Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

In a revealing interview, Judge Ali Akbar Heidarifard confessed to ordering the transfer of detainees to Kahrizak, stating: "I was the one who ordered the transfer of the detainees to Kahrizak. Sa'id Emami had interceded on my behalf."

Speaking about his role in the Kahrizak incident, Heidarifard stated: "Not only will I never express repentance, but I also believe that any potential repentance by Mr. Mortazavi has no legal or religious validity."

• Mr. Heidarifard, many people know you in connection with the controversial Kahrizak case, referring to you as "the Kahrizak Judge." However, little is known about your background and prior activities. Tell us about yourself.

"I am Ali Akbar Heidarifard. I was born on November 22, 1979, in Marvdasht, Fars Province, into a middle-class, religious family. I am the eldest child. I attended Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi High School in Marvdasht, where I was an outstanding student and served as head of the Basij organization.”

During those years, a few classmates and I formed a group called Nasihoun (The Advisers), aimed at promoting virtue (amr-e be ma’ruf) in our community.

• What motivated this initiative?

At the time, due to cultural and social issues, middle and high school girls were frequently harassed on the streets by young men. Nasihoun sought to confront this behavior. Initially, we used verbal warnings. When those failed, we resorted to physical confrontation, which eventually became our primary approach in practice.

• So, you formed a vigilante group?

Yes, we were acting on our own.

• Who founded the group?

I did.

• Did physical confrontation occur regularly?

Yes. The Nasihoun group physically confronted individuals who were openly misbehaving on several occasions. The confrontations were quite forceful. Complaints were filed against us, but they went nowhere.

• Why not?

Most of our group members came from families affiliated with government institutions, while those we confronted lacked such standing.

• Was your family affiliated with any institutions?

Some of my relatives serve in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). My father has been an active member of the Basij for years, despite working as a farmer. Two of my wife's brothers were killed in the war. One of them, Martyr Ali Bakhtiari, was the deputy head of armaments for the 14th Imam Hossein Division in Isfahan, meaning he was the armaments officer under Martyr Kharrazi.

• What is your educational background?

After graduating from high school, I decided to pursue religious studies and enrolled in the Haqqani Seminary in Qom. However, I eventually withdrew for various reasons.

• Why did you turn down the Intelligence Ministry’s offer?

I chose to attend university instead. I ranked among the top candidates in the 1998 national university entrance exam and chose to study law at the University of Tehran. Within six months, I received scholarship offers from two institutions: the Ministry of Intelligence's university, Imam Baqer University, to study counterintelligence, and the Judicial Sciences University. I declined the offer from the Ministry of Intelligence.

• Why did you decline this time?

Because it coincided with the arrest of Sa'id Emami and Mostafa Kazemi on charges related to the Chain Murders case. They were from our town and province.

• How did their arrest affect your decision?

One of them had recommended me for admission to the Ministry of Intelligence university over the phone.

• Which one?

Sa'id Emami had made the recommendation.

• Did you continue your studies at the Judicial Sciences University?

Yes, I enrolled in 1998 and received a level two judiciary scholarship. At the same time, I was active in the Basij organization at the University of Tehran, collaborating with Mr. Alireza Zakani. I graduated in 2002.

• Were you also in contact with Mr. Zakani during the student protests in July 1999?

On July 9, 1999 (18 Tir), I was among those who confronted the students at the University of Tehran. On July 12, I actively worked against what we considered to be "rioting students."

• What did you do after graduating in 2002?

I was admitted to the Master's program in Private Law at Allameh Tabataba'i University, ranking 20th. At the same time, I began my one-year judicial apprenticeship. During this period, I also took a course in national security and strategic studies at the Center for Strategic Studies led by Dr. Rahpeyk, who is currently a member of the Guardian Council. Most of my classmates were experts from the Ministries of Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, and Defense.

• Which institution oversaw that center?

The Ministry of Intelligence. Among our lecturers were Mohsen Reza'i, Hesamoddin Ashena, Ali Rabi'i, Mr. Maleki, and others. The title of my thesis for this course was “A Study of Anti-Corruption Agencies within the Judiciary.” After completing the program, the then-director of the Protection and Intelligence Center of the Judiciary, Elias Mahmudi, invited me to join the center. After undergoing the center's vetting process, I submitted a request to the Judiciary to be assigned there.

• How did Elias Mahmudi know you?

Several of the Center’s experts, who were also my classmates, introduced me. My thesis topic also caught their attention.

• Why did you choose that topic for your thesis, especially since corruption wasn't widely discussed at the time?

Because I planned to work in the Protection and Intelligence Department of the Judiciary.

• Did you eventually take the position?

No, they said they were understaffed. The head of the Judiciary at the time, Mr. Shiraj, opposed the move because there were not enough judges.

• So instead of joining the intelligence services, you became a judicial officer?

Yes. My first judicial appointment was as an assistant prosecutor at the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office in Ardabil. I worked there for about two months, but due to my lack of proficiency in Turkish, I was transferred to Fasa, a city in Fars Province. There, I served as an investigating judge. I then became the deputy prosecutor and head of Branch One at the Fasa Prosecutor's Office while simultaneously serving as head of the city’s Social Protection Task Force. I also chaired the local Trade Violations Board, which was ranked first in the country.

• How long did you remain in Fasa?

Until 2007. That year, I was admitted to the Ph.D. program in private law at the Islamic Azad University, science and research branch. About six months later, thanks to a recommendation from Ayatollah Beheshti, a member of the Assembly of Experts from Fars Province whose campaign I had supported during the elections, I was transferred to Tehran.

• What was your judicial role in Tehran?

I spent about two months as a reviewing judge at the District 2 Prosecutor’s Office. Then, I was transferred to Branch One of the Security Prosecutor’s Office under the Tehran Prosecutor’s Security Division.

• How did you end up in the Security Prosecutor’s Office?

I had previously served as a revolutionary court investigator in Fasa. I had also completed national security training at the Center for Strategic Studies and participated in a counterterrorism course organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in collaboration with the United Nations. Most importantly, I had a personal interest in this area, and Mr. Mortazavi assigned me to the office.

• When did you first meet Mr. Mortazavi?

I knew him during my judicial apprenticeship. Even as a student, I admired him and requested to complete my apprenticeship under his supervision at the Prosecutor’s Office for Government Employees. However, I was told that, since it was a security-focused division, my request was denied.

• What drew you to Judge Mortazavi? 

Ideologically and temperamentally, we were very similar. In fact, during my university years, I had a photo of him taped above my bed.

• It seems that the Security Prosecutor’s Office didn't have many cases back then.

There were cases. At that time, with the launch of the "Public Security Enhancement Plan," we classified violent offenders in Tehran into three categories.

• Who proposed this plan?

Mortazavi and Radan proposed it, and the Tehran Security Council approved it. Under the plan, cases involving second- and third-tier suspects—those deemed less important—were handled by prosecutors and investigators in the relevant judicial districts. Due to their sensitive nature, cases involving first-tier suspects were referred exclusively to Branch One of the Security Prosecutor’s Office. We used the Kahrizak Detention Center for their detention. It had been established at the request of the Law Enforcement Command and funded by the Ministry of Interior during Mr. Musavi Lari's tenure. Kahrizak was actually established under Mr. Musavi Lari and had no connection to Ayatollah Shahrudi or Judge Mortazavi.

• Are you suggesting that Mr. Musavi Lari knew about the secondary or potential future uses of the Kahrizak facility?

Kahrizak's original purpose was to detain suspects in cases related to the Khak-e Sefid neighborhood of Tehran. Later, the plan was revised in connection with the implementation of the “Public Security Enhancement Plan” as a nationwide policy.

• However, Mr. Musavi Lari was no longer Minister of the Interior during the implementation of that plan. Mr. Purmohammadi held that position under Ahmadinejad’s presidency.

That’s correct.

• I’d like to know how political and security cases were handled in that prosecutor’s office.

During my time there, I handled cases involving members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), the terrorist attack on the Rahpouyan Hosseiniyeh in Shiraz, the alleged infiltration project of the Ala'i brothers, women's rights activists including Ms. Shirin Ebadi, and the case of the “Yaran” leadership council, i.e., the Baha’i community leaders of Iran.

• Did you manage all of these cases in less than two years?

There were more. I also handled cases related to so-called "deviant sects" and mystic groups, such as "Ramallah" and the "Kingdom Assembly of Iran." I also oversaw the economic aspect of the Crescent case. The case was divided into four sections: part of it was addressed by the Security Prosecutor’s Office; another part, by the Special Economic Prosecutor’s Office; and a third part, by the Prosecutor’s Office for Government Employees. Ultimately, the case files were consolidated by the Economic Deputy of the Supreme National Security Council.

• How was the Security Prosecutor’s Office connected to intelligence agencies?

Throughout my time there, I maintained close and continuous relations with the country’s intelligence and security agencies. This relationship wasn’t one of subordination but rather of joint efforts to achieve the goals of the Revolution.

• To what extent did intelligence agencies influence decisions in the Security Prosecutor’s Office?

All intelligence agencies are recognized as judicial officers, and their reports are only considered valid if verified by a judge. Their reports are deemed trustworthy given the reliability of their methods, which range from data gathering and analysis to assessments and source validation. Their professionalism and the moral integrity of their personnel undoubtedly place the credibility of their reports at the highest possible level, leaving no room for doubt. Any differences that arise are usually about interpreting a suspect’s behavior concerning the definition of a criminal act rather than disputes over whether the act occurred or whether action should be taken.

• Have you ever received orders to issue indictments?

Everything I did was based on investigations, evidence, and documentation. However, given the intelligence agencies' high level of expertise and the integrity of their field operatives, their arguments were generally accepted as valid.

• How would you determine whether a defendant's claim that they were tortured or subjected to physical or psychological pressure to confess was valid?

Claims of forced confessions are a common tactic used by defendants. However, if I had reason to believe a claim, I would accept it because I consider myself accountable to my conscience. On multiple occasions, I disagreed with intelligence officers and released detainees despite their recommendations because I felt that they had been treated unjustly.

• Suddenly, after handling those cases, you found yourself in the middle of the 2009 post-election events.

First, let me clarify that, in 2009, I was not part of any presidential candidate's campaign, nor did I serve as an election supervisor. On the afternoon of June 13, 2009, I was passing through Vanak Square with my friend Mojtaba Alamolhoda, a cleric, when I witnessed a group of nearly 1,000 people destroying shops and public property. As the on-duty judicial officer and deputy prosecutor of Branch One of the Security Prosecutor’s Office, I felt obligated to help de-escalate the situation with the police. I had no idea what had triggered the unrest. Ultimately, around 50 people were arrested but released as soon as the area was calm again.

• Weren’t you on standby before the election?

Yes, of course. Before every election, it is standard practice for polling stations, the judiciary, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to prepare for possible unrest or disturbances.

• Are you saying that the arrests of political activists and campaign members were not premeditated?

No, I’m not saying that. On June 14, 2009, when the unrest began, however, we issued arrest warrants for many political activists based on requests from the security agencies.

• Why?

Because, instead of calming the situation, the activists issued statements casting doubt on the election results and called on people to take to the streets.

• Can you give a specific example?

Yes, such as the statements released by the Central Council of the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. These statements described the actions of law enforcement and intelligence agencies as a “white coup” intended to suppress public order.

• However, election results are often contested in many countries, including Western democracies. Such actions are not usually treated as national security threats.

On June 14, the Supreme Leader officially endorsed the election results and called on the opposition to pursue their grievances through legal channels. Additionally, Tehran’s security status was elevated to red due to the destructive actions of the protesters, based on a resolution by the Supreme National Security Council. At the same time, satellite channels and foreign-hostile media outlets actively challenged the government's position on the election results. Due to these shifts in the security climate, our definition of the protesters’ behavior changed, and actions involving street violence and public unrest were classified as threats to national security.

• What was your personal opinion at the time?

In my opinion, the Supreme Leader's words are final in all matters and carry the same weight as the Prophet's commands and the infallible Imams'. Opposing his rulings is equivalent to opposing an infallible Imam and is therefore subject to the prescribed religious punishment.

• At the time, it was said that some arrest warrants for political activists were dated June 9, 2009—before the protests even began. Why were these warrants issued before the unrest had even begun?

Because there was a background to the issue. For six months prior to the election, supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi, reformists, and elements of the domestic opposition operating under the guise of reformism had been engaged in forming vote-monitoring committees, giving interviews, writing articles, delivering speeches, and holding private meetings. They did not aim to win through democratic means but rather to use the election as a tool to push for systemic changes that would alter the nature of the regime. In their private circles, they launched broad attacks on the country's official institutions and fundamental principles, particularly those related to foreign policy.

• Are you saying that the reformists' criticism of the government's foreign policy and the electoral conduct of state-affiliated institutions in support of a conservative candidate was considered a criminal offense?

They were trying to create a political movement. Iran's intelligence services had been monitoring these individuals long before the election. One of the key figures was Mr. Tajzadeh, who publicly attacked and criticized state institutions in his speeches.

• Was that why an arrest warrant was issued for him?

Mr. Tajzadeh was under surveillance by security forces before the election due to his subversive activities. However, the arrest warrant was issued after the 2009 election.

• This fact wasn’t publicly denied at the time.

The only pre-election arrest warrant issued by Mr. Mortazavi was a general directive addressed to law enforcement authorities.

• To arrest everyone?

No, it was a general order stating that officers should act accordingly if individuals were seen engaging in destructive or subversive activities around campaign offices or polling stations due to the public and obvious nature of such offenses.

• Isn’t that essentially a blank warrant for arrests?

No, it was general. Such orders are common during elections and empower officers to act following the law if gatherings turn unlawful.

• But that sounds like a blank warrant for arrests.

Not at all. Such a concept doesn’t even exist.

• Why were members of Mousavi’s campaign office in Qeytarieh arrested?

They were arrested due to the disruptive actions of Mr. Abdollah Ramezanzadeh.

• What actions specifically?

Mr. Ramezanzadeh gathered individuals considered a threat to public security inside the campaign office and engaged in provocative activities.

• What kind of provocations are we talking about?

For example, chanting slogans that questioned the election's legitimacy. As a result, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit requested permission to search the premises. Mr. Ramezanzadeh resisted, and after a physical altercation, he was arrested and the premises were searched.

• Why weren't cases involving individuals such as Tajzadeh, Behzad Nabavi, and Ramezanzadeh handled by the Ministry of Intelligence?

These prominent figures had engaged in subversive activities through speeches, meetings, private gatherings, and foreign contacts during the election period. According to its legal jurisdiction and authority, the Intelligence Organization of the IRGC had been monitoring them. After the election, when their arrest became necessary, the IRGC carried out the detentions based on its prior investigations.

• What do you mean by "prior investigations"?

All relevant intelligence operations and security monitoring.

• Now, let's discuss the infamous Kahrizak case, in which you were the presiding judge. Tell us about Kahrizak.

According to the General Inspection Organization report attached to the case file, out of the 2,700 cases I reviewed, 80% of detainees were released after security screening and posting bail; fewer than 20% were released on bond; and the remaining detainees, who were considered security threats, were placed under temporary detention. While I was serving in a judicial capacity throughout 2009, I personally interrogated detainees referred by Law Enforcement Intelligence, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, or the Ministry of Intelligence. I never insulted or used violence against any of the detainees. I respected their human dignity and tried to persuade them not to repeat their actions.

• However, it seems that you had previously issued mass arrest orders, even before the Kahrizak incident. For instance, at the University of Tehran.

Following President Ahmadinejad’s speech on June 13, 2009, a group of non-students gathered at the university. Taking advantage of the dormitory setting, they began chanting anti-regime slogans and attacked several police officers. Around the same time, individuals leaving Ahmadinejad’s rally moved toward the university. Provoked by individuals posing as students inside the university, some police officers stormed the dormitory to free their fellow officers under attack. Unfortunately, the actual instigators fled, and approximately 100 students, most of whom were out-of-towners studying in the dormitories, were mistakenly beaten and arrested.

• How could non-students have entered the university? Is that even possible?

I don’t know. The arrested students, who were in very poor condition, were taken to the Shapour Criminal Investigation Department. I arrived there around 5:00 p.m. that same day. Mr. Alireza Zakani and Dr. Farhad Rahbar were also present. After examining the students, I immediately realized that they hadn't participated in any clashes.

• How could you tell just by looking at them?

They were all non-local students arrested in their underwear. They had clearly been pulled out of the dormitory while studying or cooking. Mr. Zakani had come to request a review of their cases, and Dr. Rahbar was there to intercede on their behalf.

• What ultimately happened to those students?

I gave a brief, 10-minute talk informing them that they had been arrested by mistake. I apologized and explained that Mr. Rahbar was present and thanks to his intervention and Mr. Zakani's presence, they would all be released. They were all injured. To prevent them from returning to the dormitory in that condition and to avoid negative publicity for the government, we bought them new clothes, water, and sandwiches. Their clothes were torn. After giving them food and water, we had them walk under the Qur'an before they got on two buses to leave.

• Was it that simple?

Yes. Of course, this only happened after their interrogation forms were completed and their identities were recorded. To protect the reputation of the Islamic Republic, I personally asked them not to tell anyone what had happened.

• However, video footage of the incident showed plainclothes individuals severely beating students.

It showed the people beating the students. No police or Basij forces were involved.

• So, how do you explain the video?

Following the incident, the IRGC’s Intelligence and Security Unit arrested four Basij members near the University of Tehran. They were detained overnight, interrogated, and released when it was determined that they were innocent.

• How were female detainees treated in 2009?

I personally released women who had been arrested during the unrest. Since there was trust in me, I handled their interrogations. Those who had university entrance exams were released the night before their tests, at Mr. Avayi's request, without posting bail. There were around 60 female detainees. Mr. Avayi consistently emphasized the importance of upholding the civil rights of detainees during the unrest. He was very concerned with ensuring that the rights of the accused were respected and closely followed up on it.

• It sounds like you had very intense days.

Honestly, the most difficult day of my career was June 19, 2009. By the next day, 1,100 people had been arrested. I personally released 200 to 300 of those individuals and issued detention orders for 700 to 800 others. They were held at Evin Prison, the police prevention detention center, and several other security facilities that I cannot disclose.

• Were there any individuals who were off-limits for arrest?

Yes. Based on an agreement I had with Judge Mortazavi, we did not arrest any children of martyrs during the 2009 detentions.

• Now, let's return to the Kahrizak case. How did the wave of arrests in July 2009 begin, and how did the mass transfer of detainees to Kahrizak start?

Three days before July 9, 2009, there were no riots against national security in Tehran. The city was shut down under the pretext of air pollution, and all roads leading north from Tehran were designated one-way to facilitate the exodus of residents. All security measures—including police deployment, psychological operations by state television, and political negotiations with elites—centered on one key principle: preventing any further unrest at all costs.

• Why was preventing further unrest considered so critical?

One month after the initial protests, the unrest was deepening and expanding into other segments of society, pushing the country to the brink of a major national security crisis.

• Do you think the efforts of security and government agencies were effective?

In the week leading up to July 9, 2009, all Persian-language satellite networks and social media platforms—which essentially served as the psychological operations headquarters for the sedition—focused heavily on ensuring that unrest would erupt on that date. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), Reza Pahlavi, the foreign ministries of Israel and the U.S., and other opposition groups issued statements urging people to take to the streets on July 9. All security officials—including the Minister of Intelligence, the Prosecutor General, the commanders of the IRGC and police forces, the Tehran prosecutor, and even the media—publicly warned against a repeat of the unrest on July 9.

• How, then, did those events still take place?

Roughly 30,000 security forces were deployed across designated red zones and high-risk areas. However, by the afternoon, a group of 4,000 to 5,000 people appeared equipped with backpacks, stones, keffiyehs, materials to start fires and counter tear gas, masks, recording equipment, and, in some cases, sticks or bladed weapons. They clashed with security forces in the streets around the University of Tehran. Given the heightened alert level, any presence in the area at that time was unjustifiable and interpreted as participation in the unrest. Ultimately, the clashes resulted in 12 injured police officers and 700 arrests.

• Are you suggesting that those 4,000 to 5,000 people were organized?

In any case, they came intending to confront the police.

• Who, in your opinion, could organize such a crowd in Iran's capital?

Social media platforms and satellite channels.

• Can I infer from your words that the arrest of reformist leaders had no impact on preventing further protests like the one on July 9?

Yes. Despite the arrests of key reformist political figures and members of their central party committees, the events of July 9, 2009, were not the result of an organized internal campaign. Social media played the primary role instead.

• What happened to the 700 individuals arrested on July 9?

By midnight, I had released about 400 of them after an initial screening. On July 10, I consulted with officials at Kahrizak and secured suitable space there. Given that Evin Prison lacked the appropriate capacity, I ordered the transfer of 140 detainees to Kahrizak and another 140 to Evin. Unfortunately, within five days, three detainees died due to detention conditions and mistreatment.

• You claim that you personally ordered the transfer of those 140 detainees to Kahrizak. It has been said that Mr. Mortazavi has privately asked the victims’ families for forgiveness and may issue a public apology.

However, I consider any potential apology or repentance by Mr. Mortazavi regarding my actions to be legally and religiously invalid.

• Why?

It's simple. According to his own statements, Mr. Mortazavi was on leave on July 9 and 10. Based on my confirmation and his testimony, he played no role in ordering the transfer of detainees to Kahrizak. Therefore, any apology or repentance concerning actions taken by others is meaningless and has no legal or religious consequence. I accept full responsibility for the transfer of those detainees to Kahrizak, and I maintain that Mr. Mortazavi played no role in it.

• Are you willing to repent for ordering the transfer of detainees to Kahrizak?

I believe that I fulfilled my duty to defend the Islamic Republic and the sanctity of the Supreme Leadership. I once again express my sympathy to the families of the Kahrizak victims and sincerely regret what occurred. I apologize to the Supreme Leader and ask for his forgiveness. However, I believe I did my duty and committed no wrongdoing. Therefore, I will not repent, and I consider any potential repentance by Mr. Mortazavi to be invalid, both legally and religiously.

• It has been said that a report was prepared on the condition of the detention center claiming that the situation there was not dire.

I personally prepared that report. I interrogated sixteen detainees who had been released from Kahrizak, and all of them stated that they had not been mistreated or beaten. I submitted the report to Mr. Mortazavi.

• Mr. Heidarifard, do you think the Kahrizak case would have become such a major issue if Mr. Ruholamini’s son had not been among the deceased?

No. If I had known that Mr. Ruholamini’s son was among the detainees, I would have released him immediately out of respect for his father—without hesitation. While that may not have been legally appropriate, I believe Mr. Ruholamini is a revolutionary figure whose son's case should have been handled differently, and whose reputation should have been protected, given his record and service. However, during the interrogation, his son concealed his identity. Although he was a university student, he wrote on the interrogation form that he only had a high school diploma and was unemployed.

• Why would he do that?

To protect his father’s reputation. I personally respect Mr. Ruholamini and consider myself his spiritual son. However, I believe that Mr. Ruholamini’s pursuit of the Kahrizak case, as well as his complaint against us, was against the interests of the Islamic Republic, given that the case became a propaganda tool against the government.

• What do you mean? Are you saying that someone whose child was killed should simply forgive and move on?

Let me explain. For example, that same year, Mr. Ruholamini arranged for several families of Kahrizak victims to meet with Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. During the meeting, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli recommended forgiveness and reconciliation. However, Mr. Ruholamini made the contents of the meeting public, quoting Ayatollah Javadi Amoli as saying, "Forgive the perpetrators, but not the commanders." This clearly demonstrated that Mr. Ruholamini was pursuing the case with political intent.

• How is that considered propaganda against the regime?

Let me continue. From the beginning, after learning of his son’s death, Mr. Ruholamini—along with Ahmad Tavakkoli, the head of the parliamentary health commission at the time, and Omidvar Reza'i—visited the morgue and inspected the body. During a time of national unrest when news of people or prisoners dying at the hands of government officials would provoke public outrage and be used as anti-government propaganda, he leveraged his friendship with Ezzatollah Zarqami to publicize his son’s death. He repeatedly kept the Kahrizak issue in the media spotlight, fueling large-scale public discourse and media propaganda.

• Are you saying that anything newsworthy or unpleasant constitutes propaganda against the regime?

He knew that the Kahrizak case would be used to justify a UN resolution condemning the Islamic Republic for human rights violations.

• Did you feel any anxiety after the Kahrizak case went public and the backlash began?

Yes, I did. However, because I didn’t believe I was at fault and felt that I had done my duty, I wasn’t worried about the outcome.

• Apparently, the legal proceedings favored the defendants during the early stages of the Kahrizak case.

After nearly a year and a half of investigating the case, Branch 13 of the Government Employees’ Court issued a decision to drop the charges against us. The investigator, Hojjatoleslam Moqaddam, was a devout and well-known revolutionary judge within the judiciary. However, following an appeal by Mr. Ruholamini, the case was referred to Branch 1060 of the same court. Six months later, the judge was replaced and a man named Azmayesh was appointed. During the initial hearing, he was unaware that Sa'id Mortazavi had served as Tehran’s prosecutor.

• How is that possible?

It's true. When we asked him to rule on the case, he said, "I will summon Mohsen Ruholamini and question him about the case." I had to explain that three people had died and that the plaintiffs were the victims’ families. Ultimately, he issued a 36-page decision rife with offensive and unprofessional legal language, much of which was copied from newspaper articles. This decision overturned the earlier one and sent the case to Branch 76 of the Government Employees’ Court.

• Was this reversal due to political pressure?

Not at all. It wasn't the result of any external pressure but rather due to Judge Azmayesh's poor judgment and limited legal knowledge. Shortly after issuing his decision, he took early retirement.

• After the Supreme Leader expressed regret about the Kahrizak incident, how did you—someone who considers himself a defender of the Supreme Leader—feel?

I repeat: the Supreme Leader's words, actions, and opinions carry the same weight as those of an infallible Imam. We fully accept any decision he makes regarding this case. However, note that he never said the accused should be convicted. He merely stated that any wrongdoing must be addressed, and it was. Military and judicial officials involved in the Kahrizak case were prosecuted and punished.

• You claim to accept responsibility yet refuse to repent. Why?

I accept the court’s ruling because I believe in the justice, independence, and integrity of the judiciary. Regardless of whether a ruling reflects the truth, it must be obeyed. That said, I personally consider myself innocent of the charges in the Kahrizak case, but I comply with the legal outcome.

• How did the families of the Kahrizak victims treat you during the legal proceedings?

To win over the Ruholamini family, I enlisted two senior IRGC officials to mediate.

• Who were these intermediaries?

Brigadier General Majid Hosseini, who was deputy to Mr. Ta'eb at the IRGC Intelligence Organization at the time, and Brigadier General Rahimi, who was deputy to Mohsen Reza'i at the Expediency Council and later deputy police chief under Mr. Qalibaf. Mr. Salek, who is now a member of parliament from Isfahan, also kindly intervened.

• What was the outcome?

Mr. Ruholamini rejected all these efforts. I even sent my parents, holding the Qur'an, to his house every morning for a week. Still, he refused. I told his lawyer that since the Kahrizak case had become a propaganda tool against the regime, I was willing to accept full legal and religious responsibility for his son’s death, even execution if necessary, on the condition that they stop pursuing the case in the media for the sake of the regime’s dignity. He refused.

• How did the Javadifar family come to forgive you?

I contacted the Javadifar family through a relative from Amol and visited them with several people. I kissed the father’s hand, apologized, and explained my situation. Mr. Javadifar later met with Sa'id Mortazavi in Tehran and declared in court: "We are not here to seek justice for our son’s death. We feel this trial has become a political vendetta. Therefore, I am withdrawing my complaint.” However, Mr. Ruholamini was not acting independently. He was influenced by others whose motives went beyond seeking justice, such as certain members of the Eighth Parliament. I have proof that one of them gave over 200 interviews to the media about the Kahrizak case.

• Which MP?

Mr. Tajari, for example.

• One of your punishments was a temporary suspension from judicial service. What was that like for you as a judge?

At the time, I was one of the most accomplished judges. I had a Ph.D. in law and had published two books: Judicial Adjustment of Contracts and Terrorism Studies. I served with integrity, faith, and dedication. Being suspended from the bench destroyed my personal and social life. It changed the course of my entire existence.

• Did you ever think someone like Sa'id Mortazavi, with all his power and reputation, would face such a downfall?

Not at all. The Tehran prosecutor is the most influential judicial figure after the head of the judiciary and enjoys the trust of the entire political system. I never imagined that Mortazavi would fall from grace. In fact, near the end of his tenure, the government offered him the Ministry of Justice, but Mr. Rahim Masha'i objected to his appointment.

• Why?

He believed that Mortazavi's controversies would cause too many problems.

• Did the judiciary support you or Judge Haddad during the Kahrizak case?

First, let me say that no one is above the law. However, the intense public and media pressure, mostly political and directed against Mortazavi, left us without judicial support. Additionally, Mortazavi’s appointment to a government post created another barrier to receiving institutional support from the judiciary.

• Did you try to lobby behind the scenes during the investigation?

(Long pause.) No, we didn't lobby because we never imagined the case would end this way. It didn't seem important at the time.

• After Mr. Shahrudi left the judiciary in 2009 and Mr. Larijani took over, it seems that the new leadership was not inclined to work with Mortazavi’s team.

Definitely. With the change in leadership, it made sense for someone aligned with the new chief justice to replace Mortazavi. Mortazavi eventually became Deputy Prosecutor General, but he had lost interest in staying within the judiciary.

• Were you aware of the secret video Mr. Mortazavi recorded that Mr. Ahmadinejad played in Parliament during the impeachment of the Welfare Minister?

I was standing outside the room. That video is fake. I was in Mortazavi’s office at the time and can confirm that the video was staged.

• But the footage appears natural.

It's not the way Ahmadinejad portrayed it. The claims made about Fazel Larijani were false and baseless.

• So, what is the truth?

Mr. Fazel Larijani did not commit any criminal or improper acts in this matter.

• What was the story behind the shooting incident at a gas station in Isfahan?

In April 2012, I was traveling through Isfahan with three companions. I was asleep in the front passenger seat when the driver braked suddenly to avoid hitting the car in front. A BMW with five intoxicated passengers stopped behind us and, in protest, forced our vehicle to pull over. They hurled profanities and began physically assaulting our driver. When I woke up, I saw our car had been damaged and the driver was being beaten. They even threw bricks at me. To protect myself and my companions, I fired a few warning shots into the air using my licensed firearm. I have since obtained their consent and resolved the matter.

• So, the incident didn’t happen at a gas station? 

No. It was mistakenly reported as a gas station incident. This occurred at the same time as the parliamentary impeachment of the Minister of Welfare over Saeed Mortazavi’s appointment as head of Social Security, which pushed the news into the national and international spotlight.

• Have you ever discussed Mortazavi’s controversial cases, such as the press bans or the death of Zahra Kazemi?

One of the prosecutor’s responsibilities is managing public perception through media oversight. Judicial approaches to the media and online platforms vary depending on the political environment and government policies. During the reform era, much of the Iranian press was under the control of reformist parties aligned with the president. These outlets aimed to challenge Khatami's political positions and published coordinated reports that conflicted with the state and the reformist administration itself. As the head of the special branch handling such cases, Mortazavi was at the forefront of confronting reformist media. The political climate at the time put him in that position, and it was actually the journalists who provoked such a response. Should such conditions arise again, they would be handled in the same legal manner. Let me be clear: those closures were not meant to suppress the press.

• What about the Zahra Kazemi case?

I have no information about that case.

• The summer of 2009 saw public trials for reformist figures detained after the presidential election. Who initiated those trials?

The Tehran Prosecutor’s Office made that decision. The idea was that, since the 2009 unrest involved a chain of unlawful actions by key political figures, media outlets, and ordinary people influenced by political rhetoric, they should be prosecuted together. The goal was to demonstrate how each link in the chain contributed to violations of national security.

• Mr. Heidarifard, don't you think you've become a scapegoat for Sa'id Mortazavi?

Contrary to public perception, I told the truth in my defense in the Kahrizak case. Mr. Mortazavi had no role in what happened there. The decision to send detainees to Kahrizak was mine alone.

• What is your personal opinion of Sa'id Mortazavi?

I believe he is a revolutionary, a loyal supporter of the Supreme Leader, and a devoted public servant. The way the Kahrizak case was handled was unfair to him. Regardless of the verdict in that case, I hold him in high regard.

• In your and Mr. Mortazavi’s case, a third individual was involved: Judge Haddad. His role has remained relatively obscure in the media. Why is that?

Judge Haddad is retired. He stepped down around the time he was suspended from the judiciary and has not held any judicial or government posts since then. I recall that he had a deep respect for Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. For example, he strongly opposed convicting Hossein Musavian.

• Where did you work after your suspension from the judiciary? 

After the Kahrizak incident, I spent about a year working in the Judiciary’s Legal Department as the head of the Program Development Office for Judicial Units. I worked for Ayatollah Razini, whom I consider to be one of the country's most competent, devout, and principled judges. He is both courageous and deeply connected with the people. He deserves a higher position than he currently holds.

• But that was before the suspension verdict. What did you do afterward?

I held many roles—are you going to publish them?

• Yes, sure.

After my suspension, I served as an advisor to the president’s special representative and the head of the Anti-Smuggling Task Force, Mr. Sa'id Mortazavi. There, I coordinated intelligence affairs. I was also the legal and judicial advisor to the Sobh-e Gharib Foundation under the directorship of Ali Tehrani-Moqaddam, head of the Arbitration Court of the Football Federation during Kafashian’s tenure, member of the Disciplinary Committee of Persepolis Football Club, anti-money laundering advisor to the Post Bank board, legal advisor to the Bank Maskan CEO, and legal advisor to the head of the House of the Press (Mr. Kazempur; judicial deputy at the Tehran Business Dispute Resolution Complex; executive deputy at the Tehran Dispute Resolution Complex; security advisor to the Deputy Governor of Tehran (General Baratloo); senior advisor to the Secretary General of the High Council of Iranian Expatriates (Mr. Malekzadeh); strategic advisor to the National Taxi Union; economic and security advisor to the Iranian Businesswomen's Association; and deputy head of security for the governor of Shiraz. At the same time, I was teaching at Azad University and the Police Academy.

• It seems your post-suspension schedule got even busier!

Yes, that’s correct.

• I assume the pay was pretty good.

No, the only salary I received was from the headquarters of the Anti-Smuggling Task Force.

• How long were you on the government payroll?

I remained on the payroll even after the Rohani cabinet took office. I was also a legal advisor to the CEO of Refah Bank up until 2014. However, during the Nowruz holiday that year, Mr. Rabi'i, the Minister of Welfare, ordered my removal from the bank.

• As a former judge close to Mortazavi, how would you compare him to Tehran’s current prosecutor general, Mr. Jafari Dolatabadi?

Mortazavi became Tehran’s prosecutor at a young age and initially lacked experience for the role. However, his innate leadership, courage, tireless work ethic, and dedication enabled him to establish nearly 30 criminal court complexes with approximately 700 investigators and assistant prosecutors, all with a single appointment letter. Over those seven years, he tackled several crises and successfully transitioned Tehran’s judicial system from general courts to modern prosecutor's offices.

• What about Dolatabadi?

At the time of his appointment, Mr. Dolatabadi was already an experienced criminal law expert. Due to his personal character, he exhibits remarkable independence. He has performed well in managing the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office and handling major economic corruption cases. He is a serious and morally upright individual.

• Mr. Heidarifard, the political fates of those involved in the 2009 unrest—including Mr. Ahmadi Moqaddam, Radan, Mortazavi, Judge Haddad, and yourself—have been grim. You have all been sidelined in one way or another. Why?

During the 2009 unrest, nearly 120 of the 150 methods outlined in Gene Sharp’s book on soft overthrow were carried out exactly as written. One of the key strategies was to discredit, prosecute, and eliminate those who opposed the overthrow. I believe we were unintentionally caught up in this process. Due to indecisiveness among decision-makers, as well as the media onslaught—particularly the media manipulation that played a major role in 2009—all of those who took a stand against the unrest became embroiled in legal and political controversy and were eventually marginalized. Also, every position has a shelf life—no one is meant to stay in power forever.

• However, some of the cases were related to economic issues.

In my view, the reformist movement and its supporters within certain levels of the administrative structure used their control of the media to discredit and eliminate key figures fighting the 2009 unrest by falsely accusing them of economic crimes.

• If Mr. Ahmadi Moqaddam had been effective, why did the protests continue for nearly 20 months?

The police worked hard during that time, but Mr. Ahmadi Moqaddam lacked the strategic leadership necessary to manage the crisis. Had commanders like Generals Radan and Ashtari not stepped in alongside him, the police's performance during the unrest would have been inadequate.

• What do you mean by "lacking strategic leadership"?

He struggled to unify the forces, understand the operational environment, coordinate the response, brief officers on how to handle street-level crises, and conduct field assessments. For example, even days after the arrests, he didn’t know how many detainees were held in police facilities under his command. Overall, he lacked the courage required for such a role.

• Many believe that Mortazavi’s team paid the price for supporting Ahmadinejad. Given that even conservatives have distanced themselves from Ahmadinejad, was it worth it?

Our actions in 2009 were not to defend Ahmadinejad. Everything we did, along with the security forces, was in defense of the regime. The Supreme Leader validated the election results and called for objections to be addressed through legal channels. Ahmadinejad was no longer the focal point. Our concern was protecting national integrity and public order.

• Do you agree that Ahmadinejad himself exacerbated the crisis?

As president and guardian of the Constitution, he was responsible for handling the post-election situation in a way that left no room for opposition. When unrest began, he should have prioritized national security, even if it meant sacrificing his own reputation. Instead, however, he remained indifferent, avoided mediation, dismissed ministers en masse, gave inflammatory speeches, and failed to pacify the opposition. His actions only deepened the crisis.

• Does your stance toward Ahmadinejad now align with that of other conservatives?

After the election, he was supposed to be the president of all Iranians. He should not have raised the banner of confrontation against protesters or withdrawn from the scene. From the beginning of the 2009 unrest, it was clear that he had adopted a neutral stance to attract opposition votes in the 2013 election. We fought because of him, yet he was already courting his critics.

• Why did he support Mortazavi?

He supported both Mortazavi and me after the Kahrizak case became a judicial matter.

• Why?

It was a political maneuver against his critics.

• What was he after?

He was trying to secure votes for Masha'i in the 2013 presidential election.

• Mr. Heidarifard, some figures within the conservative faction still believe that preserving the system justifies certain methods. Why does this mindset persist?

"Security" is a multidimensional and abstract concept that can be interpreted in many ways. On one level, security is achieved by gaining the trust and satisfaction of the people. However, security also has harder, physical aspects that sometimes require security, intelligence, and law enforcement measures to maintain.

• More than eight years have passed since those events. In your view, what was the main cause of the unrest in 2009 and 2010?

I believe the primary cause of those events—and the subsequent serious political, economic, and security damage, including the tragic Kahrizak incident—was the strategic failure of key institutions to accurately assess the situation. The lack of preventive security planning, as well as the tacit support or silence of a significant segment of the country’s political elite who were discontented themselves, all contributed to the unfolding crisis.

• How did your family, especially your wife, react when events like your suspension happened?

My wife is a judge and holds a master's degree in law. She is the sister of two martyrs. Her sister is a judge with a Ph.D. in law. One of her brothers is a judge, and three others hold Ph.D.s in management. Her father, Haj Abbas, is a devout and respected man in Isfahan known for his piety and loyalty to the Islamic Republic. My wife is a principled, capable, and trustworthy judge. However, my actions and the controversy surrounding me have hurt her reputation and that of her family. Understandably, they are disappointed in me. Still, I love her very deeply.

• What was the atmosphere like at home when the deaths of detainees in Kahrizak were revealed?

My wife was very upset. I was listed as the eighth person sanctioned by the European Union in May 2012, which saddened her greatly.

• As a judge, what was her opinion of your trial?

Because she knew the truth, she opposed my prosecution. However, we both accept the rule of law.

• Was your marriage arranged?

We were classmates. We both volunteered in the Basij student group at the University of Judicial Sciences. We have a daughter named Reyhaneh who was born in 2007.

• Mr. Heidarifard, wouldn't you like to apologize to the public for the tragic events at Kahrizak?

(Silence.) I ask forgiveness from the Supreme Leader and the people of Iran.