Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

"The motivation to overthrow the state is neither noble nor sacred.”

“It is a priority for political groups, not the people, to define political crime."

—ISNA News Agency, Tehran

Politics and Jurisprudence Desk

Gholam Hossein Elham, the judiciary spokesperson, stated that defining political crimes in the Islamic Republic of Iran is a legal and juridical necessity. However, he emphasized that, due to the alignment of values between the state and the people, there is no urgent need to define political crimes formally.

In an interview with ISNA’s legal correspondent, Elham stated that all offenders and prisoners are treated equally. He noted: “The Islamic Republic follows certain fundamental principles in its criminal policy that apply to all offenders. Access to cultural resources in prison is a basic right, not limited to a specific group of people. To reduce the social stigma of imprisonment, inmates do not wear special uniforms, and punishments are tailored to the offender's personality and the motivation behind the crime."

He continued: "This approach is applied to all offenders, whether they are classified as ordinary or so-called political. In other societies, the seemingly altruistic and non-threatening nature of political offenders affects their punishment. Here, we apply this consideration equally to all inmates."

In response to the question of why political trials have not been held publicly with a jury, despite the Constitution’s mandate, Elham said, "Due to the value convergence between the state and the people, there has been no perceived need to define political crimes." Given the political alignment — which, from a legitimacy perspective, is called public endorsement — such a designation has not been a priority. Furthermore, the public views any action against the state as contrary to their values. Therefore, socially, this necessity was not imposed upon the state. Nonetheless, the legal necessity remains undeniable.

Elham added, "Since no social necessity existed for defining political crimes, judicial authorities did not prioritize doing so, even though it should have been addressed legally."

Elham described the implementation of Article 168 of the Constitution as an outstanding legal obligation. He explained: "In 1981, the legislature mandated that the High Judicial Council submit a draft bill regarding the jury to Parliament within three months, but this did not happen. If we attribute this delay to the negligence of judicial officials since the Revolution, that would be an accurate characterization. However, socially, the circumstances and concerns of our society did not call for such a priority."

Elham asserted that defining political crime is a priority for political groups, not the public. He elaborated: "The current demand primarily stems from political factions in society. While addressing it is an obligation, as a social observer, I must state that defining political crime is not a priority for the public."

Elham noted that the Judiciary’s inaction on this matter was due to the Sixth Parliament’s intention to submit a proposal, which left the issue in limbo. Since then, the matter has remained on the agendas of both parliament and the Guardian Council. The authorities responsible must now provide clarification.

Elham added that final approval of the jury bill would be a step toward implementing Article 168 of the Constitution. Currently, we have achieved a resolution regarding jury trials for press-related offenses. One could say that major portions of Article 168 have now been implemented.

When asked why ambiguous criminal charges such as "acts against national security" or "inciting public opinion" have not been explicitly defined to prevent their overuse, Elham stated, "Criminal laws are always subject to interpretation. The clearer and more explicit they are, the better. Identifying specific instances of such crimes is the legislature’s responsibility. For example, 'propaganda against the system' is a broad charge. Parliament could attach an appendix to this or any similar law to specify the scope. Until then, in the absence of specifics, these charges are generally interpreted with maximum caution and in line with the principle of restrictive interpretation in criminal law."

He stressed: "One cannot convict individuals under vague or overbroad charges. Such methods are inconsistent with the principles of criminal law."

He argued that individuals' motivations could be evaluated within the framework of the Islamic concepts of "enjoining good and forbidding wrong" (Amr bi al-Ma'rūf wa-n-Nahy 'an al-Munkar) and that political crimes could be defined as discretionary punishments, similar to press offenses. "Some may not accept this theory," he acknowledged.

Elham elaborated: "If we consider 'enjoining good and forbidding wrong' to be a valid criterion, then we must accept the foundational principle of state legitimacy in the Islamic system. Unjust conduct must be evaluated based on Islamic and legal standards of governance. In contrast, some define political crime as being supra-systemic, which is an unacceptable theory incompatible with our Islamic foundations."

He emphasized: "I can never define political motivation as sacred. The motivation to overthrow the state is neither positive nor noble. However, if a person’s actions fall within the category of discretionary offenses (ta’zir), then, based on criminal reality, they could be defined as political crimes—but that requires expert evaluation."

The Judiciary Spokesperson reiterated that the Constitution obligates the legislature to define political crimes based on Islamic principles. "The legislature cannot alter the defined limits of Islamic law."

When asked whether political offenders currently exist, Elham stated: “We do not legally have political offenders because this designation has not been recognized by law. Some may interpret actions against security as political crimes analytically. From their viewpoint, political crimes exist, but they carry no legal weight. One of the three essential elements of a crime—its legal basis—is missing. Thus, such an offender cannot be considered a political offender and is treated as an ordinary offender under criminal law. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that the Judiciary has violated the law by not involving a jury in such trials."

He concluded: "The Judiciary has not erred in this matter because it was not obligated to involve a jury in cases where the law does not define the offense as political. Claiming that the Judiciary erred by not involving a jury is flawed because individuals have defined political crimes based on their interpretations rather than legal standards. Personal analysis cannot serve as the basis for judicial decision-making."

To be continued...