Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

https://www.iranrights.org
Omid, a memorial in defense of human rights in Iran
One Person’s Story

Ali Fath'alian

About

Age: 20
Nationality: Iran
Religion: Presumed Muslim (Shi'a)
Civil Status: Unknown

Case

Date of Killing: June 20, 2009
Gravesite location is known: Yes
Location of Killing: Navvab Safavi Expressway, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran
Mode of Killing: targeting vital organs
Age at time of alleged offense: 19

About this Case

He was a 20-year-old sophomore civil engineering student. On June 20, 2009, he went to watch the protests near the Lolagar Mosque on Navab Street in Tehran by chance. He was wearing "casual clothes and slippers" when he was fatally shot.

Information regarding the arbitrary execution of Mr. Ali Fath'alian, son of Amir, was obtained through an electronic form submitted by his friend to the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation (June 5, 2017) and a report from Javan newspaper (December 31, 2012). Additional information was gathered from the Behesht Zahra website (undated); the IRIB News Agency website (July 1, 2020); Radio Farda (October 4, 2009; , April 16, 2014), the Green Path Movement–Jaras website (May 29, 2011), the Martyrs of the Green Movement website (June 8, 2011), the Iranian Political Prisoners in Exile website (July 16, 2009), the Human Rights Activists–HRANA website (August 1, 2009), the Radio France International website (June 21, 2009), and the Parcham website (October 3, 2009).

Mr. Ali Fath'alian was born on July 5, 1989 (Behesht Zahra website). He was a sophomore civil engineering student at Islamic Azad University in Karaj and lived in Tehran (Electronic form, June 5, 2017; Radio Farda, April 16, 2014).

While no specific information about Mr. Fath'alian's life has been published, his grandfather stated that he was "not a political person," did not belong to any political party or group, and was the only son in the family. On June 20, 2009, he went out onto the street out of "curiosity." His home was near his grandfather's house, and he often went there to study. His grandfather considered him the "eldest child of the house, the only son, and the future supporter" of the family. Mr. Fath'alian’s neighbors described him and his parents as a "calm, religious, and peaceful family" (Radio Farda, April 16, 2014).

Background on the 2009 Election 

Election returns from Iran’s June 12th, 2009, presidential election declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected with 62.63 percent of the vote.  Following the announcement, citizens disputing these official results demonstrated in the streets.  Text messaging services were disrupted starting at 11:00 p.m. on the night before the election and remained unavailable for nearly three weeks, until July 1st. On Election Day, the deputy chief of Iranian police announced a ban on any gathering of presidential candidates’ supporters throughout the country.  The same evening, security forces made a “show of strength,” increasing their presence in Tehran’s public squares to “reinforce security at polling stations.”  Officials at election headquarters began reporting results soon after midnight, despite a statement from the Minister of the Interior that the first returns would not be announced until after the morning prayer (around 4:00 a.m.). 

Many supporters of other presidential candidates came out into the streets on June 13th, once the results were made public, to protest what they believed to be a fraudulent election.  Candidates Mir Hossein Musavi, Mehdi Karubi, and Mohsen Reza’i, Ahmadinejad’s competitors in the race, contested the election, alleging many instances of fraud.  They filed complaints with the Council of Guardians, the constitutional body charged with vetting candidates before elections take place and approving the results afterwards, requesting an annulment and calling for a new election.  Before the Council of Guardians could review their claims, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election.  In the meantime, many people active in Karubi’s and Musavi’s campaigns were arrested. 

On June 15th, unprecedented demonstrations filled the streets of central Tehran, in which an estimated three million protestors participated, according to statements attributed to the mayor of Tehran.  As the demonstrations were ending, paramilitary forces attacked the marchers, injuring and killing several people.  To prevent such news from being broadcast, the Iranian government expelled foreign journalists from the country and banned news agencies from reporting on the events.  Over the next three days, protesters took part in peaceful demonstrations in Tehran.  The repression entered a new phase on June 19th after Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday sermon, in which he announced his support for Ahmadinejad and warned protestors that they were responsible for any disorder and its consequences. Amnesty International stated that the speech gave “legitimacy to police brutality.”  The next day and thereafter, police and plainclothes paramilitary groups attacked the protesters.  Public gatherings of any kind were declared illegal, and police, motorcycle-riding special units wearing black uniforms and helmets, and plainclothes agents brutally enforced this restriction. 

Individuals in civilian clothing, commonly referred to as plainclothes forces, are used in the Islamic Republic to disrupt political and trade union activities, student events and gatherings, electoral initiatives, and protests.  Armed with sticks and clubs, and sometimes with chains, knives, batons, or firearms, they emerge when the state decides to suppress dissent.  These plainclothes forces move about freely, violently beating protesters and arresting them, while the police passively look on or actively cooperate with them.  

There is little information on the command structure and organization of such groups, whose members wear ordinary clothing rather than official uniforms and may be affiliated with the ministry of information, influential political groups, or the armed forces. Following the post-election demonstrations in June 2009, pictures of some plainclothes agents were posted on internet websites.  Internet users helped to identify some of them and provided evidence that these individuals were affiliated with the Basij paramilitary groups, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and state intelligence forces. On September 16, 2009, a deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Province of Tehran confirmed the active and decisive role of Basij forces in the repression of the demonstrations, saying, “Basijis, through their presence in recent events, have blinded the eyes of the conspirators, and they should be appreciated… The enemies of Islam wanted to make the air dusty and to exploit the recent events, but thank God, through the enlightenment of the Honorable Leader we were victorious against this conspiracy.” He also emphasized, “The zealous youth of [the] Basij, believers in the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, are the second and third generations of the Revolution.  They have been successful in this stage and victorious on this battlefield.” 

When personal property was damaged during the protests, government authorities and state-run radio and television programs accused the demonstrators of vandalism and justified the repression.  At the same time, however, footage posted online showed security forces destroying and damaging property on side streets and in uncongested areas away from the protests.  Moreover, in a public gathering in Tehran on October 20th, the chief of Iranian police conceded that police had destroyed and damaged property and accepted responsibility for it. 

The precise number of citizens injured, killed, or disappeared in the post-election violence is not known.  According to various reports, there were hundreds of victims in demonstrations throughout the country.  More than seventy names have been reported.  It is said that officials have threatened victims’ family members, demanding their silence and that they refrain from giving interviews.  Reports also allege that returning a victim’s body to a family has been made conditional upon their agreement to change the cause of death listed on the coroner’s certificate to that of a heart attack or some other natural cause — thus foregoing the right to file a complaint — as well as the family's agreement not to hold memorial services for the loved one.  

According to government statements, more than 4,000 people were arrested throughout Iran in the weeks following June 12th. Many have been held at the Kahrizak Detention Center, where prisoners’ rights and minimum hygiene standards were typically ignored.  Numerous reports of violence, including the torture and rape of detainees, have been published.  State reports and testimonies confirm that a number of detainees at Kahrizak died in custody due to beatings, difficult and unbearable prison conditions, and torture. 

Mr. Ali Fath'alian’s arbitrary execution

According to available information, Mr. Ali Fath'alian was fatally shot by official forces on June 20, 2009, during protests against the results of that year's presidential election. (HRANA, August 1, 2009; Radio Farda, April 16, 2014; Jaras, May 29, 2011; Radio France International, June 21, 2009; Parcham Website, October 3, 2009).

According to his father, in an interview with Jaras on May 29, 2011, Mr. Fath'alian was "in the middle of his final exams at university, studying at home and not going out. However, on June 20, 2009, he went outside by chance." According to his grandfather, after the protests began, Mr. Fath'alian went out to watch them. He was wearing "casual clothes and slippers." (Radio Farda, April 16, 2014).

After the protests began, members of the Basij militia forces fired live ammunition from the mosque's rooftop at the protesters (Martyrs of the Green Movement, June 8, 2011).

According to an eyewitness from the neighborhood where the mosque is located, Mr. Fath'alian and another person were killed by Basij members from the same mosque during the protests in front of the mosque. (Iranian Political Prisoners in Exile, July 16, 2009).

Upon not hearing from him, Mr. Fath'alian’s family called his mobile phone but received no answer. Between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on June 21, 2009, they called again and a nurse from Lolagar Hospital answered and told them, "This is a hospital. Tell his father to bring the birth certificate and take the body." (Radio Farda, April 16, 2014).

The family first went to Lolagar Hospital and then to the Forensic Medical Organization to retrieve the body. They took it home for a "final farewell" with the rest of the family. (Jaras, May 29, 2011).

He was buried on July 1, 2009, in Section 9, Row 110, Plot 222 at Behesht Zahra Cemetery in Tehran. (Jaras, May 29, 2011; Behesht Zahra Organization Website).

Regulations on Controlling Protests

There have been numerous reports of deaths during critical demonstrations in Iran. In many of these cases, armed forces have used firearms to suppress protests. Iranian law provides certain regulations regarding the use of firearms by armed forces during demonstrations. In addition, there are legal provisions in Iran for the punishment of officials who act unlawfully by firing weapons, as well as rules for the compensation of victims. This brief overview will review these provisions.

The law allows armed forces officials to use firearms in certain situations, including to prevent riots and disorders. However, the law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes riots and disorders. The Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases, enacted in 1994, outlines specific conditions for the use of firearms. The main principle established by this law is that of necessity, meaning that armed forces officers may fire their weapons only in emergencies. Regarding protests, Articles 4 and 5 of this law allow officials to use their weapons under certain conditions to restore order and prevent riots. Article 4 states: "Police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and control illegal demonstrations, suppress riots and disorders that cannot be controlled without the use of weapons, upon the order of the commander of the operation, if the following conditions are met:".

a) Other measures must have been tried first and proven ineffective.

b) There must be a final warning to the rioters and insurgents before the use of firearms.

Note 1: The determination of riots under Article 4 is the responsibility of the heads of the provincial and district security councils. In their absence, it is the responsibility of their deputies. If the governor has no political deputy, this responsibility is assigned to a member of the Security Council. Note 2: In cases where armed forces are assigned the task of restoring order and security under this article, they are also subject to the provisions of this article regarding the use of firearms. This article clearly states that armed personnel must first use non-lethal methods and only resort to firearms if those methods fail to control the situation. They must also warn the demonstrators. The law does not specify what other non-lethal methods should be used, but logically they would include things like water cannons, tear gas, and batons. This article refers to unarmed protests. For armed demonstrations, Article 5 states: "Military and police officers are authorized to use firearms to restore order and security during illegal armed demonstrations, riots and armed rebellions. Such forces are required to act immediately upon orders of the commander to restore order, disarm and collect weapons and ammunition, and arrest those to be handed over to the judicial authorities".

In all of the above situations, officers must first have no alternative but to use their firearms. In addition, they must follow the following sequence, if possible: a) Warning shots. b) Shots aimed at the lower body. c) Shots aimed at the upper body. (Note 3, Article 3)

If an officer shoots following the above regulations and the victim is not found to be innocent, neither the officer nor the officer's organization will be held responsible (Article 12). However, if the officer violates these rules, shoots without following the rules, and someone is injured or killed as a result, the officer may face retaliation, compensation, or imprisonment, depending on the case. Article 41 of the Armed Forces Crimes Law states: "Any armed forces personnel who, while on duty or operations, intentionally shoot in violation of rules and regulations will be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year, and will also have to pay blood money. If the shooting results in death or injury, the officer will be sentenced to the above punishment, in addition to retaliation or payment of blood money, as the case may require. If the case falls under Articles 612 or 614 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted on May 23, 1996), the officer will be subject to the penalties specified in those articles."

The law also addresses a situation where an officer follows all required protocols for the use of firearms, but the victim is still found innocent in court.

**Note 1:** If the shooting was conducted according to regulations, the officer will not be punished or required to pay blood money. If the victim is found innocent, the blood money will be paid from public funds. According to Article 13 of the Law on the Use of Firearms by the Armed Forces in Essential Cases: "If officials use firearms under this Law and an innocent person is killed or injured, as determined by the courts, or if there is financial damage, the responsibility for paying financial compensation and covering the damage falls on the relevant organization. The government is required to allocate a budget for this purpose each year and to provide it to the armed forces as necessary".

Given this situation, the families of those killed in the recent protests should file a complaint of murder with the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office against the law enforcement officials involved. Although the prosecutor's office is responsible for conducting its own investigation, it is important to file the complaint and request an autopsy and forensic analysis before the body is buried. In addition, if there are witnesses to the scene, their written statements should be obtained as soon as possible. Their identifying information should also be recorded so that it can be presented later in court. The prosecutor's office should be asked to review any available CCTV footage of the scene. A major problem in these cases is the unwillingness of prosecutors to conduct a complete investigation. Without a complete investigation, it is difficult for the victim's family to identify a specific official as the perpetrator or to prove that the shooting was intentional.

Officials’ Reaction

At the time, Esma'il Ahmadi Moqadam, the head of Iran's police force, denied that the shooting occurred from the rooftop of Lolagar Mosque. A member of the Tehran Parliament introduced Mr. Fath'alian as a Basij member killed by a weapon with a caliber different from those used by the Iranian government. (Radio Farda, April 16, 2014).

Additionally, the commander of the IRGC’s Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran stated that those killed near Lolagar Mosque on June 20, 2009, including Mr. Fath'alian, were killed by "rioters" (Radio Farda, October 4, 2009).

According to Kayhan newspaper and Fars News Agency, both of which are government-affiliated media outlets, Mr. Fath'alian’s family filed a complaint against presidential election candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who disputed the election results. However, Mr. Fath'alian’s family rejected this claim. (Radio Farda, April 16, 2014).

According to RFI Radio, citing the French news agency AFP and Iran's English-language Press TV, 10 people were killed in clashes between security forces and protesters in Tehran on Saturday, June 20, 2009. The radio network also reported that Iranian state television claimed that "rioters" had set fire to the Lolagar Mosque, resulting in several deaths. However, this news was denied Sunday morning. (June 21, 2009).

In an interview with the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency, several members of the Lolagar Mosque association claimed that protesters attacked the mosque on Saturday, June 20, 2009. One association member said: "On Saturday, June 20, 2009, we witnessed tragic events, including the burning of the mosque by rioters. Over 60 Molotov cocktails were thrown into the mosque by trained individuals." Another association member stated: "It was clear that their leaders were professionals. They tried to enter the mosque but couldn’t, so they broke the windows. The carpets caught fire. The curtains burned. The windows were broken. The mosque was damaged." (July 1, 2021).

According to RFI Radio, quoting AFP News Agency, the images of the Lollagar Mosque fire broadcast by Iranian television show that the fire occurred during the day, while the Iranian state television had reported that the mosque caught fire at night, coinciding with the Maghrib prayers. (June 21, 2009).

An eyewitness living in the neighborhood where the mosque is located reported that banners commemorating Mr. Fath’alian were taken down the day after they were put up. The witness did not mention the reason for this. (Iranian Political Prisoners in Exile, July 16, 2009). 

Familys’ Reaction

Mr. Fath'alian’s family filed a lawsuit in court regarding his killing, but despite their repeated efforts, the case remained unresolved. (Radio Farda, April 16, 2014; Jaras, June 8, 2011).

In an interview with Jaras, Mr. Fath'alian’s father spoke about the reasons for the family's media silence after their son's death: "We weren't interested in interviews, and we didn't want anything in return. When I lost my son, would speaking bring him back? Would anything I said bring back a moment to hold my son in my arms again? Even if the world were given to me, my son wouldn’t come back to life." (Green Path Movement — Jaras, June 8, 2011).

Impacts on Family

In an interview with Jaras, Mr. Fath'alian's father spoke about the impact of his son’s death on the family: "Ali was my eldest child. As I speak to you now and recall what happened, it becomes difficult to continue the conversation. My son was going to be the support of my life. He was everything to me. I have nothing else to say. I feel like my life purpose has been wasted" (June 8, 2011).

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