Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Nasrollah Farokhnia


Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim
Civil Status: Unknown


Date of Execution: May 31, 2016
Location: Nowshahr Prison, Nowshahr, Mazandaran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: Hanging
Charges: Rape

Human rights violations in this case

The Legal Context

The Courts


Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994


In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.


Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.


The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.



Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002


With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

 6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.


The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.


Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present


The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.


With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present


From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.


The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.


Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.


With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982


In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.


General Courts, 1982-1994


The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.


General Courts, 1994-2002


The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.


General Courts, 2002-2015


In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.


General Courts, 2015 to Today


With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.


The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present


The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).


In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.


The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.


For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.


Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.


The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989


The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy


These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.


On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”


The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”


These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.” 


The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present


There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.


Military Courts


The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.


The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.


The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present


The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.


The judges


1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.


The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.  


By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.


1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.


Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.


The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.


Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.


Human rights violations

Based on the available information, the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

The right to due process

  • The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

  • The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a

  • The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or the right to legal aid. The right to communicate with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b and Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1, Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.

  • The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b.

  • The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.

  • The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

Trial rights

  • The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.

  • The right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against one, and the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on one’s behalf under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d and Article 14.3.e.

  • The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Judgment rights

  • The right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.

ICCPR, Article 6.4.

Capital punishment
  • The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.

  • The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

About a year after she had lodged her original complaint, the plaintiff submitted an official letter of acquiescence in which she retracted her complaint against Mr. Farokhnia and his co-defendants and denied any sexual acts having taken place.

News of Mr. Nasrollah Farokhnia and his co-defendant’s execution was published by HRANA News Agency and on the Iran Human Rights website (May 31, 2016). Additional information about this case was obtained from an interview conducted by the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center with a person with knowledge of the case, and from evidence and documentation obtained by the Center’s research.

Mr. Nasrollah Farokhnia, child of Ali Akbar, was from the city of Chalus. (Documents available at the Boroumand Center).

Arrest and detention

Mr. Farokhnia was arrested in the summer of 2008, following a complaint by a woman who claimed he and his friends had kidnapped and [sexually] assaulted her. In the afternoon of June 18, 2008, on their way from Chalus to [the city of] Noshahr, Mr. Farokhnia and two of his friends gave a ride on their motorcycle to a student who had asked for their help. The girl had told them that the driver of a Peugeot 405 had picked her up as a passenger and had intended to rape her on the way. The next day, the girl went to Chalus Police and stated that Mr. Farokhnia and his friends had [sexually] assaulted her. Mr. Farokhnia spent approximately 6 years in Noshahr Central Prison. (Documentation available at the Boroumand Center).


Mazandaran Province Criminal Court, located in Chalus and composed of a panel of five judges, tried Mr. Farokhnia and the other defendants in the case in a single session on May 6, 2010.

Based on available information, a court-appointed attorney was designated for Mr. Farokhnia; however, since the plaintiff was not at the trial, the attorney did not have the opportunity to question her and mount a defense for the defendant. (Documentation available at the Boroumand Center).


The court declared the charge against Mr. Farokhnia as “forcible rape”. He was accused of “kidnapping, rape, and robbery of the plaintiff’s money and cell phone” based on the complaint.

The validity of the criminal charges brought against these defendants cannot be ascertained in the absence of the basic guarantees of a fair trial.

Evidence of guilt

The Plaintiff’s testimony during preliminary investigations, and the defendant’s statements during interrogations, questioning by the investigating judge, and in court, were used as evidence against Mr. Farokhnia at trial. Furthermore, the Medical Examiner’s report alluding to “injuries suffered by the plaintiff” was also among the evidence used against him. Based on available documentation, it is not clear what the extent of the “injuries” was, what parts of the plaintiff’s body were affected, and what caused those injuries.

International human rights organizations have repeatedly condemned the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for its systematic use of severe torture and solitary confinement to obtain confessions from detainees and have questioned the authenticity of confessions obtained under duress.


Based on available evidence, Mr. Farokhnia and the other defendants in the case stated that the plaintiff was present at the scene of her own free will. Furthermore, based on the plaintiff’s statements, available in the case file, she had been brought to the location in another vehicle.

The defendant was deprived of an attorney in the course of the adjudication and was designated a court-appointed attorney only in the trial session that resulted in his conviction and the issuance of a sentence. Even then, however, the plaintiff was not present so that the attorney could question her and thereby be able to defend his client.

On appeal, the Supreme Court did not heed the defendants’ attorneys’ request to summon the driver of the automobile that had brought the defendant to the scene of the crime, and announced that even if the driver could be found and summoned, “it would not alter and affect the course [and consequences] of the case”.

On June 18, 2009, that is, about a year after she had lodged her original complaint, the plaintiff submitted an official letter of acquiescence in which she retracted her complaint against Mr. Farokhnia and his co-defendants and denied any sexual acts having taken place. According to her statement, Mr. Farokhnia and the other two defendants intended to [sexually] assault her but she had been able to run away, and they had not been able to harm her, and no sexual acts had ever occurred. Because she had been mentally and emotionally harmed, the plaintiff stated that she intended to “get even” and that she had been advised that [the best way to that was to lodge a complaint and] the complaint was filed for that reason. (Documentation available at the Boroumand Center).

Given the denial of the occurrence of sexual acts by the plaintiff, it is not clear what the “injuries” alluded to in the Medical Examiner’s report, cited in the Supreme Court Decision, consisted of, and what parts of the body they encompassed.

A Summary of the Defects of Mr. Farokhnia's Legal Proceedings

In this case, it appears that the judges have not conducted the necessary investigations and have not taken certain existing evidence into consideration. On June 18, 2009, the plaintiff went to the court clerk and officially declared that that the defendants had no sexual relations with her and that her prior statements were completely false. Given that the Province Criminal Court issued its decision subsequent to the aforementioned admission, it seems clear that the judges had not taken her statement into consideration. Although there is no information regarding what the plaintiff said in court, if the trial court issued its decision and the Supreme Court upheld the same without conducting investigations into the plaintiff’s assertions denying sexual relations, then their rulings are most certainly unlawful.

According to the Supreme Court Branch Seven’s Decision, the defense attorneys had requested that the driver of the car who had driven the plaintiff [to the scene] be summoned, but neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court heeded that request, with the Supreme Court judges arguing that questioning said driver would have no bearing on the case and the principal issue. This action is in complete contradiction to the law, since the investigating and the adjudicating judges have the duty to conduct thorough investigations. To assert that questioning the aforementioned driver is of no consequence, is not an acceptable argument since, at the least, his statements could indicate the extent to which the plaintiff was honest in her own statements.

Another defect in this case is the defendant’s considerable limited access to an attorney. Based on available information, the defendant only met his attorney in court. The attorney was a court-appointed one who had not been present at any of the preliminary investigations phases. Pursuant to Iranian law, a defendant is entitled to have an attorney present at all stages of the adjudication. [The lack of access to an attorney] was in complete contravention of the law, since in cases of forcible rape, the presence of an attorney to defend the accused is mandatory. Pursuant to the Law on the Rules of Criminal Procedure in General and Revolutionary Courts, Article 186, Note 2, “If in crimes for which the law has mandated the punishments of Qesas of life, execution, stoning, and life imprisonment, the defendant does not personally introduce an attorney, it is mandatory that a court-appointed attorney be designated.” In spite of differences of opinion regarding this Note, the absence of an attorney was one reason why there was no fair trial in this case. The defendant stated that when the judge asked him if the “reprehensible act” had taken place, he had answered in the affirmative because he did not know the meaning of the word “dobor” (“anus” for purposes of Islamic jurisprudence). Certainly, had he had access to the services of an attorney, he would not have made such a mistake.


On June 2, 2010, Mazandaran Province Criminal Court sentenced Mr. Nasrollah Farokhnia to death (Hadd punishment for murder), pursuant to Islamic Penal Code* Articles 12, 13, 43, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, and 83, based on the Judge’s Knowledge. On February 15, 2011, Supreme Court Branch Seven upheld the sentence. In the morning of May 31, 2016, Mr. Nasrollah Farokhnia and his co-defendant were hanged at Noshahr Central Prison.

Funeral services for Mr. Nasrollah Farokhnia and the other defendant in the case were held in the afternoon of Wednesday, June 1, 2016, at Amir-ol-Mo’menin Mosque in Chalus’ Ashkardasht region.


*Islamic Penal Code of 2013. The following are the Articles alluded to in the present text and one other Article referred to therein:
Article 12: Imposition of a punishment or security and correctional measures and implementation thereof, shall be done by a competent court, in accordance with the law, observing the conditions and requirements contained therein.
Article 13: The levels and conditions of a punishment or security and correctional measures and implementation thereof, shall not exceed the limits and conditions specified in the law or the court ruling; any injury or damage resulting therefrom, whether caused deliberately or negligently, shall result in criminal and civil liability, as the case may require; otherwise, the damage shall be compensated by the state treasury.
Article 43: Under a supervised suspension, the court may, given the nature of the offense, the personal characteristics of the offender, and the conditions of his/her life, order the offender to perform one or more of the following tasks during the period of suspension, in such a way as not to fundamentally and significantly disrupt his/her life and his/her family’s life:
a. To learn a trade or hold a particular occupation
b. To reside or not reside in a particular location
c. To obtain treatment for an illness or kick an addiction
d. To pay nafaqa (alimony and/or child support) to those required by law
e. To refrain from operating all or certain motor vehicles
f. To refrain from any professional activity related to the offense or utilize the means of the offense
g. To refrain from contacting and associating with accomplices and accessories to the crime or other persons such as the victim of the crime, at the court’s discretion
h. To undergo special course(s) for training and learning basic life skills or participate in training, moral, religious, educational or athletic courses.
Article 63: The executive guidelines regarding partial release and conditional release shall be drafted by the Prisons and Security and Correctional Measures Organization and ratified by the Head of Judiciary within six months of the coming into force of the present law.
Article 64: Substitute punishments for imprisonment consist of a supervisory period, providing free public services, monetary penalty, daily fine, and deprivation of social rights, which shall be determined and implemented in the event of the plaintiff withdrawing his/her complaint and existence of mitigating factors taking into account the nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission, the consequences of the crime, the convict’s age, skills, conditions, character and criminal record, as well as the victim’s conditions, and other circumstances.
Note. In its sentence, the court shall specify the compatibility and proportionality of such sentence with the requirements and conditions provided in this article. The court cannot issue more than two of the substitute punishments.
Article 66: Perpetrators of intentional offenses, the maximum legal sentence for which is ninety-one days to six months imprisonment, shall be sentenced to substitute punishments for imprisonment unless they have a criminal record for commission of intentional crimes within the previous five years, as follows:
(a)   More than one account of final conviction to up to six months imprisonment or a fine of more than ten million (10,000,000) Rials or Ta’zir flogging;
(b)   One count of final conviction to more than six months imprisonment, Hadd punishment, or Qesas punishment, or to payment of more than one fifth of [a full] Diya (“blood money”).
Article 67: The court may sentence perpetrators of intentional crimes the maximum legal punishment for which is six months to one year imprisonment, to substitute punishments; in the event of the existence of the conditions provided for in Article 66 of the present law, however, issuance of substitute punishments for imprisonment shall be prohibited.
Article 68: Perpetrators of unintentional crimes shall be sentenced to substitute punishments for imprisonment unless the legal punishment prescribed for the crime is more than two years imprisonment, in which case issuing a substitute punishment for imprisonment is discretionary.
Article 69: Perpetrators of crimes for which no type or level of Ta’zir punishment has been prescribed by law, shall be sentenced to substitute punishments for imprisonment.
Article 70: While issuing a substitute punishment, the court shall also specify the commensurate term of imprisonment, to be implemented in the event of impossibility of implementation of the substitute punishment, violation of court orders by the criminal, inability to pay the monetary penalty.
Article 83: The supervisory period is the period during which the criminal, by order of the court and under the supervision of the sentence implementation judge, shall be ordered to perform one or more of the orders prescribed for supervisory suspension [above], as follows:
a. For crimes that carry a maximum legal punishment of three months’ imprisonment, up to six months;
b. For crimes that carry a legal punishment of ninety one days to six months imprisonment, as well as crimes for which no type or level of Ta’zir punishment has been prescribed by law, from six months to one year;
c. For crimes that carry a legal punishment of more than six months to one year imprisonment, from one to two years;
d. For unintentional crimes that carry a legal punishment of more than one year imprisonment, from two to four years.
Article 105: The Statute of Limitations applies to crimes subject to Ta’zir punishments only if prosecution has not commenced from the date of the commission of the crime until the following deadlines, or if no final ruling has been issued since the last prosecutorial or investigative action was initiated until the following deadlines:
a. First to third degree Ta’zir offense, upon passage of fifteen years
b. Fourth degree Ta’zir offense, upon passage of ten years
c. Fifth degree Ta’zir offense, upon passage of seven years
d. Sixth degree Ta’zir offenses, upon passage of five years
e. Seventh and eighth degree Ta’zir offenses, upon passage of three years
Note 1. A prosecutorial or investigative action is an action taken by judicial authorities in performing a legal duty such as summoning, arresting, interrogating, hearing eyewitness testimony and the testimony of persons with knowledge of the case, carrying out field or crime scene investigations or relegating judicial authority.
Note 2. Regarding issuance of a Conditional Injunction, the statute of limitations begins to toll from the date a final decision is rendered by the authority upon whose decision criminal adjudication is conditioned upon.

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