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Unknown

Case

Date of Killing: May 25, 2006
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Naqadeh, Naqadeh County, Azarbaijan-e Gharbi Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Arbitrary Execution » Unspecified arbitrary execution method

About this Case

Mr. Razaqi was killed during the Naqadeh protests on May 25, 2006.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Mr. Razaqi was obtained from the Iranian National News Agency website (May 28, 2006) and the Faza’el Azizaan blog (May 30, 2009). Additional information was gathered from the BBC Persian website (May 28, 2006), Radio Farda (May 31 and June 22, 2006), and the Shahidler blog, quoting Oruzm (August 2007).

Little is known about Mr. Razaqi’s life except that he participated in the Naqadeh demonstrations on May 25, 2006. 

Background of the 2006 Azerbaijan Protests

On May 12, 2006, the state-run Iran newspaper published a cartoon in its Friday edition. In the cartoon, a cockroach responds to a child speaking to it in Azerbaijani with the question, "Nemanə?" (meaning "What?"). Many Azerbaijani readers interpreted the cartoon as equating the Azeri people with cockroaches, viewing it as an explicit insult to the Azerbaijani community in Iran.

The authorities' longstanding refusal to allow education in mother tongues in schools had already created tensions among Azerbaijanis. News of the cartoon’s publication, coupled with the lack of an official response to initial protests—mainly organized in universities—sparked a wave of street demonstrations beginning in late May 2006. In Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil, Zanjan, Marand, Maragheh, Ahar, Khalkhal, Khoy, Miyaneh, and Solduz (Naqadeh), protesters chanted slogans such as "Haray, haray, men Turkam" ("Cry out, cry out, I am a Turk"), demanding the suspension of Iran newspaper and a formal apology from high-ranking officials.

As the protests escalated on May 23, 2006, the government officially condemned the cartoon as an "insult to Iranians." The judiciary ordered the suspension of Iran newspaper and the arrest of its editor and cartoonist. A motion to impeach the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance was raised in Parliament. Though these measures were intended to quell the unrest, they failed to calm public anger.

On May 24, 2006, as demonstrations intensified in Tabriz, then-President Mahmud Ahmadinejad accused the United States of “plotting to incite ethnic division.” The judiciary and police in East Azerbaijan announced the arrest of more than 50 individuals in connection with the protests. Iranian officials continued to attribute the protests to foreign interference and warned of harsh measures against demonstrators in Azerbaijan.

The following day, in the city of Naqadeh (West Azerbaijan Province), police and Basij forces opened fire on protesters marching toward the governor’s office. In response to this violent crackdown, thousands of demonstrators in Tabriz threw stones at government buildings and banks. Riot police across various cities used tear gas, batons, and, in some cases, live ammunition against the crowds.

According to Azerbaijani activists and Amnesty International, at least 20 people were killed and dozens more were injured during the protests. However, Brigadier General Hassan Karami, the then-commander of the West Azerbaijan police, reported a lower toll of four dead and 43 injured.

On May 28, 2006, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei described the demonstrators as agents of "the enemy" and declared: "The enemies do not know Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan belongs to the Islamic Revolution." Other officials echoed this sentiment in the days that followed. On May 29, the Minister of the Interior accused the United States of fueling the unrest. The government spokesperson blamed the protests on individuals and groups incited by satellite channels. The head of the East Azerbaijan Judiciary announced the arrest of 330 people in connection with the protests. It accused some of belonging to the "Baha'i faith, the "Tudeh Party," or having "links with Israel." In the following months, many detainees were prosecuted on charges such as "acting against national security," "propaganda for separatism," and "ethnic incitement."

Nearly two years later, in September 2008, the Urmia Military Prosecutor’s Office ruled on the complaints brought by the families of the Naqadeh victims against police and Basij forces. It issued a non-prosecution order, declaring the use of firearms to have been “in accordance with the law,” and held the state responsible only for paying diyah (blood money) to the families. A separate lawsuit against the governor of Naqadeh at the time was dismissed by the Tehran Public Employees Court, which acquitted him. However, pressure on the victims’ families and restrictions on holding public memorials continued for years.

Mr. Razaqi’s arbitrary execution

According to available information, Mr. Razaqi’s name appears on the lists published by Azerbaijani activists documenting those killed during the Naqadeh protests.  (Faza’el Azizaan blog, May 31, 2009)

However, there is no information about the circumstances of his death or his burial location.

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms.

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible:

a) Warning shots.

b) Shots aimed at the lower body.

c) Shots aimed at the upper body.

(Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

**Note 1:** If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Given this situation, the families of those killed in the recent protests should file a complaint of murder with the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office against the law enforcement officials involved. Although the prosecutor's office is responsible for conducting its own investigation, it is important to file the complaint and request an autopsy and forensic analysis before the body is buried. In addition, if there are witnesses to the scene, their written statements should be obtained as soon as possible. Their identifying information should also be recorded so that it can be presented later in court. The prosecutor's office should be asked to review any available CCTV footage of the scene. A major problem in these cases is the unwillingness of prosecutors to conduct a complete investigation. Without a complete investigation, it is difficult for the victim's family to identify a specific official as the perpetrator or to prove that the shooting was intentional.

Officials’ Reaction

Officials of the Islamic Republic did not directly reference the Naqadeh protests or the killing of Mr. Razaqi. In separate statements about the broader wave of demonstrations in Azerbaijan in May 2006, however, the Supreme Leader, the President, and the head of the Judiciary described the unrest as a "foreign conspiracy" and blamed the United States and Israel (BBC Persian, May 28, 2006; Radio Farda, May 31 and June 22, 2006).

Official figures concerning the Naqadeh fatalities were inconsistent. On the evening of May 25, 2006, state television announced six deaths, later revising the number down to four. Akbar Alami, a parliamentary representative from Tabriz, reported five deaths in total. Brigadier General Hassan Karami, the West Azerbaijan police commander at the time, stated on May 28, 2006, that four people had been killed. However, Azerbaijani activists maintained that the number of victims was at least 20. Although Mr. Razaqi’s name was not among the four victims officially acknowledged by state television, it appeared in several reports by Azerbaijani activists and media outlets covering the Naqadeh protests. (Shahidler Blog, citing Oruzm, August 2007; BBC Persian, May 28, 2006; Radio Farda, May 31, 2006).

Familys’ Reaction

No information is available about the Razaqi family's reaction to his death or any legal actions they may have taken.

Impacts on Family

No information is available regarding the impact of Mr. Razaqi’s death on his family.

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